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This thesis focuses on one battalion of infantrymen who trained for, and served during, 
the D-Day landings and north-west Europe campaign. Battalion histories in this detail 
are rare, as they usually form part of self-serving and uncritical histories produced by 
the parent regiment. This small unit acts as a microcosm of the infantry of the line 
during the period, reflecting the typical high casualty rates and long periods on the front 
line. The existing sparse evidence about the 2"d Battalion was enhanced by interviews 
with veterans of the unit, which proved central to the study. Their memories revealed a 
wealth of rich and previously unknown detail. 
Existing secondary literature is critical of the battalion's, and 3id Division's, efforts on 
D-Day and the units of the 3`d Division were dubbed `The Unspectaculars' in the press. 
These criticisms are challenged in the first three chapters of the thesis, which examine 
the level of training the infantrymen received; the battalion's performance on D-Day; 
and the progress of the battalion from D-Day onwards. The performance of the battalion 
is argued to have been solid yet unspectacular for much of the campaign. However in 
February 1945 came its spectacular moment, at the Battle of the Bridge. Chapter Four 
and the Afterword address what life was like for the infantrymen of the battalion and 
assess what happened to these soldiers when they returned home, since for many, the 
war did not end when Germany surrendered. 
The thesis provides a social and cultural history of the 2"d Battalion, albeit within the 
military sphere. While individual memories remain an important source, the narrative of 
the battalion also forms a group memory, particularly focusing on one outstanding 
officer, Major `Banger' King. A group record is also apparent during commemorative 
events, in particular the 600' anniversary of D-Day, in June 2004. 
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Introduction. 
Part One - Aims of the thesis 
The aim of this thesis is principally to examine the actions of the 2 °d Battalion East 
Yorkshire Regiment during the Second World War in order to establish its achievements 
and failings, and to consider whether or not the 2d Battalion fought an `unspectacular' 
war. Lt Col Renison, the Commanding Officer of the 2°d Battalion from October 1944, 
and its Second-in-Command from the previous July, noted in his memoir that the 3`a 
Division had been dubbed `The Unspectaculars' in the press and remarked on the 
adverse reaction of his soldiers to the general lack of publicity about the actions of the 
Division, recalling, `the troops felt this silence rather keenly'. ' The word `spectacular' is 
used in this context to denote an action or a campaign characterised by a successful 
military outcome under circumstances in which a unit would not usually be expected to 
prevail. A spectacular action would therefore be one in which the unit managed to take 
an objective against all the odds, or continued to hold an objective against counter- 
attacks by superior numbers of enemy troops. Of course, this definition assumes that the 
two forces were equally matched in calibre, a situation that was not always the case 
during the north-west Europe campaign. During the Second World War, instances of 
actions falling into the category of `spectacular' would include the heroic but ultimately 
doomed defence of Oosterbeek / Arnhem by 1" Airborne Division, and the siege of 
Tobruk from April to December 1941, when two Brigades of 9`h Australian Division 
held off repeated attacks. 
However the usual actions of standard infantry battalions would not be classed as 
spectacular since it would be a failure of command if soldiers found themselves in such 
situations on a regular basis. Indeed, military doctrine subscribes to the idea that under 
normal circumstances, battles should take place with superior numbers of forces than 
1 Colonel J. D. W. Renison DSO TD, Experiences in BLA with the 2"d Battalion The East Yorkshire 
Regiment, IWM (PPIMCR/248) p. 180. 
5 
m 
those deployed by the enemy, to ensure the greatest chance of success, as described by 
2nd Battalion officer, Major Clive Crauford: 
When you are attacking it doesn't matter what you are 
attacking, you must bring to bear a superior force of 
attack. If you are attacking a section you use a platoon. If 
you are attacking a platoon you use a company. If you are 
attacking a company you use two companies, or a major 
battalion. 2 
In this thesis the performance of the 2°d Battalion, which formed part of a standard, 
regular, county regiment, is measured against the yardstick of the aforementioned 
definition of `spectacular'. 
The limited existing records regarding the battalion meant that the experiences of the 
infantrymen have been approached using oral history. In so doing, the research aimed to 
give the soldiers of the battalion a voice; a voice which has been denied them in the more 
than sixty years since the war's end. The infantrymen of this battalion were initial assault 
troops for the D-Day landings on Sword Beach. The 5v' Battalion of the same regiment 
fulfilled a similar role on Gold Beach, which means that one-third of the initial assault 
troops for the British-allocated beaches were from the East Yorkshire Regiment. Yet 
references to the 2"d Battalion in particular are sparse in the wealth of secondary literature 
which continues to be produced to satisfy the on-going curiosity about this operation. 
Authors writing new books on Operation Overlord have relied on oft-quoted sources, 
leading the battalion to become overlooked at each new major anniversary. The advanced 
ages of those taking part in D-Day meant that this position was unlikely to alter, unless 
new primary sources were created. 
The thesis also aims to convey what it was like to serve in the infantry during the north- 
west Europe campaign. The infantry was, and is, known as the PBI, or `Poor Bloody 
Infantry', for the reason that these men, the `footsloggers', serve at the `sharp end', 
fully exposed to the physical elements and dangers of war. Anthony Farrar-Hockley 
2 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5'4 November 2000. 
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argues that, `of all the military Arms, the skills required of the infantry are the most 
numerous and varied. Its members must be skilled in reconnaissance and sniping, in 
closing with the enemy in open country, woods or urban areas. They must be foremost 
in and the mainstay of the defensive line against enemy attack' .3 At some point the 
infantry will always have to take the ground and consolidate it, despite the hazards. 
The 2 °Q Battalion was a typical infantry battalion of the period, initially comprising 800 
men, but with numbers boosted for the D-Day operation. Of these 800, only half served 
in the rifle companies and the remainder were, for example, drivers, regimental 
policemen, and clerks. The high casualty rate during the campaign meant that the 
riflemen of the 2 °d Battalion were turned over two and a half times, as the majority of 
those injured served with the rifle companies in the front line. Infantry warfare differs 
from service in the armoured corps, or in the various corps that service the front line, 
such as the Service, Ordnance or Pioneer Corps, because other servicemen did not 
endure close-up combat, or prolonged periods under shellfire as part of their usual lives 
in the front line. The strains of infantry life were consequently very great, possibly no 
greater than serving in an armoured regiment during the campaign, but certainly more 
dangerous than serving at the rear. 
The thesis focuses on a battalion, a relatively small unit, in preference to a regiment or 
division, because to examine the role of a regiment during the period would entail 
considering perhaps desert warfare, combat in the Far East, prisoner of war experience 
and Home Defence, in addition to service in Europe. To interview veterans across this 
spectrum would not enable useful conclusions to be drawn. Likewise, to consider one 
Division would necessitate studying many different units, all with their own areas of 
specialty. In studying one, typical battalion of the period, it is possible to put forward 
arguments about service in the infantry during the north-west Europe campaign. This 
3 Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Infantry Tactics 1939-1945 (London, 1976) pp. 7-8. 
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study is primarily a social history of the infantry, however the inter-disciplinary aspects 
are evident. In considering the training and progress of the 2°d Battalion, I have also 
delved into the field of military history. The concept of individual memory enters the 
realm of psychology and, of course, the study of leadership, how groups operate, and 
the relevance of class are studied within sociology. 
There are four chapters to the thesis and in each there is an exploration of the theme of 
memory, on both an individual and group basis. The first chapter considers the issue of 
the training of the 2 °d Battalion soldiers in readiness for active service. I compare the 
training of those involved in the D-Day landings, with that of the later reinforcements, 
and consider the preparation of new officers in light of the criticisms of their training 
within secondary literature. The memories of the interviewees will show that all 
considered their training to be adequate for the tasks they faced. However the 
interviewees who were trained in Scotland, prior to the D-Day landings, spoke of a 
breadth and depth to their training, which the reinforcements could not have received in 
the short time set aside for that purpose. The officers reveal that their training is 
comprehensive and my argument is that it was largely the high casualty rate that 
deprived the officers of sufficient time to settle into their roles, and lead effectively, 
even more than a lack of quality preparation, which led to problems during the 
campaign. 
The second chapter considers how D-Day has been viewed within secondary literature 
since the end of the war. The trend has been a shift in the way the operation has been 
perceived, from merely the start of a longer-term campaign, to an historic day 
deserving of a wealth of literature in its own right. This wealth of literature has not 
included the 2 °d Battalion to any meaningful extent, and the second part of the chapter 
sets out to explain why that might be so. The performance of the 2nd Battalion has been 
criticised comprehensively by the Commandos who landed on Sword Beach, and these 
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criticisms have become accepted as fact, due to the lack of opportunity on the part of 
the 2nd Battalion infantrymen to set out what their roles were on the day. I examine the 
arguments and conclude that the Commandos were over-critical, although it is possible 
to establish where the misunderstandings may have arisen. 
The third chapter considers the performance of the 2'd Battalion in comparison to the 
other battalions in the brigade, as well as to other divisions in action during the 
campaign, to establish whether the performance of the battalion was `unspectacular'. 
The memories of the individual interviewees confirm the official details in the 
Battalion War Diary and Lt Col Renison's memoir and add another, dense layer of 
recollections. 4 These memories are considered in more detail in Chapter Four, which 
looks at life for the 2 °d Battalion infantrymen and its strains during the campaign. The 
details provided, form overlapping layers of memory which will clearly show the 
difficulties associated with service in the front line. 
My final section looks at what happened to the interviewees post-war and how they 
acclimatised to returning home. This Afterword considers the preponderance of 
interviewees adversely affected by their memories of service life and how incapacitating 
their experiences have proved for some. I then briefly examine how the group record of 
the 2nd Battalion has been laid down, and reinforced, at group reunions. 
Part Two - Existing literature and sources. 
The two main written primary sources that exist for the 2 °d Battalion East Yorkshire 
Regiment, are the Battalion War Diary, 5 and the memoir of Lt Col Renison. Both 
documents reveal little of the individual soldier, how he lived and, in particular, how he 
coped with the strains of the battlefield. 
4 This reflects Lummis' assertion that `documentary and oral evidence are more frequently 
complementary than contradictory', in Listening to History. The authenticity of oral evidence (London, 
1987) p. 82. 
5 Held at the National Archives (WO 987/1). 
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During the Second World War, the War Diaries were often written away from the front- 
line action and after the battle had finished. The record depended on the individual 
writer and it was that person's decision what was included or omitted. In the case of the 
2nd Battalion during this period, the duty usually devolved upon the Intelligence Officer, 
although the overall responsibility for its completion and submission to the War Office 
remained that of the Adjutant. The purpose of the War Diary was to record a true 
account of operations to counter possible rumours, and to allow lessons to be learned for 
purposes of future training. 6 As the writing up of the War Diary was one duty among 
many, how assiduously it was completed depended on the time available and the 
inclination of the person assigned to that task. As a military document, few details about 
the personnel are recorded in the 2nd Battalion War Diary, other than leave 
arrangements, as personal information fell outside its remit; a rare exception is the 
recording of the death of Major `Banger' King, a `blow', as he was `loved by all'. 
Almost entire months are recorded as `general routine' with `nothing to report', except 
weather conditions or leave arrangements. It is apparent that entries were regularly 
made well after the event and sometimes for a few days or a week at a time. 
The difference in the level of detail provided is clearly evidenced. D-Day, which could 
be argued to be the major action of the 2 °d Battalion, is sparsely treated and yields few 
clues as to the progress of the different companies. Naturally, the action was confused 
and the battalion headquarters took some time to be established on the day. In contrast, 
the battles in April 1945 were recorded in great detail, although their importance was 
not as significant militarily. This source therefore cannot be considered in isolation, as it 
does not provide a complete account of events. 
The memoir of Lt Col Renison is an extremely detailed account of the progress of the 
battalion and proved very useful. However it too, concentrates on the performance of 
6 Instructions for the Preparation and Disposal of War Diaries 1944. Copy held at the Duke of 
Wellington's Regimental Archive, Halifax. 
' 2" Battalion War Diary 16-17th April 1945. 
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the battalion at company level, as well as matters of strategy. Lt Col Renison's memoir 
proved a vital document in `fleshing-out' the battles and confirming the details and 
gives a more in-depth impression of which actions were the most exhausting, confusing 
and difficult to prosecute. Written in April 1946, the memoir uses positive language 
throughout. The most accepting of the circumstances was when he wrote `the battalion 
as a whole were in a pretty bad way' 8 in describing the atrocious weather conditions 
near Troam, which led to flooded slit trenches in which the troops were forced to 
remain. It was, of course, produced with the benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of 
the war's successful military outcome. However he provides a more detailed version of 
events, outlines the difficulties of being in command during the battles, and offers an 
impression of the level and quality of the opposition facing the battalion at each stage. 
The two main secondary sources which detail the actions of the 2°d Battalion during the 
Second World War are firstly, the Regimental History, and secondly, a history of the 3«' 
British Infantry Division, the Division to which the 2°d Battalion belonged during the 
period. Both have their limitations. The Regimental History9 was published in 1952 at 
the behest of a Regimental Committee. A thorough and respectful account, it was 
written by an officer who served with the regiment. A detailed factual book, it does still 
contain minor inconsistencies and makes much of celebrating the role of the regiment in 
action. The circumstances under which the study was commissioned go a long way 
towards providing an explanation for its overwhelmingly positive slant. The foreword to 
the book, written by Brigadier R. J. Springhall OBE, who was the incumbent Colonel of 
the Regiment, states: 
Although this History has as its main purpose the placing 
on record of the activities of all units of the Regiment 
during the War, it is also designed to do honour to those 
who fought in its ranks, and to be a memorial of those who 
8 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 29. 
9 Lt Col P. R. Nightingale OBE, A History of the East Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of York's Own) in the 
War of 1939-45 (Howden, 1998). 
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gave their lives either whilst serving with the Regiment or 
with other units. 
An honourable sentiment, but one which does not allow for the voice of the individual 
in action, what it was actually like for those in the frontline, or for the display of any 
human characteristics which may have been detrimental to the Regiment. Lt Col 
Nightingale found that the official War Diaries were scanty, even dubbing some as 
`nothing but a bad joke"° yet managed to produce a testament to the East Yorkshire 
Regiment which outlined only the achievements, leaving the reader to assume that as a 
regiment it remained a disciplined and successful force at all times. There was no room 
within this history for individual acts or viewpoints as it was not the intended purpose of 
the book to consider the individual beyond the group setting. The only individual 
contributions were those of the Commanding Officers. 
Prior to this Regimental history, an account of the 3rd British Infantry Division, was 
written by Norman Scarfe. l ' Although very accurate factually, when referring to 8t' 
Brigade the author usually outlines the movements of the South Lancashire or Suffolk 
Regiments, for whom more information was available. The 2 °d Battalion is mentioned 
but less frequently, due principally to the dearth of records. Two later Divisional 
histories are useful sources, but share the same difficulty associated with Scarfe's 
account. 12 
There is also a lack of 2 °d Battalion sources within the wealth of secondary literature 
concerning D-Day. To take one example, in D Day - Piercing the Atlantic Wall, 
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Robert Kershaw quotes only one 2nd Battalion source, attributed to an earlier work by 
'° lbi ., Preface p. viii. " Norman Scarfe, Assault Division. A History of the 3'd Division from the Invasion of Normandy to the 
Surrender of Germany (London, 1947). 
12 Robin McNish, Iron Division (London, 1978) and Patrick Delaforce, Monty's Ironsides: From the 
Normandy Beaches to Bremen with 3'1 Division (London, 1999). Delaforce's book includes some oral 
accounts, but these had to encompass all the units in the 3"d Division, therefore the 2d Battalion input is 
limited. 
13 Robert Kershaw, D-Day - Piercing the Atlantic Wall (Annapolis, Md, 1994). 
12 
Philip Warner. 14 The shortage of available accounts in the public domain means 
therefore, that existing ones have to be `recycled' for new literature. There are four main 
personal accounts15 quoted in secondary literature, and three of them are held at the 
IWM, together with a small collection of letters written by the Battalion Second-in- 
Command, Major `Banger' King. 
Visual references to the battalion's actions on D-Day are equally sparse, as there were 
few external recorders of events on Sword Beach during the initial landing period. A 
small number came in with the second wave troops and it was these men who recorded 
the few photograph and film images available of the chaos presiding at the top of the 
beach, as well as the film of the 2 °° Battalion HQ Company flag being carried ashore. 
There were casualties among these men of the Army Film and Photographic Unit. Wilf 
Todd recalled the death of a photographer alongside him during the assault, 16 and Sgt 
O'Neill, a cameraman, was wounded. However, the Commandos received good 
coverage as a photographer, Captain Leslie Evans, was on board Brigadier Lord Lovat's 
LCI'7 (S) 517 and Sgts George Laws and Ian Grant were responsible for film coverage. 
As a result, much of the surviving film footage depicts the actions of the Commando 
troops during D-Day. In respect of the 2 °d Battalion, there are no surviving photographs 
of the initial assault phase, only of the follow-up period, and certainly nothing to rival 
the evocative photographs of troops sheltering behind beach obstacles while under fire, 
taken by Robert Capa on Omaha Beach. This then was the main reason for undertaking 
responsible research and interviewing in this area; to fill in the substantial gaps left by 
existing sources and to use oral techniques as a check and balance system for those 
sources, in order to reconstruct the history of the 2 id Battalion. 
14 Philip Warner, The D Day Landings (London, 1980). 
's The accounts found in secondary literature are that of Clive Crauford, Jack Pearse, Hugh Bone and Ron 
Major. Dan Van Der Vat's book D-Day. The Greatest Invasion -a People's History (New York, 2003) included a short extract about Peter Brown. 
16 Wilf Todd recalled, `A photographer from one of the newsreels climbed up at the side of us to take 
some film and he was shot right between the eyes', during his interview l' May 1999. 
17 LCI - Landing Craft Infantry. 
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We cannot assume however, that a more accurate or full account can be obtained from 
an individual infantryman involved in the action, because grand strategy was not his 
concern. Usually a soldier would only be able to see what was going on in the 
immediate vicinity; he was permitted no more information than the next objective, 
whether it be a section of woods or a farmhouse. What he can give us therefore is 
personal; the weapon he carried, what he ate, things he can remember seeing or taking 
part in. It is precisely the human aspect that current written sources regarding the 
battalion are unable to provide. 
On studying more general secondary literature pertaining to the Second World War, in 
particular, the north-west Europe campaign, it is apparent that the 2°d Battalion East 
Yorkshire Regiment receives few direct references. The scale of the Normandy 
campaign, and the sheer number of individual units taking part, mean that authors are 
largely forced to write of higher formation levels than regiments or battalions. The 
activities of the 3`d Division do rate inclusion within the literature, but any discussion of 
the progress of the Normandy campaign invariably concentrates, in the British sector, 
on armoured thrusts, and thereby, armoured regiments. 
This then, is the extent of the information available about the 2 °d Battalion in the public 
domain. The Museum of the East Yorkshire Regiment, which was amalgamated into the 
Prince of Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire, is in York. However details of the 2nd 
Battalion during the Second World War are confined to two large scrapbooks and back 
copies of `The Snapper', the Regimental magazine, held in the Regimental Archive. 
To produce a history of the 2 °d Battalion that was unfettered by the need to show the 
battalion in an overwhelmingly positive light, and could focus on the battalion rather 
than a higher formation level, the best route was to interview men of the battalion. By 
following the oral history route, interviewees could be asked what serving with the 
battalion was really like. Did the Regimental History reveal an accurate history of the 
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battalion? What was missed from the Battalion War Diary, and what could the 
interviewees remember that could not be found in those short daily entries? In answer to 
this latter point, the interviewees were to provide a wealth of human detail, 
enlightening, entertaining, and sometimes tragic. 
Although the interviews provide the human element missing from the official history, it 
was interesting to discover that when interviewees were asked to contribute written 
records of their experiences to a museum in their training area of Inverary, these 
accounts were more detailed factually than their oral interviews. A five page account by 
Wilf Todd, 18 outlines the differences in training once it became clear the battalion 
would be used as leading assault troops on D-Day. From concentration on fitness levels, 
after which his girlfriend Mary `was quite surprised at the fact that I had lost a lot of 
body-fat and replaced it with muscle', the emphasis changed and `we spent more time 
on exercises on a Brigade level... Most of the time, three or four hours in bed at night 
was the norm because we always seemed to be just falling into bed after finishing an 
exercise or getting up in the early hours to start one'. The oral interviews have not 
revealed the interviewees' fatigue, although the written account and letters do. It is 
apparent that the respondents were more anxious to stress their extraordinary fitness and 
the different types of training undertaken during the period, rather than how tiring this 
strenuous training proved. Perhaps too, the interviewees compared youthful good health 
and physical well-being to their current states of health. 
The difficulties in assessing the performance of the 2 °d Battalion were most apparent in 
the D-Day and north-west Europe campaign chapters. In respect of D-Day, to achieve a 
clearer idea of what happened to the battalion members, and how successful they were 
in achieving their objectives, I studied 26 accounts from the participants in the landings. 
Some of the nine written accounts are very short, others are rich in detail. Several of the 
18 A copy of Wilf Todd's account was reproduced in the 2d Battalion Veterans' Group newsletter 2003. 
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interviews are also sketchy, where memories are poor, due to advanced age or illness. 
Others among the interviewees possess extremely good memories, in one or two cases 
almost rivalling the level of recall reproduced in Hugh Bone's letter home. 19 This letter, 
held at the IWM, recorded the progress of events on D-Day, in rich and thick detail, as 
remembered by Bone, who was at that time the Battalion Signals Officer. It proved a 
challenge to access further accounts due to the dearth of records in the public domain, 
the small number of men from the battalion taking part in the D-Day landings and the 
advanced ages of the surviving veterans. The usual level of a hundred men per company 
was boosted for the initial assault, although records no longer exist of the exact figure. 
Based on the realistic training operations held prior to D-Day, it is probable that the 
total number of infantrymen involved within the four Rifle Companies in the first wave 
was approximately 460. This figure included the reserves, and encompassed a small 
number of stretcher-bearers, runners, and Regimental Policemen, although half of this 
number landed 20 minutes after H-Hour. From the total, 60 `other ranks' were killed on 
the day, with a further 137 wounded, which constitutes a high casualty rate. Others, who 
survived the landings, were killed later on in the campaign. 
The casualty rate meant that access to surviving participants proved difficult. More than 
half of the accounts, 15, have been obtained by means of interviewing, and were 
therefore recorded between 55 and 60 years after the event. The remainder have been 
obtained by reference to the IWM, SWWEC, The Liddle Collection at the University of 
Leeds, 2nd Battalion Veterans' Group newsletters, and relatives of the participants. Only 
two accounts were written shortly after the event, those of Lt Hugh Bone and Lt Arthur 
Oates, both officers. Of course, the men who comprised the `other ranks' were not 
permitted to keep diaries or write letters home which included military details. On the 
rare occasions that primary documents are available, it can be frustrating that further 
19 Hugh Bone, letter to mother dated 4`h July 1944 IWM (87/31/1). 
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research to clarify and expand the accounts, cannot be undertaken via the donor. The 
diary of Pte Harold A Rowland, 2 °d Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment, is held at the 
Second World War Experience Centre and reads: 
4 June Church service on board. 
5 June Cleaned all weapons. Received invasion maps. 
6 June D Day. Left boat at 6.5am. LCA hit beach at 
7.20am. Captured beach. Became a casualty. 
7 June On board LCT converted to hospital ship. 
8 June Docked at Tilbury. Arrived Romford hospital 2° 
It would be more rewarding historically if we could ask this infantryman about his 
injury, the company he was in and what he was ordered to do, as well as his impressions 
on landing, which is one of the main strengths of oral history. Certainly, for the 
purposes of my analysis of the battalion's performance on D-Day, `captured beach' 
does not reveal anything other than the operation's ultimately successful conclusion. 
As approximately 460 2 °d Battalion men took part in the initial assault, it would appear 
that examining just 26 accounts would inevitably fail to provide a cohesive view of the 
events of that crucial operation, especially as they have been provided by, among others, 
signallers, drivers, a Regimental Policeman and only a few from the first wave ashore. 
However from these accounts it did prove possible to formulate an historical opinion on 
the 2nd Battalion's performance. It is rare to find this number of accounts from one unit, 
other than recollections supplied by the American forces, particularly from Omaha 
Beach, which have assumed importance within secondary literature due to the high 
casualty rate and difficulties experienced during the landing. The secondary literature on 
D-Day is forced to adopt a `scattergun' approach in response to the fragmented nature 
of the available accounts and is unable to offer a comprehensive overview of individual 
units. Of course authors would argue that such an approach is necessary to ensure 
inclusion of all the different units and services involved. However the reality is that this 
approach is the only one available to authors. These difficulties render the 2 °d Battalion 
20 Pte Harold Rowland diary SWWEC (2000.631). 
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accounts valuable historically on a group basis rather more than individually, although 
this is not to denigrate the individual importance of some of the recollections by the 
interviewees, whose memories have not been included previously. Nor is it the case in 
this instance that the written accounts are richer in, or provide more, detail. Two of 
those interviewed21 provided particularly full accounts of their experiences on D-Day 
and were of necessity interviewed on several occasions in order to capture their 
memories of the period. 
Several accounts have been included singly within existing secondary literature but 
have not been considered on a group basis until now. u It is only when all the 
recollections are considered collectively that useful conclusions can be drawn. Having 
considered the 2nd Battalion oral interviews and memoirs, it is apparent that in some 
areas the accounts reinforce what is already readily available from memoirs in the 
public domain and edited passages in secondary literature regarding the sights, sounds 
and general impressions of the beach. Many recalled the terrific noise from the naval 
shellfire, the sinking of the Svenner, 23 the seasickness aboard the landing craft, the 
casualties in the water and the difficulty of landing among the mined beach obstacles. 
However, more importantly, the individual accounts vary from those currently 
available, in offering up details which only one particular infantryman of the battalion 
noticed; the out-of-the-ordinary episodes, the humorous, bizarre or tragic incidents that 
have remained vivid in recall because of their extraordinariness. For example, Alf 
Ackroyd recalled seeing a German prisoner running up the ramp of a landing craft 
desperately trying to board an Allied vessel to be taken to England. However `as he got 
21 Wilf Todd and Alf Ackroyd had particularly detailed memories of the D-Day operation. 
u For example, Clive Crauford's written account can be read in The D-Day Landings, Philip Warner 
pp. 172-174, and Jack Pearse's account is in We Remember D-Day by Frank and Joan Shaw (London, 
1994) pp. 264-265. 
'A Norwegian destroyer which was hit by a torpedo and formed a V-shape as it sank. It was this shape 
that remained as a clear memory, and is also noted in recollections of others landing on Sword Beach. 
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to the top, one of the commandos carrying his bicycle swung round, gave him an 
uppercut, and knocked him straight into the water' 24 
Post-war, Harold Isherwood suffered from health problems after witnessing a shell 
`landing among some officers and there were limbs and torsos blown high into the air. 
A small pebble went into my arm, which I have to this day'. 5 Wilf Todd recalled one of 
the humorous episodes when he spoke of being hungry while in a shell crater, waiting 
for the order to move: `Our section commander, Corporal Jim Watts was with me and 
when I offered him some chocolate he said "What a bloody time to be eating 
chocolate! "'. Earlier in the interview Wilf had recalled the landing craft next to his 
detonating a mine and exploding. The memory that had remained was of `a helmet 
going up in the air. I knew it didn't belong to one of our lads because we'd all been 
issued with D-Day helmets which came down the sides a bit. This particular one 
spinning up in the air was an ordinary flat one'. 26 
As well as the small details, some of these individual accounts, when analysed together, 
provide a more cohesive view of the attacks on the battalion's objectives of `Sole' and 
`Daimler'. Moreover, the accounts give a comprehensive overview of the conditions on 
the beach, the orders the infantrymen had been given beforehand, and the successful 
conclusion to the initial assault. However, for those interviewed it became apparent that 
D-Day, despite being considered momentous, both at the time and in retrospect, was 
just one day in action and for some, it was not out of the ordinary in terms of the part 
they played in the clearing of defences. For those who went on to serve during the 
subsequent weeks and months, there were other memorable battles, near-misses and 
personal injuries. This explains why, on several occasions, the events of D-Day took up 
a small proportion of the interview's duration. 
24 Extract from interview with Alf Ackroyd 1& February 2002. 
23 From Harold Isherwood's application for a War Pension, undated. Copy supplied by Mrs Isherwood 
11th September 1999. 
26 Both quotes are extracts from interview with Wilf Todd 20`h March 1999. 
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In respect of the period between D-Day and V. E. Day, the interviews proved central to 
providing an understanding of the overall north-west Europe campaign, and the 2°d 
Battalion's role within it. Only by considering the harshness of the physical conditions, 
the escalating strain and the lack of rest, can a proper judgement be made on how the 
battalion performed during the period. No matter how good the leadership, the battles 
were fought by individuals as part of a team effort, and how the individual performed, 
or even if they performed at all, bearing in mind the conditions, is crucial. Sir Robin 
Dunn MC27 wrote that Eric Cooper-Key of the Royal Norfolk Regiment revealed to him 
that after two months, when his battalion had been turned over with 100 per cent 
casualties, he was content if he, his platoon commanders and sergeants and perhaps half 
a dozen men of his company, reached the objective in an attack. The rest would appear 
over the next twenty minutes or so following the worst being over. `Lagging behind' to 
this extent has not been recorded in the 2 °d Battalion interviews and literature although a 
reluctance to leave the safety of the slit trenches on occasion, has been noted in Chapter 
One. However, honesty to the extent offered by Cooper-Key, albeit laudable, is rare 
within primary sources about infantry performance from this period, as it also implies 
criticism of the `other ranks' and thereby his own battalion and regiment. 
Pride in one's own regiment and its achievements are paramount, and can result in 
careful `editing' of War Diary entries and an unwillingness to record less creditable 
events within interviews. As Passerini noted, interviews can show up the selectivity and 
omissions of the official documents. 8 Certainly some interviewees requested that 
names and events would not be revealed, despite the seemingly innocuous nature of the 
incident to the outside observer and the passage of time since the events occurred. This 
would usually happen after the interviewee read the completed transcript - seeing an 
incident written down afforded the interviewee the opportunity to reflect on what had 
27 Sir Robin Dunn MC, Sword and Wig - memories of a Lord Justice (London, 1993) p. 75. 28 Luisa Passerini, Fascism in Popular Memory (Cambridge, 1987). 
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been said and thereby assess its potential impact on other readers. Examples of `self- 
censorship' extend not just to the interviewees but also impact on the formal battalion 
records, as well as the regimental and divisional histories of this, and other battalions 29 
The process of self-censorship began even during the war itself, as soldiers decided 
which incidents to discuss and which should be `forgotten'. Interviewees remain largely 
protective of their officers and asked for those involved in particular incidents, such as a 
safe-break, to remain anonymous, for fear of upsetting the officer's family and 
tarnishing his military reputation. 
Of course it would be extremely difficult to cover up events such as a mutiny or a mass 
unauthorised retreat during a battle within a Battalion War Diary. However with the use 
of particular vocabulary it is possible to highlight the creditable performances at the 
expense of the less noteworthy. Within the interview process, silences can mean either 
lost memories or deliberate exclusion. If all those involved subscribe to the exclusion 
then the silencing of the unacceptable is successful. As Gittens reminds us, `silence and 
power work hand in hand' 30 
Part Three - Issues of Methodology; Oral History and Memory. 
It has been some years since apologies needed to be made for basing academic work on 
the foundation of oral history. Critics focus on the unreliability of oral sources in 
comparison to written documents, and consider it as secondary in importance to formal 
records. 1 Sceptics also point to the anecdotal nature of the evidence, the vagaries of 
memory and the undue influence of the interviewer in creating the material. These 
arguments have been countered vigorously in the wealth of literature regarding the 
discipline of oral history, firstly by Paul Thompson in The Voice of the Past, but also by 
29 A rare example of an admission of early problems in Normandy came from the divisional historian of 
the 5l' Division, J. B. Salmud, quoted in Carlo d'Este, Decision in Normandy. The Unwritten Story of 
Montgomery and the Allied Campaign (London, 1983). 
30 Diana Gittens, `Silences. The case of a psychiatric hospital', in Narrative and Genre. Contexts and 
Types of Communication, eds. Mary Chamberlain and Paul Thompson (New Brunswick, 2004) p. 46. 
Arthur Marwick, The Nature of History (London, 1989). For a discussion of these criticisms see Nigel 
de Lee, `Oral History and British Soldiers' Experience of Battle in the Second World War', eds. Addison 
and Calder, in Time to Kill. The Soldier's Experience of War in the West (London, 1997). 
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leading exponents including Alessandro Portelli. It is evident that we cannot directly 
access the past to discover the historical `truth' of an event. Different interviewees will 
also vary in their ability to recall an event in any great detail. However it is equally clear 
that, as Lummis argues, long-term memory does not inevitably fade. 2 This study will 
show that some interviewees retain an extraordinary ability to recall precise factual 
details. More importantly, many more interviewees provide compelling accounts which, 
when taken together, provide `layers' of memory that depict a group experience, which 
could be detected at veteran reunions. The interviews proved vital in achieving a greater 
understanding of the battalion during the campaign. Although they were used to 
corroborate or enhance existing documentary sources in the first instance, their ultimate 
strength lay in revealing new, and richly detailed facets of life in the battalion and its 
performance. 
The interviews were with thirty eight veterans of the battalion, as well as six wives and 
widows. I also corresponded with two of the Canadian `officers on loan' to the 
battalion. One further officer agreed to be interviewed but not recorded, as he 
considered that due to the passage of time his memory was unreliable, and that he could 
have told me stories which happened to others, genuinely believing that they had 
happened to himself. One enormously positive element of the interview process was the 
discovery of many associated documents, held by the veterans and their families, which 
were made available in order to facilitate the research. These documents included 
private collections of letters, memoirs, photographs, maps and a training video of the 
Schaddenhof farm battle. The building up of personal contacts encouraged the sense of 
ownership of their past by ex-battalion members and their partners, and as a result of the 
interview process, some of the veterans decided to write their own memoirs. 
32 Trevor Lummis, Listening to History. The authenticity of oral evidence, p. 118. 
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The interviewees were traced through various sources. The main source was the 2nd 
Battalion Veterans' Group who issued quarterly newsletters and advised members about 
my search for interviewees. In recording the group's approval of my research by 
mentioning it in the newsletter, veterans knew of me before I contacted them. As group 
members also knew I was contacting others on the list, this acted as a check and balance 
on the content of the interviews. 
Additional interviewees were discovered through the Regimental Association's 
membership list, although these were relatively few in number. Further sources came 
from an appeal on the Service Pals page on Ceefax, and through the website of the 
Second World War Experience Centre in Leeds, which displayed details of the research. 
Of those who made contact through the website, the initial approach came from the 
veterans' families. By far the most reassuring aspect of the interview process was that 
some veterans passed on my details to their ex-battalion friends, thereby demonstrating 
it had been considered a positive experience. For this study, no sampling of respondents 
needed to be made, the onus was to interview every 2 °d Battalion veteran who was 
available and could be traced. In this way, I aimed to reduce any potential bias that 
membership of a more formal "veterans' group" could have on an interviewee's 
memory of their experiences. Mainly, the interviews were conducted in the 
interviewees' homes, where the interviewee is most relaxed. The others took place at 
the annual reunions, in the lounge of the hotel, which was set aside for our use and 
therefore private. 
Of those interviewed, the majority came from working-class families, with jobs ranging 
from millworkers to miners, brewery workers to butchers. Only one who was not an 
officer, stayed on for further education past the age of fourteen: John Scruton was 
fortunate to be able to finish his degree course shortly before being called up. The 
remainder had a basic education which represented the school system for the working 
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class in England at that time. 3 Scientific or technical education was practically non- 
existent at this level and the interviewees usually left school to provide much-needed 
income for their families. Very few of the veterans' families had sufficient resources to 
finance further education or attendance at a grammar school, even when this had been 
on offer. 
My preferred path for the interview was to follow the `life story' route, whereby we 
began by discussing the interviewee's childhood and schooling, then early jobs, before 
talking about time spent as a recruit, the training and active service. Following 
discussions about the war, we then covered what happened to the interviewee post-war, 
in terms of relationships and career paths. Before commencing the interview I made it 
clear that if the interviewee was unhappy to discuss any element, then we would move 
on to other issues. Some of the interviewees did exercise that right, mainly concerning 
details of their childhoods 34 However I do consider discussing childhoods an essential 
first step in the interview process. Firstly, it eases the interviewee into the discussion, so 
that by the time we reached the war-time years, he had relaxed. It also reassured the 
interviewee of my interest in their life as a whole and is a recognition that the war 
played a small part in their lives in terms of years served, even if it played a more 
dominant role in their memories. For their army service I also followed a chronological 
route, since it made sense in terms of the interview structure. Thus as each period of 
service had been covered, I would ask what they remembered of, for example, 
Touffreville, or Venraij. 
I then asked other questions about their service, concerning officer-men relationships, 
physical conditions such as opportunities for bathing, and what feelings they had for 
their opponents and allies. As the interviewees joined and left the battalion at different 
33 Only 4 per cent of 17 year olds were in full-time education in Britain in 1938-39, according to Tony 
Mason, in From Blitz to Blair. A new history of Britain since 1939, ed. Nick Tiratsoo (London, 1997),. 34 Wendy Rickard also gave interviewees this option which did result in difficulties in producing a 
comprehensive interpretation. "Oral History -More Dangerous than Therapy'? Interviewees' 
Reflections on Recording Traumatic or Taboo Issues". Oral History Journal Vol. 26 Autumn 1998. 
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times it is not feasible to draw statistical conclusions from the interviews. However it is 
clear from the results that the interviews have substantial `overlaps' and similarities in 
experiences which allow confident analysis to be attempted. 
Each interview followed the same path, although questions were tailored to the 
individual responses. For example, if an interviewee were more expansive about their 
family backgrounds, then I restricted questions about schooling, as I was conscious of 
time restraints. Each interviewee was interviewed once, and the length of time allotted 
was dependent upon whether other interviews had been scheduled for the same day. In 
following the path of interviewing once, the result was a `snapshot' of the individual's 
memories on that particular day. 35 A visit on an alternative day would probably have 
elicited different anecdotes and responses. 
Overall, the detail provided by the interviewees backs Kate Fisher's assertion that `oral 
history provides the historian with dense and rich qualitative material rather than 
strength in numbers' 36 Yet within the responses, there was also a consistency. Some 
elements of the interviews produced denser memories than others; the recollections of 
actual battle conditions were particularly intense, because they were dramatic and, as 
Winter and Sivan argue, `harrowing moments are denser still' 37 
The interview process proved a steep learning curve, and I was extremely fortunate to 
discover as my first interviewee, a man with a remarkable memory. From this initial 
interview, the remainder varied in detail, with difficulties in people and place names 
common. Patently this was to be expected after sixty years. Where opportunities permit, 
I would argue that interviewing closer to the event produces richer detail. However, for 
this study it was important to record those who had taken part in historic events and had 
previously been overlooked. From the completion of the first few interviews, it also 
35 Alessandro Portelli, `What makes oral history different? ' eds. Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, The 
Oral History Reader (London, 1998), 
36 Kate Fisher, An Oral History of Birth Control Practices c. 1925-50. A Study of Oxford and South 
Wales. (Oxford, 1997) Unpublished PhD thesis p. 40. 37 Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds. War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, p. 12. 
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became apparent that they formed an overlapping narrative, dependent on when the 
interviewee joined and left the battalion. Certainly what the interviewees remembered 
was clear and appeared reliable. What had been forgotten in the intervening years was a 
more problematic issue. As a group, the interviewees are similar in terms of life paths 
chosen, and views expressed, and society appears to have influenced the memories of 
the veterans in the same manner. The interviews therefore reflect a `collective' memory 
as well as individual memories. Although Portelli argues against the use of the term 
`collective memory', citing the reason that individuals become viewed as 
`interchangeable and indifferent', 38 for this thesis, group memory is a central theme, and 
the term, as I use it, denotes memories that assume an importance outside the individual 
account, in that they take on a life of their own, supported by similar memories of other 
individuals within the group. 
The transcript process proved challenging and had to take into account different dialects 
and modes of speech. 39 Several were transcribed by an external agency and it was 
obvious the difference that a single comma could make to the understanding and 
meaning of the spoken word. Pauses, shuffles in the chair, coughs and laughter were all 
important aspects of the interview that were difficult to transfer to the transcript. Strong 
emotion, such as that displayed by Dennis Bowen when describing his bayoneting of a 
German soldier, or Clive Crauford in describing the death of a young soldier he 
particularly remembered, could be concealed in the transcript but was apparent by the 
different tones in the voice and pauses in the flow of speech. 
During the course of the interviews, the understanding of the dual impact of both 
parties, and the importance of the individual, came to the fore. Each interviewee had 
different expectations of the process and approached it with their own personality. For 
38 Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Guilia. Oral History and the Art of Dialogue (Madison, Wis, 
1997) p. 57. - 39 See Raphael Samuel, `Perils of the Transcript', eds. Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, The Oral 
History Reader p. 389. 
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example, John Scruton, a meticulous man and keener on the written, rather than the 
spoken word, asked to read the transcript, and made amendments on several occasions, 
until he was satisfied with the result, because he considered he `must have spoken 
carelessly or without thinking in some places'. 0 The finished transcript had had all 
spontaneity removed and resembled a written article. This was understandable, as John 
Scruton had previously prepared several pieces concerning his wartime experiences and 
had had the benefit of time to consider what should be included. The freedom of 
expression, the fluidity and unplanned nature of speech, were anathema to him. 
In the case of another interview, Clive Crauford began to speak as soon as the recorder 
was switched on and recalled his experiences of D-Day: `Let's start at the beginning, 
which is really when we were rehearsing for it'. 1 This was the subject that he had 
assumed I was coming to interview him about, and he had clearly prepared for the 
interview in advance. Here, Crauford was displaying his `historical consciousness', 42 
because he was aware of the importance assigned to D-Day both at the time of the 
operation, and within subsequent secondary literature. Following his lead, I listened to 
his experiences, then returned to the more usual `life story' route. 
Several of the interviewees asked for my reassurance before we began that they would 
not be asked to speak randomly about their wartime experiences, as they had doubts as 
to how much would be recalled. 3 This was often voiced as `So, what do you want to 
know? ' Despite any difficulties, the interview process was rewarding as any points not 
clearly understood, could be queried immediately. As a point of comparison, 
correspondence with the two Canadian officers was drawn out and written answers were 
short. There was little expansion on the questions posed and the questions did not lead 
40 Letter from John Scruton dated 28th June 1999. 
41 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5th November 2000. 
42 See Ronald J Grele, `Movement without aim. Methodological and theoretical problems in oral history', 
eds. Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, The Oral History Reader. 
43 Trevor Lummis argues that respondents are reassured by the knowledge that the onus will not be on 
them to volunteer information, in Listening to History. The authenticity of oral evidence. 
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on to other, perhaps unrelated, but equally useful, areas of enquiry. This was anticipated 
and certainly not the fault of the officers concerned. However to query any answers 
given, necessitated a long wait for the reply. 
During several of the interviews, the wife remained present throughout. I did not feel in 
a position to request her to leave, and on some occasions the wife prompted the 
interviewee to reveal forgotten anecdotes. As I did not ask questions about relationships 
while serving in the army, and the choice of whether to discuss traumatic instances was 
left to the interviewee, I consider that the presence of a partner was not detrimental to 
the interview process in this study. On no occasion did a wife `hijack' the interview, 
and a few clearly had not heard some of the information previously. In one instance the 
interviewee's sister, with whom he lived, revealed her surprise as to how her brother 
had received an injury. She had noticed his arm was misshapen, but he had never told 
her how it had come to be so" Some interviewees were inspired by the interview 
process to prepare their own memoirs, having been made aware of the historic 
significance of their memories and reassured that others would find them of interest. 
This was often reinforced by family members 45 
Of course, the interviews cannot reconstruct the history of the 2 °d Battalion as it actually 
occurred. Their memories are a representation of what happened, filtered by what has 
been forgotten or suppressed, and influenced by society in the intervening years before 
interview. 46 Critics of oral history have traditionally focused on the fallibility of human 
recall and argue that the reliability and validity of the resultant interviews are open to 
question. 47 Yet, when examined against the official records, and against each other, 
there are significant similarities between the experiences of the interviewees in this 
44 Interview with Alf Harrison 5th November 2000 during which his sister remained present. 
`s That family members paid more attention post-interview was also found by Sally Sokoloff `Soldiers or 
Civilians? The Impact of Army Service in World War Two on Birmingham Men'. Oral History Journal 
Vol. 25 Autumn 1997. 
46 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History. Aims, methods and new directions in the study of modern history 
(London and New York, 1991) p. 213. 
47 Alice Hoffman, `Reliability and Validity in Oral History', eds. David K. Dunaway and Willa K. Baum, 
Oral History. An Interdisciplinary Anthology (Walnut Creek, 1996). 
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study. At reunion events it has also been possible to conclude that the stories remain the 
same despite the number of times they are told. For the most part then, it has proved 
feasible to test for reliability and validity with some confidence. As Ritchie argues, `oral 
history is as reliable or unreliable as other research sources. No single piece of data of 
any sort should be trusted completely, and all sources need to be tested against other 
evidence'. 8 The safeguards to ensure the interviews were as accurate as possible, have 
enabled confident assessments to be made as to, training levels of individual soldiers, 
where they served and the conditions discovered in each location, the difficulties of 
service life, and those aspects that enabled soldiers to remain in action for long periods. 
When tested against the existing primary and secondary sources, the interviews were 
revealed to be an historically important source material, which concurred with, but also 
added a rich new dimension to, existing records about the 2 °d Battalion. 
As recently as 2003, Hodgkin and Radstone asserted that memory was a minority study 
for historians, relegated to an adjunct of oral history. Although this situation is changing 
with regard to history generally, it is clear that in the area of oral history, memory has 
been a central issue for many years. There has been an evolution in the way memory has 
been regarded, in that in the second half of the twentieth century memory was initially 
held to be important because it acted in confirmation of particular events and allowed 
certain sections of the population previously overlooked to be recorded. The impetus 
was to collect information. However from the end of the 1970s, studies began to focus 
on the concept that memories could be challenged, and different versions existed with 
an equal claim to veracity. What was interesting therefore was the process of memory, 
in that we could assess how people recollect events, and what we can learn from their 
accounts; in essence what became important was their subjectivity. 
48 Donald A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History (New York, 1995) p. 6. 
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Within this development, some theorists stressed that memories are `filtered' through 
society, which was expounded earlier by Maurice Halbwachs and later by the Popular 
Memory Group. The influence of dominant social structures on individual memories is 
highlighted, so that the interviewee is the `bearer of a culture'. 9 Individual memory, 
therefore, has almost no meaning unless it is located within social memory. S° This idea 
reinforces the role of authority and power in deciding which memories take precedence. 
In regard to this thesis the views of the Commando forces were accorded more weight 
because special forces are deemed superior, the title `special' infers they are somehow 
extraordinary. Their views would have remained unchallenged unless the 2 °d Battalion 
veterans were afforded their own voice. It is clear that what stories are told will not be 
acceptable to everybody and will often be contested, so it can be impossible to reach a 
consensus. 
Of course, memory in its common use is viewed as essentially an individual occupation, 
with oral history therefore being deemed to be `a science and art of the individual '5land 
an expression of the `historicity of personal experience and of the individual's role in 
the history of society and in public events'. 2 Moreover `having been in the war is the 
most immediately tangible claim for having been in history. Alistair Thomson argues 
that memories are shaped to link the past and present, and that they are altered to `fit', in 
order for the interviewee to be more comfortable, with memories going through 
phases. 54 It is therefore evident that `life stories are not as transparent as they seem. 
They do not reveal objective truths, but the truths of the interviewee'. 55 
49 Ronald J. Grele, `Movement without aim. Methodological and theoretical problems in oral history' in 
The Oral History Reader, eds. Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, p. 48. 50 See Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge, 1989). 
sl Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia. Oral History and the Art of Dialogue p. 57. 52 Alessandro Portelli, `Oral History as Genre', in Narrative and Genre. Contexts and Types of 
Communication, eds. Mary Chamberlain and Paul Thompson (New Brunswick, 2004) p. 26. 53 Ibid. 
54 Alistair Thomson, `Anzac memories. Putting popular memory theory into practice in Australia', in The 
Oral History Reader, eds. Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson. 
ss Yvette J. Kopijn, `The Oral History Interview in a Cross-Cultural Setting', in Narrative and Genre. 
Contexts and Types of Communication, eds. Mary Chamberlain and Paul Thompson, p. 142. 
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A landmark in the historiography of memory studies was the seminal work of Pierre 
Nora in Les Lieux de memoire, a collection of essays on French identity. Carrier56 
considers Nora's work to be a monument, a symbol of the political role of social 
memory, with a prime example being the upsurge of commemorative events and public 
enthusiasm for remembrance. Such commemoration, as it relates to the veterans of the 
2"a Battalion, will now be discussed in more detail, with particular emphasis on the 60th 
anniversary of D-Day, June 2004. 
Part Four - Private and Public Commemoration. 
By following the `life-story' route during the interview process, it was possible to 
consider the interviewees' beliefs about war and its remembrance, and it became 
evident that commemoration took various forms, both public and private. It has been 
argued that the veterans' memories shift according to what stage they are in their lives 
and how the war is remembered in the public arena, by the press and the state 5.7 Public, 
or popular, memory depicts the Second World War as a time of national unity and 
cohesion, which is supported by the interviews 58 However for the men of the 2°d 
Battalion who were involved in D-Day, their individual role was overlooked, despite D- 
Day as an operation receiving much attention during the fiftieth and sixtieth 
anniversaries, with those taking part being lauded as 'heroes' . 
59 These anniversaries 
witnessed many public commemoration events, yet it was the individual, private acts of 
commemoration which were recounted during the interviews. Of course, private 
56 Peter Carrier, `Places, Politics and the Archiving of Contemporary Memory in Pierre Nora's Les Lieux 
de memoire', in Memory and Methodology, ed. Susannah Radstone (Oxford, 2000), 
S' See eds. T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper, The Politics of War Memory and 
Commemoration (London and New York, 2000). 
5s The Popular Memory Group holds that public and private memories are interactive. Lucy Noakes 
argues that national unity was a partial memory, not the complete picture in War and the British. Gender, 
Memory and National Identity (London and New York, 1998). 
s9 Lucy Noakes rightly argues that the male soldier is the key figure in images and war commemorations, 
while the women's contribution is depicted as subsidiary. Women's WWII memorials are only recently 
beginning to be regarded as valid. 
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memories become `community remembrancing'60 during the course of their re-telling at 
veteran reunions, and are affected by, and mediated by, the state in transmitting 
memories to future generations. Some memories are therefore encouraged, as in the case 
of D-Day memories, which depict the nation as a cohesive and unified force61 acting in 
defence of democracy, while others are discouraged 62 
The fiftieth anniversary of D-Day witnessed an avalanche of new books, TV 
programmes and press coverage, and `such a sustained and popular expression of 
remembrance has no precedent within British history' 63 This popularity is linked to a 
view of Britain as a victor in the Second World War, leading to what Shaw refers to as 
`nostalgia militarism' . 
64 Yet the previous anniversaries were eclipsed by the coverage of 
the sixtieth, which was widely held in newspapers to be the final chance to hold services 
while veterans were still available in enough numbers and in good enough health, to 
make the journey to Normandy to attend the ceremonies. 
After sixty years it is clear that the Second World War remains central to the national 
psyche, with a concentration on the men of the armed forces as heroes. Marginalisation 
is apparent along gender and race lines 65 Exclusion can also encompass some sections 
of the `soldier-heroes' that are considered the prime focus. Concentration is often 
directed towards, for example, the airborne forces, the Commandos and the specialist 
armoured divisions, the `glamorous' units, as opposed to those in the `Poor Bloody 
Infantry'. This was apparent in the press and TV coverage of the sixtieth anniversary, 
60 Joep Leerssen `Monument and Trauma : varieties of remembrance', in History and Memory in Modern 
Ireland ed. Ian McBride (Cambridge and New York, 2001). 
61 See Sonya 0. Rose, Which People's War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain 1939- 
1945 (Oxford, 2003). 
62 D George Boyce "'No lack of ghosts': memory, commemoration, and the state in Ireland", ed. Ian 
McBride, History and Memory in Modern Ireland 
0 Martin Evans and Ken Lunn, eds. War and Memory in the Twentieth Century, pXV (Oxford and New 
York, 1997). They have pointed out that 1.5 million attended the `Victory in Europe' Day events in Hyde 
Park May 1995. 
64 Martin Shaw, `Past Wars and Present Conflicts: From the Second World War to the Gulf, eds. Martin 
Evans and Ken Lunn, War and Memory in the Twentieth Century p. 192. 65 Lucy Noakes, War and the British. Gender, Memory and National Identity. Also Bernice Archer, `A 
Low-Key Affair. Memories of Civilian Internment in the Far East, 1942-45', eds. Martin Evans and Ken 
Lunn, War and Memory in the Twentieth Century. Both write of the exclusion of women, in the view of 
the Second World War as a defining experience. 
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with programmes looking at the contribution of the `funnies' of Hobart's 79th Armoured 
Division and the DD `swimming' tanks on D-Day, as well as the glider-borne soldiers 
at, particularly, Pegasus Bridge. It is generally held by the veterans of the 2 °d Battalion 
that the contribution of the East Yorkshire Regiment has been overlooked and this again 
proved to be the case during the sixtieth commemorations in 2004. A reporter of The 
Mail on Sunday visited three veterans of the Regiment to interview them, with the 
promise that an article would appear on Sunday 6th June, yet nothing was published. 
In June 2004, the commemoration of one day's action in the north-west European 
campaign meant that, inevitably, many veterans who served after D-Day, and in other 
theatres of the war, were excluded. During this campaign, reinforcements arrived on an 
almost daily basis to fill gaps left by casualties, yet the services focused only on those 
involved in the assault. The commemorative medal issued during special services in 
Normandy was also limited to those taking part in D-Day. The `exclusive' and historic 
nature of Operation Overlord gives a special status to certain veterans but excludes those 
with the `misfortune' to arrive shortly afterwards. 
For three veterans on the Regiment-organised trip, this was their first visit to Normandy 
since the war. They expressed their reluctance to return before, with one citing the need 
to come to terms with his memories, yet all felt that the sixtieth anniversary was a 
special event, in that it was most likely their last opportunity to visit, and future 
commemorations would not be on as large a scale. For the 2°d Battalion veterans, the 
sixtieth anniversary held a further significance, in that for the first time they would be 
witnessing the unveiling of a memorial plaque dedicated to their regiment alone. The 
purpose of such memorials is clear: `these historical signs and stories, inscribed on the 
surface of the landscape, strengthen, direct and validate both personal and collective 
memory'. 66 There are already Divisional monuments in existence, and in Hermanville 
66 Petri J. Raivo, `This is where they fought'. Finnish war landscapes as a national heritage, eds. T. G. 
Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper, The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, p. 159. 
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the 3rd Division emblem is embedded in the square. However it took four years of 
planning before the Prince of Wales' Own Regimental Association (which is the 
Regiment into which the East Yorkshires and West Yorkshires were amalgamated in 
1958) received the go-ahead from the French authorities for the plaque. Although a 
symbol of public and Regimental recognition of the contribution made by the D-Day 
veterans, it was not universally welcomed. 67 However, most veterans were in favour of 
the plaque and saw it as long overdue. 
The memorial was unveiled during the afternoon service of remembrance in 
Hermanville on 6th June, and is dedicated `to the everlasting memory of the officers and 
men of the 2°d and 5t' Battalions of the East Yorkshire Regiment who landed on the 
beaches of Hermanville-sur-Mer and La Riviere in the first wave of the Allied assault 
on 6th June 1944; and in proud and grateful tribute to those whose courage that day and 
in the days that followed was to cost them their lives. Each risked all in freedom's 
cause'. This is the only memorial dedicated specifically to the 2 "d Battalion's actions in 
north-west Europe and, of course, excludes the majority of those who served with the 
battalion during the campaign. The service was a sober and dignified affair, attended by 
many veterans from different units who were associated with Sword Beach, however 
there were only six veterans from the 2°d Battalion. 68 One veteran expressed a feeling of 
pride that five young, serving members of the Prince of Wales' Own Regiment of 
Yorkshire, which from June 2006 became the Yorkshire Regiment, were there to 
represent the Regiment at the Hermanville service. However, the remainder of the 
service personnel attending the ceremony were not from units familiar to the veterans 
and, of more concern, were placed directly in front of the veterans' marquee, obscuring 
their view of the ceremony, which was largely conducted in French. It became clear to 
67 Canadian veteran, Jim Fetterly, wrote: `Regarding the suggestion of a memorial. I am not big on this 
kind of thing and feel that after 56 years the money could be spent in more useful ways', in letter to 
author dated 9th January 2000. 
68 Of the six veterans, three have since passed away and two more are now too infirm to travel. Therefore 
the Second World War will swiftly be passing from direct memory to cultural memory. 
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those attending the French-arranged religious service that it was not being held for the 
veterans' benefit, more that they were a `token' presence at a ceremony dominated by 
references to lessons to be learned from the past and a call for European solidarity. 
Despite the importance of the occasion, it was not an emotional event for the veterans 
present. The emotional events were the private visits to Hermanville war cemetery 
which contains sixty East Yorkshire Regiment graves, 38 of them casualties of the D- 
Day landings. It was here that the individual aspect of commemoration became 
apparent, with open displays of emotion and reminiscing about the dead in a way that 
`brought them to life' for the listener. One example was that of a boxer in the battalion, 
twenty year old Cliff Milnes, whose legs were shattered on the beach and another 
infantryman, Cpl Wilkinson, who used Bren gun oil on his hair. Remembering the men 
when they were alive, serves as a reminder of the horrors of combat and of the random 
nature of death. The youth of many of those killed is a sharp contrast to the age of the 
veterans and many veterans remark on their good fortune in surviving. The youngest 
member of the Regiment in the cemetery is eighteen year old Pte Arthur Blackmore and 
the oldest is thirty-eight year old Pte Eric Elliott, with the majority in their twenties. 
After the public ceremony, the Secretary of the Regimental Association asked each 
member of the party to place a small cross on the individual East Yorkshire Regiment 
graves. These crosses, and the other tokens left at the gravesides, including flowers and 
messages, act as the `focus of a ritual exchange. The dead have given everything; the 
living, symbolically or tangibly, offer something in return' 69 Naturally this was a more 
difficult situation for the veterans present, who could remember the names as people, 
and the emotion was evident. There was the added psychological pressure that in many 
cases they could remember how the men became casualties, with the attendant sights 
and sounds. Some had been close friends, having endured the rigours of training 
69 Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1999) 
p. 38. 
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together. Despite the individual nature of the remembered losses, the memories do not 
provide a coherent alternative, or oppositional, popular memory of the war to the `finest 
hour' mythology already embedded in the national consciousness. Rather, these 
memories operate alongside this popular mythology, and the veterans use it as a 
justification for the losses and sacrifice. 
The individual nature of the 2°d Battalion cemetery visit was in direct contrast to the 
formal and impersonal nature of the public events which, while focusing on loss and 
sacrifice, spoke of such loss in general terms. The service in Hermanville was low-key 
in comparison to the larger event held at Arromanches, attended by world leaders, the 
Queen and the international press. During this service there was concentration on 
sacrifice and loss, yet the Queen's speech was directed towards those veterans present 
and reflected the feeling of national pride when she said: `What for you is a haunting 
memory of danger and sacrifice one summer long ago, is for your country and for 
generations of your countrymen to come, one of the proudest moments in our long 
national history'. This speech reinforced the general view of the Second World War as 
being a `righteous war' in which Britain, together with her allies, triumphed over evil. 
The public recognition of the veterans' contribution is valued by them, however the 
focus in the press on the veterans as `heroes' sits uncomfortably with their own visions 
of themselves as merely doing their duty. 
Press coverage during the week leading up to the events, and June 60' itself, was intense. 
However veterans are aware that such interest is short-lived. Doug Parker had written a 
short piece regarding his D-Day experiences, for inclusion in The Sheffield Star, but 
bemoaned the fact that for most of the time veterans are overlooked by the media and 
society. Shortly after the events, `Chic' Watson asked his local newspaper to feature a 
photograph of the 2°d Battalion veterans at the commemorative event in Hermanville, 
yet it was deemed `old news'. 
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The press coverage was uniform in its praise for the role of the veterans on D-Day, 
viewing them as liberators and old warriors. Those killed on D-Day are also 
automatically deemed to be heroes, by stint of their being involved in the operation. Of 
course, all those servicemen killed on D-Day died in the service of their country, but not 
all died heroically and very little is read about those who do not fit the hero model. 
During the visit to Hermanville cemetery, Jack Reid found the grave of a friend who 
had served with him in India during the 1930s. After the war, his friend's widow asked 
Reid to investigate what had happened to her husband's personal effects. Reid was 
warned by others in the battalion not to become involved as his friend had allegedly 
been killed on D-Day while `running away'. Yet the overwhelming view of the Second 
World War as being a time of national unity and cohesion against Nazism, has no room 
for individual experiences that conflict with the dominant theme. 
The sixtieth commemorations were, as on previous anniversaries, `hijacked' by the 
world leaders for political purposes. 70 On this occasion the focus was on reconciliation 
and unity, particularly in President Chirac's speech welcoming the German leader, 
Gerhard Schroeder, to the commemoration event. Afterwards Schroeder laid a wreath in 
remembrance of his nation's war dead, yet refused to visit La Cambe cemetery as 
members of the SS Das Reich Division were buried there. Schroeder's attendance was 
by no means universally approved by British veterans. Eddie Hannath, general secretary 
of the Normandy Veterans Association spoke for many when he argued: `The past 
cannot be so easily shrugged off when there are still people who bitterly remember 
it... It is wrong to talk simplemindedly of reconciliation'. 1 He maintained that the time 
perhaps would be right in ten or twenty year's time, not yet. That time, of course, would 
see the majority of Second World War veterans gone. For the 2 °d Battalion veterans, 
70 In The Politics of War Memory & Commemoration, T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael 
Roper argue that these anniversary events are an opportunity to reinforce the mythic national narrative, of 
`our finest hour', extend the message to the younger generation, and consider the relationship of Britain 
with its `European partners', p. 4. 
71 The Daily Mail 5th June 2004. 
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there was no lasting animosity towards the German people expressed during the 
interviews. On the contrary, there is great respect towards the fighting abilities of the 
ordinary Wehrmacht soldier. However, this respect does not extend to soldiers of the SS 
Divisions who, the veterans believe, were capable of acts of brutality towards civilians 
and Allied servicemen alike. 72 This opinion is shared by Don Baker, Chairman of the 
Parachute Regimental Association, who said he had no hatred of the Germans, `but we 
won't stand for the SS'. 73 
One 2 °d Battalion veteran who found it accept the idea of reconciliation was Harry 
Smithson, which is understandable given that due to his wife's illness during the war, 
his family became separated and he was unable to intervene as he was serving in 
Europe. He wrote, `I'm very pleased I killed as many Germans as I did. I should have 
shot more especially towards the end of the war, when they all wanted to declare they 
were "good Germans"'. 74 Post-war, Smithson returned to Holland to work in the 
building trade, `helping to re-build Holland, which I had sometimes helped to destroy in 
1944-45', and during the fortieth anniversary commemorations he began to re-assess his 
feelings towards the German people, `the thoughts of real peace at heart are breaking 
through the barriers. The young people already have it. We older ones are feeling it'. 
For Smithson, as for others from the 2°d Battalion, they `had seen so much' that 
reconciliation was a difficult issue. Commemoration, for 2 °d Battalion veterans, is 
therefore focused on remembrance of their own lost comrades and the issues of 
reconciliation and unity are of less importance. particularly difficult to 
The rousing Churchillian method of encouraging the nation to `pull together' through 
adversity has sometimes been expounded by leaders in an attempt to encourage public 
n Wilf Todd, in his interview 4th April 1999, recalled that in Holland the bodies of two Dutch Resistance 
men were found. `They'd had their feet slashed and then they'd been killed, but they'd obviously been 
forced to walk in their bare feet with their feet slashed', through a forested area. Such instances of cruelty 
are remembered clearly. 
73 The Daily Mail 5th June 2004. 
74 Harry Smithson's recollections. 
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acceptance of war, such as Margaret Thatcher and the Falklands War. 75 That the 
political aspects of commemoration are closely linked to the events can be seen from the 
sixtieth anniversary, when the press credited the D-Day commemorations as having 
promoted a greater sense of international goodwill and harmony. The powerful grip of 
Second World War memories, passed down to younger generations, is demonstrated by 
Martin Shaw's survey of feelings about the first Gulf War in 1991, when Saddam 
Hussain was sometimes likened to Hitler. 76 Winter and Sivan argue that `the social 
organization of remembrance tends to be decentralized', with an emphasis on civil 
society groupings rather than the central organizations of the state. 77 However, 
according to Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, politics will always feature in attempts make 
sense of the mourning and damage of war. 78 1 would argue that individual acts of 
commemoration are deemed to be the most valid for the 2nd Battalion veterans, despite 
an appreciation that national events are held to pay respect to the fallen and to 
acknowledge the part played by members of the Armed Forces in securing peace. For 
these veterans, the political elements to the events largely go unnoticed. 
Other forms of private commemoration are equally important to veterans of the 2nd 
Battalion and their wives. Two widows of 2°d Battalion servicemen have taken great 
comfort in remembering their husbands through the letters they received during the war. 
Two interviewees remembered the deaths of soldiers that particularly affected them. 
Horace Pinfold spoke of the death of his great friend Arthur Jessop: 
On February 28 every year we go without fail. We go to 
our Hall of Memory, which is in the city centre, and take a 
wreath and we go on Remembrance Sunday as well. 
Actually this is what gets me. What I should have done 
when I came out of the Army was get in touch with his 
mother and father and go and see them, but for some 
unknown reason you are out of the Army and you forget 
75 Lucy Noakes, War and the British. Gender, Memory and National Identity, p. 105. 76 Martin Shaw, `Past Wars and Present Conflicts: From the Second World War to the Gulf', eds. Martin 
Evans and Ken Lunn, War and Memory in the Twentieth Century, pp. 194-195. n Winter and Sivan, eds. War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, p. 38. 78 Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, eds. The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, p. 9. 
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about it, and then we went to somewhere, oh we went to 
the Reichswald Forest and saw his grave. 79 
For this interviewee, the memories of his friend were reawakened by the visit to the 
cemetery. Witnessing his friend's death just a few feet in front of him had been 
traumatic and the loss was felt more keenly because Arthur Jessop had taken the young 
reinforcement `under his wing' since he had joined the battalion. Similarly Clive 
Crauford remembered one soldier's death in particular. Crauford had taken a fatherly 
interest in this young infantryman, helping him to cope with his fear under shellfire and 
gain a measure of confidence. When he was mortally wounded at Troarn the young 
soldier asked for Clive, before his death, in order to express his thanks for his care. The 
death of this soldier was particularly affecting, leading Crauford to `think of him 
whenever there is an Armistice service or some wartime memories. He always comes 
back to me. He was just one of many, but he is one of the chaps that I can't help 
thinking about' 80 In both examples the formal commemoration services remind 
veterans of the losses that affect them personally. For both Hugh Bone and John 
Scruton, commemoration of their lost friends takes the form of unpublished poetry, with 
Bone composing a long piece remembering `Banger' King and Scruton writing about 
Frank Lockwood, who he particularly remembers `as memory's curtains part a little 
slower each year'. 8' 
Formal commemoration events offer a framework within which the veterans can 
conduct their own remembrance. Yet some veterans do not attend any commemorative 
events because they do not wish to remember. For example, Arthur Oates would not 
attend any services until towards the end of his life, when he allowed his daughter to 
79 Extract from interview with Horace Pinfold 2"d December 2000. 
80 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford St` November 2000. 
81 From Remembrance Day, by John Scruton. In it he describes Lockwood as `a Brighouse lad, big, 
clumsy', yet `he did his whack' and "young Frank `as `ad it, Corp", was his obituary. 
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take him, in his wheelchair, to a Remembrance Day service in Hull 82 While for some, 
the memories can be unwelcome and painful, others made a conscious decision to put 
their war service behind them and build a new future with no room for reflection. Hugh 
Bone decided as the war finished, that he would make a fresh start and not allow his 
wartime memories to figure as important in his future. 3 
For the 2°d Battalion veterans, commemoration is both an expression of pride in the 
regiment and a way of remembering those who were killed during their service. 
Commemoration is undertaken in different ways, both at formal events, which are not 
attended by all veterans, and also in private reflection and visits to cemeteries. The 
sixtieth anniversary events, including the French-organised service to dedicate their 
memorial, demonstrated that the veterans of the 2 "d Battalion were again overlooked by 
society and the media, despite the best efforts of the Regiment. 
Part Five -A Brief History of the Reeiment. 
The East Yorkshire Regiment had a long and illustrious record of service, dating back to 
1685, when it was known as the 15th Regiment of Foot. Over its history, the fortunes of 
the regiment followed that of the British Army as a whole - perceived threats meant an 
increase in size and importance, periods of peace resulted in fewer soldiers and a less 
significant role. 
The regiment's battle honours include General Wolfe's success at the Heights of 
Abraham in Quebec, Canada in 1759. Subsequently, ten officers of the 15th went on to 
become governors of provinces in North America. During the American War of 
Independence the troops gained their nickname of the `Snappers' when, at the battle of 
Brandywine in 1777, their ammunition ran short. Lt Col Bird ordered that the remaining 
ammunition be handed to the best shots, while the rest of the soldiers `snapped' (fired 
small blank charges of powder) to give the impression they could still fire effectively. 
82 This is reflected in Alistair Thomson's work. See `Anzac memories. Putting popular memory heory 
into practice in Australia', in The Oral History Reader, eds. Robert Perks and Alistair Thom f/// 
From interview with Hugh Bone 15 July 2004. 
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By this means, the Americans were held off until reinforcements arrived. 
The First World War witnessed an initial rush of recruits to the Regimental Depot at 
Beverley and by the end of 1914 there were twelve battalions. The regiment saw action 
at the Somme, Ypres, Arras and Passchendaele in France and also at Gallipoli and by 
the end of the war the regiment had earned four Victoria Crosses. 
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the East Yorkshires had two regular and two 
territorial battalions, together with a Home Defence group comprising First World War 
veterans, which became the 60' Home Service Battalion. On the 7t' September 1939 the 
2 °d Battalion moved to Dorset to form part of the Yd Infantry Division under Major 
General Bernard Montgomery. This regular battalion formed part of the British 
Expeditionary Force which headed to France, together with the 4t' and 5t' Territorial 
Battalions. By May 2 1St 1940 it was clear that the BEF would be forced to withdraw and 
all three battalions fought a rearguard action. Waiting on the beach at La Panne for their 
evacuation, the soldiers of the 2 °d Battalion incurred around eighty casualties. 
On its return from France the 2°d Battalion reformed and was sent to Frome in Somerset 
to be re-equipped to fight the expected German invasion. The 4t' and 5th Battalions were 
used to strengthen coastal defences on the south coast, while the 6t' Home Defence 
Battalion, as part of the Home Guard, guarded the docks in Hull and kept order during 
the air-raids. 
Due to the large number of recruits passing through the 15th Infantry Training Centre at 
Victoria Barracks, a further two battalions were formed: the 7t` and 8th East Yorkshires. 
As an anti-aircraft battalion, the 8u' was posted to North Africa, Sicily and Italy. The 7th, 
having trained in invasion tactics in preparation for Normandy, was not selected for D- 
Day, and was disbanded in July 1944, with many being transferred to the 2 °d Battalion 
which was, by then, already desperate for reinforcements. 
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In May 1942, the 4t' and 5t' Battalions were serving in North Africa, as part of the 
Eighth Army, and during the intense fighting Rommel's Afrika Korps virtually 
destroyed the 4th Battalion, with many of the infantrymen being captured. The 5`h 
Battalion too, was under attack, covering the withdrawal to Matruh. By the time it 
reassembled at Alamein, only 170 troops remained of the original 800. Yet by March 
1943 the tables had turned, and the 5t' Battalion, as part of 151st Brigade, broke the 
Mareth line. The Germans fought a last stand at Wadi Akarit and the 5t' Battalion was 
in the centre of a frontal assault in which Private Eric Anderson, a stretcher bearer, was 
awarded the VC. In July 1943 the 5t' Battalion was again in action, in the invasion of 
Sicily, being the first British troops to enter Messina. By November of that year the 
battalion had returned to England to train for D-Day. Meanwhile, the 2°d Battalion had 
trained throughout 1943 in preparation for the Normandy landings and its troops were 
aware of the purpose of the combined training exercises. These exercises, and the 
lengthy training period they entailed, will now be examined in the following chapter, to 
assess the readiness of the soldiers to meet the challenges of D-Day and the subsequent 
battles in north-west Europe. 
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Chapter 1- The Training of the 2nd Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment for D-Day 
and after. 
Securing adequate training was essential in ensuring the successful prosecution of the 
north-west Europe campaign. With this in mind, in the first part of the chapter I will 
examine the basic training each infantryman received, as well as the specialist training 
he underwent specifically for D-Day. In comparing this training with that received by 
the later reinforcements' I will assess the troops' readiness to face the actual battle 
conditions they encountered. Existing secondary literature is largely critical of levels of 
training within the infantry, both for officers (particularly junior officers) and the `other 
ranks', although it is generally agreed that great strides had been made in this area since 
the outbreak of the war. 2 This criticism extends to shortcomings in battle drills and 
tactics, and a lack of co-operation with other arms, in particular, that between the 
infantry and the armoured corps. On an individual level, the infantryman is charged 
with displaying little personal initiative, since training was aimed at promoting 
obedience at all times, over an ability to adapt to changing circumstance. Since the army 
was allocated the less educated recruits and the infantry was, erroneously, deemed the 
least important branch within the army in terms of recruitment, its shortcomings were 
compounded by these problems. By contrast, the German Army is held up within 
secondary literature as the model of the finest army of the period, with training forming 
a central part of that reputation. 3 
It has been maintained that the Allied armies performed poorly in north-west Europe 
against this skilful opponent, with inadequate training playing a key part. In the second 
part of this chapter, I will look at these arguments, particularly relating to the training 
1 For the purposes of this study, the reinforcements are classed as those veterans who served with the 
battalion at any time after D-Day until the conclusion of the war in Europe. 2 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army 1940-44. From Dunkirk to D-Day. 
(London, 2000) p. 63. Ian Hay, Arms and the Men (London, 1977) p. 156. 3 See, for example, Max Hastings Overlord D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (London, 1984) and 
Richard Holmes, Battlefields of the Second World War (London, 2001). 
44 
experiences of new officers, to analyse whether they are valid, based on the experiences 
of the 2 °d Battalion interviewees. 
In 1939, the British Army was ill-prepared to fight the type of battles that it would face 
during the Second World War. General Montgomery considered the Army, at that stage, 
was `admirably organised and equipped to fight the 1914 war, and with the wrong 
officers at the top', 4 leaving the Army `totally unfit to fight a first class war on the 
continent of Europe' 5 The inter-war years had seen the Army under-funded and 
hampered by the `Ten Year Rule'. With no expectation of another Continental conflict, 
the few efforts that did occur were directed towards increasing mechanisation rather 
than developments in infantry tactical orthodoxy, although how this should be achieved 
was disputed, with important ideas being expounded by Fuller and Liddell-Hart. With 
no coherent military doctrine in existence to face the new German tactics, and with 
many soldiers poorly trained and under-equipped, the BEF succumbed to the 
`Blitzkrieg' implemented by the Wehrmacht in 1940. 
It would now fall to Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke to play the major role in re- 
structuring the British Army. This role extended to organising intensive training 
exercises and running frequent conferences on all facets of modem war, as well as 
replacing large numbers of commanders .6 Following its evacuation from France in June 
1940, the 2 °d Battalion was allocated to home defence duties in anticipation of an 
invasion attempt by German forces. The initial threat receded, yet the battalion was to 
remain in the UK until D-Day, despite undergoing amphibious landing training in 
preparation for the Dieppe assault in 1942 and the invasion of Sicily the following year. 
Those already serving in the battalion during that period had a long time available in 
which to undergo training in all areas. 
4 B. Law, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery ofAlamein KG (Collins, London, 
1958) p. 39. 
5 Ibid., p. 49. 
6 David Fraser, Alanbrooke (London, 1982). 
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At this point, it is important to consider that at the time of the Normandy invasion, the 
2nd Battalion was a regular battalion, comprised overwhelmingly of long-standing 
servicemen, some of whom had served with the battalion throughout the 1930s, with 
many others volunteering to join the Army following the outbreak of the war. This 
difference, between the regular army, and the conscripted personnel, rapidly changed 
when the battalion landed in France in 1944, as large numbers of conscripted 
reinforcements were drafted in to replace casualties. For all recruits, basic training 
followed a similar path, but varied thereafter, depending on whether the recruit joined 
the battalion prior to, or post-D-Day. 
Basic training. 
From the interviews, it appears that the veterans had no choice in deciding which of the 
services or, indeed, which branch of the army they would be joining. The experience 
was not unusual, although during the Second World War it was increasingly recognised 
that some recruits would not be suitable to withstand the rigours of active service in the 
front line. 7 Despite this, the increasing need for manpower overrode the warnings of the 
Army psychiatrists. 8 This pressure on manpower in the infantry meant that anyone not 
displaying particular work experience or qualifications would be viewed as suitable 
candidates. Two of the interviewees mentioned rudimentary selection tests but the 
majority only recalled their lack of choice. 
Several revealed they had volunteered for the RAF or Royal Navy in preference to 
waiting for their call-up papers, yet were unsuccessful. Arthur Smith was one of those 
7 In a Report on a Visit to 21 A. G. B. L. A. by the Consulting Psychiatrist to the Army, who visited No 3 
Military Prison in Bayeux on 25d' October 1944, he concluded that 5 per cent of those examined were of 
such low intelligence they should not be in a fighting unit, 5 per cent were psychopaths and the bulk 
included numbers of immature type and men of low combatant temperament. (NA WO/32/11550). 
8 Reports of Meetings. Command Specialists in Psychological Medicine, (NA WO222/1584). During the 
meetings it was held that `a surprisingly large number of men suffering from constitutional mental defect 
escape detection by the Recruiting Medical Boards'. 
9 John Baynes and Cliff Pettit, `Preparing for War: the experience of the Cameronians' eds. P. Liddle, J. 
Bourne, I. Whitehead, The Great World War 1914-45 Vol. 1 Lightning Strikes Twice, (London, 2000). 
The experience of Thomas Laing is similar to that of my interviewees: when asked if he had any 
particular preference for an arm of the service he said he was a musician and was told, `It's the infantry 
for you'. p. 38. 
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who had volunteered for the Navy but `nothing happened until after Dunkirk. Then all 
they had on the books went willy nilly straight into the army'. 1° Even once serving in 
the infantry, some interviewees volunteered for service in other regiments. Denis Cade, 
disillusioned with the harshness of his training, volunteered for an Airborne Division 
but returned to his unit after four days" and Alf Ackroyd was pleased to be transferred 
into the 2°d Battalion because he regarded it as a `fighting battalion' and had been keen 
for a transfer from the 70th (Young Soldiers) West Yorkshire Regiment for some time, 
as his current service was not fulfilling his `sense of adventure'. 12 This desire to see 
active service should not be underestimated and Alf Ackroyd was not alone in being 
conscious that, until D-Day, he had not been contributing to the war effort, and his 
service, through no fault of his own, had been less than spectacular. 
On arrival at the barracks, a recruit faced a period of basic training lasting six weeks. 
The purpose of this initial training was twofold: to instil in the soldier the realisation 
that he was no longer an individual but a member of a group and, above all, to obey 
commands. 13 The aim, over time, was that the recruit should become acclimatised to 
putting the needs and welfare of the group before his own. 14 The recruit relinquished his 
civilian clothes and was allocated a uniform and, during basic training, he lived to a 
timetable set by the Army instructors, from `reveille' to `lights out'. Thus the period of 
basic training was not so much a time for learning new skills, as an acclimatisation to 
the Army way of life, with the instillation of a new set of values. This process was 
assisted by the fact that the recruits were largely young and therefore more malleable. 
All the interviewees recalled this short time as a period of drills, basic weapons training, 
PT, inoculations and kit inspections. The emphasis on drill, which is the ordering of 
lo Extract from interview with Arthur Smith 27`h September 1999. 
11 From interview with Denis Cade 4t` July 1999. 
12 Extract from interview with Alf Ackroyd 10* February 2002. 
13 Gwynne Dyer, War (London, 1986). 
'a For Alex Bowlby, in The Recollections of Rieman Bowlby, this realisation of group loyalty came 
during training for a river-crossing in Italy, when his Platoon started singing Lili Marlene. `For the first 
time in my life I lost all sense of self. I was inextricably part of the Platoon and they were part of me', 
(London, 1999) p. 13. 
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bodies of men to move in identical ways in response to a shouted set of commands, was 
a reinforcement of the group ethos. In a move towards automatic acceptance of 
commands, the recruits were taught to make their beds, to lay out their kit for inspection 
and to wear their uniforms in a specified way. Any minor infringements of the rules 
resulted in punishments, including additional cleaning duties, and were often imposed 
on the group. It was therefore in the interests of the group to ensure that all recruits 
conformed to the instructors' expectations of them. 
This period of basic training also put great emphasis on the standard of dress required of 
the recruit, the `spit and polish' or `bull' aspect to promote discipline, pride and instil 
high levels of personal hygiene. '5 A letter from Arthur Oates to his mother, while 
undergoing potential officer training, explained what this entailed: 
Courses having been discontinued for about a week we are 
at present "dagging mad". A definition of "dagging" is: 
the polishing of anything and everything - so that by next 
Sunday we shall look like recruits with phosphorescent 
equipment - imagine the patience required to make a 
bayonet shine like glass and a buckle '/2' square shine like 
the rising sun - still it's all part of the army. 
6 
The interviewees often remarked that this period witnessed the start of their making 
long-lasting friendships with other recruits, based on shared experiences and hardships, 
a camaraderie which they later found difficult to replicate in civilian life. Several of the 
interviewees who joined the battalion as reinforcements, recalled staying with these 
same friends right through their service, although this was rarer for those interviewees 
involved in D-Day, as so many became casualties. Dennis Brown remembered, `you 
were all split up to go to different regiments but Ralph Bramley and I stuck together 
right through'. 17 
is See Manual of Elementary Drill (All Arms), 1935, which includes sections on instructions for drilling 
recruits, words of command and rules for inspection. Copy held at Duke of Wellington's Regimental 
Archive, Halifax. 
16 Arthur Oates' letter to Mater dated 2d February 1941 SWWEC (2003/2075). 
17 Extract from interview with Dennis Brown 4th July 1999. 
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Following the initial training of six weeks, the interviewees who came to the battalion 
as reinforcements progressed straight on to an additional training period lasting twelve 
weeks. However, those who joined the battalion prior to D-Day were then posted to 
wherever the battalion was based in the UK, and additional training was on an ad hoc 
basis. For Arthur Smith, serving with the battalion in the years before D-Day was a 
frustrating experience at times: `They had no idea what to do with the men they were in 
charge of. On Monday it was RSM's parade, on a Wednesday it was Adjutant's parade 
and on Friday it was a CO's parade and this was while there was a war going on'. 18 
Many hours were spent mounting guards and the men were sometimes detailed off for 
labouring duties, including constructing large concrete ramps at Fort George in 
preparation for assault training. Indeed, it was only once the battalion was allotted a 
particular role in forthcoming operations, involving amphibious landings, that training 
intensified. 
Combined Operations Training. 
On I" May 1942 the battalion moved to Inverary, and so began the first of the regular 
moves which continued until D-Day. Up until 1943, the Combined Operations Training 
Centre at Inverary, on Loch Fyne, was the main centre for amphibious training. The 
early attempts at amphibious landings were from twelve naval cutters, as LCAs19 were 
in short supply. These cutters had to be rowed and the men became very fit. Wilf Todd 
recalled that consequently the men were always hungry. 20 This initial amphibious 
landing training was in preparation for the Dieppe raid of August 1942. However the 2°a 
Battalion was replaced in this high-casualty operation by Canadian units. The craft and 
equipment used by the Canadians during that raid were utilised by the battalion during 
its combined operations training on the Isle of Wight over the following months. From 
'8 Extract from interview with Arthur Smith 27'h September 1999. 
19 Landing Craft Assault. 
20 From an interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999, in which he remembered filling his helmet with 
mussels and taking them back to camp for boiling. 
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December 1942 to February 1943, the battalion took part in Divisional exercises and 
practised assaults on concrete and wire obstacles, before returning to Scotland. On this 
occasion, the equipment was much improved and beach obstacles and fortifications had 
been erected for demolition and attack during training. 21 As the Course finished, the 
battalion embarked on a special hardening-off exercise, during which the entire unit 
undertook a cross-country march of around a hundred miles to the Ardnamurchan 
Peninsula. This march took six days to complete and each veteran involved can 
remember precise details as to its hardships. Those who managed to avoid the march 
consider themselves fortunate. 22 
Arthur Smith's oral account reflects the cold and wet conditions while bivouacking on 
the march, together with the infantryman's ingenuity in his attempts to remain dry: 
So we had to put the groundsheets down ... then we had 
gas capes and we utilised those, then of course we had the 
blanket. After the first day we were shattered ... and I 
remember waking up and it was chucking it down, ... and 
there were a little rivulet running straight down my back. It 
was pitch black dark. I felt around and I got my small pack 
and inside was my mess tin, so I put that under my head 
and shoulders and got my steel helmet under my bottom 
and spent the rest of the night that way. We weren't a bit 
bothered. We got up the next morning and had some 
breakfast and were off again 23 
The troops were permitted to put one blanket each on board the accompanying lorries, 
but after the first day they also wrapped their heavy greatcoats inside the blankets, to 
avoid having to carry them. The interviewees also recalled sleeping in the local school 
at Kinlochleven, so they had one night out of the rain. Some of the interviewees spoke 
with obvious pride that the paths they followed were also trodden by East Yorkshire 
troops hundreds of years earlier. The Regimental History records that men of the 150' 
Regiment of Foot were involved in road-making in the Highlands in 1689,1723 and 
21 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 147. 22 From interview with Albert Eccles 11'h September 1999. 
23 Extract from interview with Arthur Smith 27"' September 1999. 
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1773 24 The interviewees had been made aware of the historic nature of the exercise by 
their officers. One of these young officers, Arthur Oates, wrote to his fiancee Audrey, 
from the Tartan Hotel, Kinlochleven during the march: 
Darling, I'm still very much alive and kicking but it's no 
secret that it's the roughest trip I've done yet. As a 
historical fact this route was last covered by the East 
Yorks in 1746 when they went from Inverary to Fort 
William and it was conceived as impossible - we're out to 25 break the record. 
The concentration on achieving supreme physical fitness is epitomised by this march 
and, by the end of it, Oates noted that fatigue was widespread. He wrote that the packs 
weighed around 60lbs `and after four days marching one's feet start to feel bruised'. 
Under the censor's mark it is possible to read that he had recorded that `the soldiers 
were beginning to show signs of fatigue too'. This is not the type of detail that civilian 
readers would be encouraged to read for fear that it would reveal any lowering of 
morale. None of the interviewees recorded that fatigue was an undue problem, although 
all who completed the march emphasised its toughness. 
Oates certainly felt that the fitness training was having the desired effect. He advised 
Audrey in April 1943, that `the three weeks immediately after this involves a total 
marching distance of 380 miles - so you see why I consider that we are getting tough'. 26 
Interestingly, Oates' letters also include references to the climb up the 1,000ft mountain 
just north of Inverary which the interviewees clearly recalled, although this is 
unsurprising, given that it was a daily event. Oates described it as `rather a tough climb 
as most of it is practically sheer but well worth the effort my hands are still rather sore 
from the efforts so it's rather a problem to write'. 7 The fitness levels are reflected in the 
time it took to complete the climb, `yesterday's timing was 23 minutes up and 12 down 
24 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 147. 
u Letter from Arthur Oates to Audrey, undated. 
26 Letter to Audrey dated 3` 1 April 1943. 
27 Letter to Mater dated 241 March 1943. 
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and the view at the top! Super! There's an old watch tower at the very top - commonly 
known as the RAF canteen'. 28 
At the end of the march, the Regimental history records that there were no casualties, 
can excellent record seeing that the march had been made intentionally tough' . 
29 This 
comment on casualties was an acknowledgment of an anticipated casualty rate during 
exercises. Although the troops were safer during training than on active service, training 
at this level carried a relatively high risk. Some of these accidents were witnessed by the 
interviewees and are clearly remembered, for example, George Burnham recalled: 
there was another incident where we were introduced to 
live ammunition and being fired at, and the Bren gun was 
on a fixed line. It couldn't move, and it was firing about 
three feet above the ground, and you came to this place 
and there was a big sign and it said "crawl or else". Of 
course, these three lads went straight out, straight into the 
machine gun fire and were cut to pieces 30 
Accidents in vehicles were common, particularly given the nature of the roads in the 
area. During one of the exercises in Scotland a carrier exploded after Polish soldiers 
mistakenly laid live mines. Hugh Bone remembered this incident as he had been 
advising one of those fatally wounded on his matrimonial problems `and suddenly they 
were all solved in a moment'. 1 Another of the incidents, remembered by Alf Harrison, 
demonstrated the effect that a `friendly fire' injury had on the person inflicting it. He 
watched a soldier trip as he left a landing craft: 
As he has tripped he has knocked the safety catch off and 
as he has gone down ... his rifle has gone off and he shot, 
shot the bloke in front and it went right through the collar 
of his shirt and that killed him instantly. And the chap who 
had done it he is an ex-Glasgow policeman and he knew 
all about first aid, runs over to try to stop him, you know, 
bleeding, but couldn't and that man then he cried his eyes 
28 Letter to Audrey dated 25th March 1943. This was also referred to as the `Airmen's Naafi' during 
interviews. 
29 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 147. 30 Extract from interview with George Burnham 26th February 2000. 31 From An Ordinary Person, unpublished memoir of Hugh Bone p. 32. 
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out. So what they done, they transferred him to another 
regiment 32 
The individual training received by the 2 "d Battalion was not dissimilar to that 
undertaken by the Commandos, who were held to be elite troops. The Commando 
forces were designed to be highly trained in individual battle skills, lightly equipped and 
exceptionally fit 33 This emphasis on physical fitness, deemed so important by General 
Montgomery, 34 was also found within the 2 "d Battalion. All the interviewees recall the 
assault courses to raise fitness levels, and in particular one built for the Commandos, 
which was regarded as `the "Daddy" of all assault courses - we stopped counting our 
bruises after thirty'. 5 One veteran remembers each obstacle in great clarity, 36 and 
another remembers the course for the reason that he broke his ankle tackling it 37 The 
emphasis on fitness extended to cross-country running, boxing matches and forced 
marches. The interviewees attributed this concentration on fitness as coming directly 
from the orders of General Montgomery. Montgomery also insisted that all commanders 
took training seriously, with emphasis on the practising of battle drills, a concentration 
on realism with the use of live ammunition, and the opportunity, where practicable, to 
rehearse operations in advance. 38 He keenly advocated battle drills as a way to speed up 
the prosecution of operations. As French argues, Montgomery did not create the army's 
operational doctrine but he ensured that a common interpretation of it was in place by 
1944, which led to `considerable flexibility on the battlefield' 39 
During this period there was also intensive training at Ardnamurchan on a Company 
basis and `to each Company a Commando type Officer was attached' 40 These officers 
again concentrated on fitness levels, and assault landings, under battle conditions, took 
32 Extract from interview with Alf Harrison 5th May 2000. 
33 James Dunning, The Fighting Fourth. No. 4 Commando at War 1940-45 (Stroud, 2003). 34 See The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery ofAlamein (London, 1958) pp. 71-73. 35 Extract from interview with Jack Reid 4'h July 1999. 
36 Wilf Todd interview 20'h March 1999. 
37 Albert Eccles interview 11th September 1999. 
38 David French, Raising Churchill's Army, p. 249. 
39 Ibid., p. 261. 
40 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 147. 
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place at HMS Dorlan. However the battalion's anticipated role in the Sicily operations 
did not transpire. The Regimental History records that `this last-minute cancellation was 
a severe blow to the Division, trained to full fighting pitch - an anti-climax bringing in 
its train a heavy drop in morale'. 1 This view is not borne out by the interviewees. 
George Burnham's extract is indicative of the general feeling: 
You said that you should have gone on the Sicily 
landings? 
Yes, we should have done. 
And that was postponed? 
Yes. The old man said "we are not going. They are saving 
you for better things". We thought "Oh my God". 
Did you not feel that it was an enormously long time 
doing all that training? 42 
Well, I mean you never thought anything about it. I mean 
you did as you were told, and, you know, that was it 43 
It was certainly not unusual for troops of all specialties to remain on home soil for this 
long, 44 and for the interviewees it brought a bonus, in that each operation which failed 
to materialise was preceded by embarkation leave. 
As it became clear that the Division had been selected to take part in Operation 
Overlord, the exercises became increasingly intensive. They took place both by day and 
night, at all levels, and on a combined basis with armour and artillery. After a very wet 
period in Tighnabrugich, during which time the battalion practised assaults against 
defended positions, the Division then moved to Nairn in the Moray Firth area. In late 
1943, an area at Burghead Bay was selected as suitable for amphibious landing training 
41 Ibid., p. 148. 
42 This is clearly a leading question, although it was within the confines of a conversational, rather than 
formal interview. The interviewee's response indicates he felt at ease and could disagree with the 
supposition. 
43 Extract from interview with George Burnham 26th February 2000. 
44 Capt Alistair Bannerman of the 2°' Bn Royal Warwickshire Regt said of D-Day that `I had been 
training for this very day for about three years in England' (SWWEC 2001-819). Also P. E. G. Balfour of 
Guards Armoured Brigade (SWWEC 99.90) and Sir Anthony Dewey, an Anti-Tank Regt officer 
SWWEC (2001-1233). 
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as it resembled Sword Beach, the battalion's assigned landing area for D-Day. `They set 
it up with a little narrow gauge railway and put fortified bungalows up, which were 
concrete emplacements. We landed at daytime, night time, again and again, so it 
became second nature' 45 Exercises took place involving armoured vehicles, the Beach 
Groups, signals, engineers and artillery. 
Exercises `Wetshod', `Leapyear', `Burgher 1' and `Burgher 2' epitomised the idea of a 
`combined operation' as being `one in which two or more of the Fighting Services co- 
operate in order to strike the enemy with the maximum of effect at a chosen place and a 
chosen moment', since `troops, even veterans, are useless unless the Navy can put them 
ashore at the chosen place and at the right time, and both may fail if there is no air cover 
above them'. 6 Successfully prosecuted in the Torch landings in North Africa in 1942, 
and the landings in Pantelleria and Sicily in 1943, combined operations had not, before 
that time, been an unqualified success. Yet the massive growth during the war in the 
numbers and types of craft available made a landing in strength on the coast of France 
feasible, assuming that the training and preparations were of a sufficient standard. The 
autumn and winter exercises were extremely tough on the men due to the regularly 
rough seas and cold weather. The interviewees remember the physical conditions very 
clearly, particularly Peter Brown who feels he almost contracted hypothermia on one 
exercise in November 1943. Having jumped out of the landing craft, Peter Brown 
received a thorough soaking after being dragged under the water. He then set off for the 
shore: 
Our objective in this exercise was a wood about fifteen 
miles inland across rough countryside. By the time we got 
there and had dug a slit trench I was in a pretty poor state. 
My clothes had partially dried but as darkness fell and it 
got colder I could not stop shivering and began to think I 
would not last the night. However about three in the 
morning the exercise was called off and we were able to 
45 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
46 Both quotes from Combined Operations 1940-1942 (London, 1943). 
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light a huge bonfire and this, together with a generous rum 
ration, probably saved my life. 
Two interviewees also remembered being aboard a landing craft which began to sink: 
`we threw all our rifles and everything over the side. It started going down but they 
reckoned they were unsinkable. Fortunately another boat that was going back to the LSI 
saw us and picked us up, otherwise I wouldn't have been here. It was that cold in the 
water' 
48 
The 2nd Battalion War Diary is only available from January 1944, as the records prior to 
this date have been lost, which means that the Regimental history, the memoirs, and the 
oral interviews, are the only sources for the years 1942 and 1943. However, from 
January to June, the Diary reveals the intensive nature of the exercises, if not the details. 
In January, three days were spent at Burghead Bay during Exercise `Grab', with the 
intention `to practice assaults on beaches and the capture of initial objectives by assault 
battalions'. There was also emphasis on night operations, including breaching 
minefields, compass work and direction finding, as well as time spent on the range. 
In January and February, Companies also attended Street Fighting Courses, signifying 
that while overall concentration was placed on the landings, it was not to the exclusion 
of all else. In February, during Exercise Anchor, the assault troops built on the previous 
month's exercise by focusing on rapid consolidation of the positions they aimed to 
capture on D-Day. For this exercise, full details were laid out, including numbers of 
men per assault craft and the equipment each craft was to carry, for example four 1Oft 
Bangalores, 3 scaling ladders and 3 rolls of rabbit netting were on board the second 
landing craft. This was now a full-scale rehearsal for the landings, albeit without live 
ammunition. While other exercises used live ammunition for purposes of battle 
inoculation, this exercise allowed all involved to practise their D-Day drills without too 
great a risk of being injured in the process, although provision had been made for the 
47 Peter Brown - privately held memoir. 48 Extract from interview with Doug Parker 17`h July 1999. 
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inevitable casualties to be evacuated to nearby hospitals. Unfortunately, there was no 
information on how successful the exercise proved, but such exercises were conducted 
to familiarise the men with their allotted roles, so that by D-Day they would act 
instinctively and the training would override any uncertainty amidst the confusion of 
battle. This element of training was crucial, and remains so today. 
The following month saw the re-introduction of platoon marches for fitness purposes as 
well as two major exercises, one at Brigade level, and the other a higher formation 
exercise set at Divisional level. Exercise `Deputy' on 15th and 16th March focused on 
co-operation between infantry and tanks during an assault landing, and Exercise 
`Leapyear' proceeded under `as realistic conditions as possible' 49 `Leapyear' was 
another full-scale rehearsal for D-Day, before the battalion moved to Cowplain in 
preparation for the invasion. From April the concentration reverted to individual fitness, 
with four day, platoon level, route marches including a one night compass march. On 
alternate days there were also battalion level marches, dressed as for the assault. The 
emphasis on personal fitness continued in the sealed camps in the run-up to D-Day. Jack 
Pearse wrote of two marches in two days, as well as playing sports in the camp: `This is 
the weather when the men appreciate a decent sports field to play basket-ball, deck 
quoits, open-air darts, even football, of their own arranging rather than the 
regimentation of P. T. parades. Morale is consequently high'. 50 The importance of strong 
religious beliefs for some servicemen, as a source of comfort during difficult times, was 
also apparent during this period and is illustrated in film taken of 8`h Brigade troops, 
including members of the 2nd Battalion, at a packed open-air service just before D- 
si Day. 
49 2d Battalion War Diary 15-16th March 1944. 
50 Letter from Jack Pearse to his wife Dorothy, dated Thursday 1" June 1944. Copies supplied by the 
family. 
51 Film A70 15-1 and 15-2, The P Division rehearses its D-Day invasion role during Operation Fabius, 
IWM. 
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At the beginning of May 1944, Force S (Sword Beach) took part in exercise Fabius 4, 
landing to the west of Littlehampton. In the same optimistic note adopted throughout 
the Regimental History, its author argued that `the last great try-out exercises such as 
"Fabius" had resulted in but very minor deficiencies in the arrangements coming to 
light'. 52 Others who witnessed the exercise, have focused on the confusion associated 
with this exercise. Under stormy conditions, some troops lost their lives, landing craft 
became disordered and the exercises were called off. It was thought that many more 
weeks of training would be needed, yet time had run out. 53 Whatever the official 
reports, the Divisional Commander, in a letter to the 2 °d Battalion wrote `the exercise 
went very well' and `all were particularly impressed with the enthusiasm and 
cheerfulness of the troops'54 in an effort to sustain morale in the run-up to D-Day. In 
another attempt to foster confidence in the task ahead, the battalion attended a 
demonstration on beach clearance by 79 Sqn RE, using AVRE, at Littlehampton. 
For the D-Day troops, training was focused intensively on preparations for the assault as 
its importance was so great. However the long build-up for the 2 °d Battalion ensured 
that there was also ample opportunity for house-to-house fighting to be practised 
including the technique of `mouseholing' whereby soldiers learnt `tunnelling from one 
house to the next when we couldn't go out. You knocked a hole through the wall' 55 
These house-clearing skills would prove especially useful for those serving later, in 
Holland and Germany. The longer-serving interviewees had specialist street fighting 
skills which were practised in Glasgow: `You are running through the houses and. . 
. they had taken the window frames out and you have got to run through these houses 
52 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 164. 53 Paul Lund and Harry Ludlam, The War of the Landing Craft (London, 1976). 54 Quoted in the Bn War Diary. A visit by General D. W. Eisenhower was also recorded on 13th May 
1944, with his subsequent letter stating `It was good to see your Division looking so fit and in such good 
spirits'. The King inspected the battalion on 19 May. 5 Extract from interview with Alf Ackroyd 10th February 2002. 
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with your rifle and that, and you have got to run straight through the window, and you 
have got an eight or ten foot drop there to the basement'. 56 
Clearly, both the length of time available to the battalion between Dunkirk and D-Day, 
and its specific task for the invasion, ensured that the level of training received by the 
longer-serving infantrymen was comprehensive, detailed and designed to achieve 
success in taking the initial objectives. Despite fears of heavy casualties during D-Day, 
the training also ensured that those coming through the assault on the beach physically 
unscathed, would possess the necessary skills and knowledge to fight during the 
subsequent months. The long preparation also meant that those serving on D-Day had 
had the opportunity to undergo full section, platoon, and company training. Despite the 
high casualties inflicted on D-Day, this training would prove beneficial during the 
Normandy campaign. 57 
Training of the Reinforcements. 
As has already been noted, the level of training received by reinforcements post D-Day, 
was the same during basic training but differed thereafter. Reinforcements underwent a 
short, but intensive twelve weeks of additional training, focusing on fitness, weapons 
handling and `hardening off. There had certainly been substantial improvements in 
training of reinforcements since earlier in the war. Major General J. S. Nichols wrote 
that of 860 men posted to 50th Division, Eighth Army, in 1942, only about 25 per cent 
had done any field firing and 131 had never thrown a live grenade. 58 The 2°d Battalion 
reinforcements interviewed, were without doubt trained to a higher standard for 
overseas service. The conditions experienced in the bocage of Normandy, with its high, 
impenetrable hedges and deep ditches providing ideal cover for the defending forces, 
reinforced the need for troops to be able to withstand long periods without sleep or 
56 Extract from interview with Alf Harrison 5`h May 2000. 
S' Where such opportunities were lacking, it was considered a great handicap, ie Lt Col P. H. Richardson 
of 7`h Bn The Green Howards. Papers at the Green Howards Regimental Museum, Richmond. "Report by Major General J. S. Nichols. NA (W0201/2590). 
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personal comforts, to be able to `dig-in' quickly after putting in an attack and to be as 
aware as possible of proper battle conditions in the short time available. It was in this 
area of battle readiness that training faltered. Of course, as the interviewees argued, it is 
impossible to simulate real battle conditions. 59 `Battle inoculation' came to be regarded 
as increasingly important as the war progressed. Live firing exercises, village and town 
fighting courses, coping with loud explosions and firing at moving targets all featured in 
the training of the longer-serving members of the 2nd Battalion. 60 However, none of the 
reinforcement interviewees mentioned such exercises, in contrast to the D-Day veterans, 
who had a much longer training period. That is not to argue that such exercises did not 
take place, more that within the realm of additional training, other aspects, particularly 
the `hardening off exercises were those which produced more vivid recall. Denis Cade 
remembered these exercises clearly: 
Then I moved to Longhorsely in Northumberland. Believe 
me it was tough. It was winter. They'd take you out for a 
couple of days and you had to dig trenches and sleep in 
them at night. You'd put your gas cape over you and your 
overcoat. But it was only the same as being at the front. It 
was the toughening up period 61 
The most important transition between training and proper battle conditions, for all 
infantrymen, is the realisation that serious attempts are being made to inflict harm. A 
comment from one interviewee that `there were people actually trying to kill you! '62 
carried a serious message; it was the one aspect that training really could not instil in the 
recruits, it had to be a mental adjustment once on the battlefield. 
59 Diana M. Henderson argues in `The Scottish Soldier - Reality and the Armchair Experience', that there is very little you can do to prepare yourself for the shock of battle completely, eds. Paul Addison and 
Angus Calder, Time to Kill. The Soldier's Experience of War in the West 1939-1945. 60 In 1944, over 80 per cent of 344 infantrymen questioned in Italy, considered that realistic battle training 
had been important in preparing for combat. From Samuel A. Stouffer The American Soldier: Combat 
and its Aftermath Vol. 111949, quoted in Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing. Face -to-Face 
Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare (London, 1999). 
61 Denis Cade judged that his training was a good preparation for his life in the front line in Holland and 
Germany. Extract from interview 9`h May 1999. 
62 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
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Certainly two of the interviewees expressed the opinion that their training was 
momentarily forgotten on arrival in the front line. `Funnily enough, you learnt all these 
things about keeping your head down but when you go into your first assault, you seem 
to forget it all'. 63 Two interviewees also remembered digging slit trenches and then 
sitting, or sleeping, above ground: `Harry and I dug a slit trench and we were sat having 
a smoke. All of a sudden we heard an 88, well by the time you heard it, it was too late, it 
went that fast. I don't know if it went between us or not but we got down! 'M Keeping 
under cover was a valuable lesson that was soon learnt, to ensure personal survival. 
The longer-serving soldiers had strong regimental ties, instilled during the years of 
training before D-Day. However reinforcements had no such loyalty initially. 
Interviewees who were 2°d Battalion reinforcements came from various regiments, 
including the Lancashire Fusiliers and the Sherwood Foresters. 65 Horace Pinfold 
recalled, `actually without being nasty, we had never heard of the East Yorkshire 
Regiment. Our regiment was the Royal Warwicks and that is what we were aiming 
for'. 66 Other reinforcements came from different regiments and one interviewee67 
remarked that after D-Day, reinforcements could arrive at the battalion, be wounded, 
and leave, before anyone knew their names. 68 Robin Neillands wrote that as a general 
rule British reinforcements went to battalions of their own regiment or to a battalion in 
the same brigade. Yet my interviewees went neither to their own battalion nor their own 
63 Extract from interview with Ray Robinson 19th September 1999. 
64 Extract from interview with Ray Robinson 19'h September 1999. A similar situation was recalled by 
Peter Brown, interviewed on the same date. 
65 Robin Neillands, The Battle ofNormandy 1944 (London, 2002) p. 413. 66 Extract from interview with Horace Pinfold 2°d December 2000. As with all the reinforcement veterans, 
Horace's allegiance soon transferred to the East Yorkshire Regt. 
67 Extract from interview with Alf Ackroyd 10th February 2002. 
" This experience was replicated in other units and also US Divisions. Robin Neillands, The Battle of 
Normandy, p. 250. 
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division. Since regimental loyalty is an important factor in ensuring men continue to 
serve effectively, the reinforcements were at an immediate disadvantage. 69 
Well-directed training can instil confidence in soldiers in their own abilities and the 
quality of their equipment. However the element of personal risk that a soldier deems 
acceptable and the level of responsibility that he is willing to accept, still varies 
according to the personality of the infantryman concerned. Wilf Todd, for example, was 
keen to seek promotion, as it brought extra pay, and carried a Bren gun single-handedly 
around a testing assault course to draw attention to his strength and ability. This attempt 
did not work, yet during active service in north-west Europe, he had a chance of 
promotion when his Sergeant reported sick in preference to leading an attack: 
We set off to clear a small wood. Chris Lochran said "Do I 
have to lead you buggers everywhere? " and I took 
umbrage and said "No bugger has to lead me, I can lead 
myself. But he's getting paid for doing the job". So Chris 
Lochran said "If you get paid will you bloody well do it? " 
and I said yes. So I was section commander just like that 70 
My point here is that regardless of rank, some will be more prepared than others to 
display leadership qualities, because it is in their nature to do so. The argument put 
forward in secondary literature, that individual soldiers failed to show initiative because 
their training directed them towards complete obedience, may be true of a proportion of 
infantrymen, but these men would not possess leadership skills in any event and would 
not choose to exercise initiative. What they preferred, was to be led by others, of any 
rank, who possessed these skills. Arthur Smith remembered one such example: 
When we were in Venraij I remember this section. . . and there is this lad leading. He weren't a Lance Corporal, he 
was just a private, but he took charge, which I could well 
understand. He was one of them sort. And he were in 
charge of that section marching up the street with rifles 
over their shoulders, you know. Just marching up street 
one day. I don't know where they were going or anything, 
69 The mutiny at Salerno was as a result of men being drafted to divisions other than their own. The men 
refused to be transferred, see Robert H Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World 
War (London, 1958) p. 215. 
70 Extracts from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
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but it were just the sight of him being the leader of the 
section. 7' 
That initiative was recognised and rewarded by High Command is evident in the awards 
made to Private J. Roberts of the 2nd Battalion, who received a certificate for initiative 
and gallantry while under fire at the Chateau de la Londe on 28th June 1944, and another 
for gallantry and leadership in taking command of his section during an action on the 
Udem road on 27th February 1945.72 However it is clear that displays of initiative and 
leadership from the ranks were not commonplace. The argument that certain men will 
display leadership abilities, regardless of rank, reflects John Keegan's idea of the `big 
man', the person who can wield power over the others and who is a `key figure in the 
way battles work'. Such `big men' are the ones who bring battles alive and who 
encourage others to follow them, yet may not hold any rank at all, indeed `authority 
may disapprove of him and his comrades may even dislike him'. 73 
The doctrine of the British army was to stress obedience before all other attributes, 
otherwise it was believed that once in battle morale would falter and serious problems 
would ensue. 74 This prevailing attitude is evident in a chapter of John Scruton's memoir 
entitled `On not being paid to think', whereby he wrote that in reality, he was being paid 
not to think. However it was also increasingly recognised that due to the nature of 
modern warfare, soldiers would inevitably be split into small groups on the battlefield, 
rather than be under the direct control of officers, and may therefore need to make their 
own decisions on occasion, thus confronting `the army with a serious conundrum that it 
never really solved' 75 The major attempt to reconcile the two positions was by 
implementing educational training, however, in practice the hours devoted to formal 
71 Extract from interview with Arthur Smith 27th September 1999. 
M Records of the Regimental Museum of the Prince of Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire, York. 73 John Keegan, Part 1. Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation, pp. 8-9, eds. Paul Addison and Angus 
Calder, Time to Kill. The Soldier's Experience of War in the West 1939-1945. 74 David French. Raising Churchill's Army. The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945 
(Oxford and New York, 2000). 
75 Ibid., p. 56. 
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drill were far in excess to those on education. 76 1 would argue that those men who were 
predisposed to showing leadership and intelligent initiative would do so, regardless of 
the different focuses during training. 
It is also apparent that writers equate the less educated recruits, who were more likely to 
enter the infantry, with having a lesser ability to display initiative. 77 It must be 
acknowledged that these recruits had few educational opportunities during this period, 
often due to family circumstances. Many of those interviewed were obliged to leave 
school at the earliest permitted age, in order to contribute towards family finances. 
However this does not mean that they were unintelligent, far from it, and many 
displayed both initiative and a strong desire to capitalise on opportunities within the 
army and in civilian life post-war. 
Certainly, infantrymen were willing to be exposed to differing levels of personal risk, 
depending on their personalities and the length of time they had already served in the 
front line. One NCO, Alf Ackroyd, was sympathetic towards the reluctance of his men 
to take risks in action. He maintained that perhaps he too, may have been more reluctant 
to expose himself to dangerous situations without his `stripe', although he was angry 
with those who did not come to the rescue of their mates, buried in collapsing slit 
trenches under shellfire, who were calling for assistance. 8 Wilf Todd, once section 
commander, remembered calling to his section to follow him into a wood. Having 
advanced quite some way, he discovered that no-one had followed him and he was 
making the advance single-handed. 79 This situation was by no means an isolated 
incident and was certainly found within other battalions. 80 Some refused the opportunity 
of promotion because it not only conferred responsibility, but could cause problems 
76 Ibid., p. 56. 
n David French, Raising Churchill's Army p. 65 and Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the 
British Army 1940-44. From Dunkirk to D-Day p. 54. 
78 Interview with Alf Ackroyd 10`" February 2002. 
79 Information relayed to author by Wilf Todd at the 2°d Battalion Veterans' Group reunion April 2005. 
80 See Sean Longden, To the Victor the Spoils. D-Day to VE Day, the Reality behind the Heroism 
(Gloucs, 2004). 
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with those who were formerly friends. This reluctance by some infantrymen, generally, 
to accept promotion, also concealed another important fact: `My six weeks as a lance- 
corporal -I kept the stripe until Egypt - had convinced me that I was better off as a 
rifleman. Three weeks' fighting had confirmed this. Riflemen lived longer than 
NCOs'. 81 
Tommy Hall was an accomplished NCO who was commended for his initiative at 
Udem: `we had to crawl up to this house and we could hear them (the Germans) talking. 
If we'd have done what the officer told us, we'd have all been killed. They said it was 
empty. We chucked a grenade in and got out of it'. 82 Tommy found it frustrating that he 
was not given any information other than his objective, and felt more knowledge would 
have helped him, although he acknowledged that often the officers were not furnished 
with more details either. Tommy is an example of an infantryman, albeit an NCO, 
prepared to use his initiative. He is remembered by the reinforcements as not 
differentiating between the ranks, despite his own higher position. Horace Pinfold 
joined Hall's section in Holland and was told he would be carrying the PIAT83: `so I 
stood to attention and said "yes, Corporal". He said "none of that. . . You are not 
in 
training any more. This is the real thing and I haven't got time for all that bull", and 
those are the words he said I remember'. 84 Tommy Hall claimed during his interview 
that he did not enjoy assuming responsibility. However he was certainly very good at it, 
and the reinforcement interviewees remember Hall as a tough and skilful Corporal. 
Having demonstrated that the reinforcements were not given training for as long, or in 
as much depth as those trained for the Normandy landings, I will now consider how the 
longer-serving infantrymen viewed the readiness of the reinforcements for action and 
how the reinforcements themselves measured their preparation. One of the interviewees, 
81 Alex Bowlby, The Recollections of Rieman Bowlby (London, 1999) p. 88. 82 Extract from interview with Tommy Hall 17th July 1999. 
83 Projectile Infantry Anti-Tank. 
84 Extract from interview with Horace Pinfold 2nd December 2000. 
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when asked whether he thought that the reinforcements were well enough trained for 
their role defended them by replying, `Oh they was alright. They was just the same. If 
you put a rifle in his hands he was alright. He was able to pull the trigger, and that is all 
he had got to do'. 85 However others felt there to be a definite lack in battle readiness: 
You used to get these young lads come out and they 
wouldn't last 3 or 4 days before they were killed. In 
comparison, they didn't have as much training. We'd been 
there since the landings and we'd trained under the 
conditions. You've got to learn in the army, you've got to 
be wise, otherwise you don't survive. You learnt the hard 
way. 86 
As a Corporal, in command of a section of eight men, John Scruton was ideally placed 
to judge the performance of the reinforcements: `you had to tell them just what to do 
whereas the others knew by training and experience how to react in a variety of 
circumstances'. 87 It should be stressed that there would be different standards of training 
received by the reinforcements, as they were trained at Infantry Training Centres in 
various regions in the UK, and the quality of training depended on the abilities of the 
individual instructors. Certainly Lt Col Renison considered the training of the 
reinforcements to be lacking. During training for river crossings under Lt Dick Laming, 
an officer of the Royal Navy, in January 1945, Laming voiced his concern that, `with 
the exception of B Coy's Chindits, the general standard of fieldcraft was low'. Renison 
agreed, but argued, `I could understand this however as most of our old original men 
were gone and the standard of reinforcements could never be the standard of a battalion 
trained together'. 88 
The reinforcement interviewees themselves however, certainly felt that they were 
prepared for their role: `When we were in training it was exactly what you met over 
85 Extract from interview with Les Turner 2nd January 2003. 
86 Extract from interview with Doug Parker 17th July 1999. Major `Banger' King also wrote to his batman 
Blenkhorn, on 29th August 1944, saying he was pleased to see the return of several wounded men to the 
battalion as `the stuff we had been getting lately was pretty bad as you know', (IWM 93/39/1). 87 Extract from interview with John Scruton 31 s` May 1999. 
88 Lt Col J. D. W. Renison's memoir p. 212. 
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there so you knew what to expect. You had live ammunition fired at you and nights 
sleeping out. We were very well trained with all kinds of weapons. When we got in 
action the lads there said they'd keep an eye on us'. 89 Indeed, newly arriving 
reinforcements to the battalion were encouraged to `keep their heads down'. Alf 
Harrison, a D-Day veteran remembered: 
some of them think - oh they are jack the lads, they do this 
and do that, but they are the first ones who cops it. And 
what we do, we try to ease them up and tell them. "Don't 
be silly, don't do nothing silly and just wait, do what you 
are told and don't take chances", and that is all you can 
tell them otherwise they start going off and then they go 
out looking for all souvenirs to take home ... 
90 
When asked whether they considered themselves properly trained in order to operate 
effectively as infantrymen, the reinforcement interviewees invariably concurred, 
however it should be remembered that they had no point of comparison, as they had no 
direct knowledge of the in-depth training of the D-Day veterans. They assumed that the 
`old hands' learned their skills through actual battle experience and admire those who 
landed on D-Day, feeling that they were somehow `better' soldiers. Horace Pinfold 
summed this up: 
They were veterans - half the Platoon, and they looked 
after us youngsters. Like Harold Isherwood, he was a big 
friend, he looked after us and what is his name, Dougie 
Parker, and Ginger Baxendale. They were all veterans 
although they weren't much older than myself I suppose, 
but they were veterans and we looked up to them. There is 
no doubt about that. Always admired the chaps who 
landed D-Day. 91 
It should also be noted that the interviewees are the survivors of the battles they took 
part in and perhaps they learned the additional skills they needed quickly, in order to do 
so. Of course, luck also played a large part in deciding the fate of those in the front line. 
89 Extract from interview with Denis Cade 9th May 1999. 
90 Extract from interview with Alf Harrison 5th November 2000. 
" Extract from interview with Horace Pinfold 2°d December 2000. 
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Having considered the training and battle readiness of the individual soldier, I will now 
consider the arguments put forward concerning the effects of training deficiencies on 
the campaign in north-west Europe. One of the criticisms of the training in secondary 
literature highlights a supposed undue concentration on the initial landings on the 
Normandy coast at the expense of skills required for the long period of fighting 
thereafter. 92 It is true that the 2 °d Battalion underwent a concentrated period of training 
specifically for D-Day, including repeated landings from LCAs, weapons training and 
assaults on defended strongpoints. However, as I have already demonstrated, the long 
period of training available for the D-Day infantrymen ensured that other aspects were 
also amply covered, including street-fighting and house-clearing. Certainly all the 
contemporary training manuals were made available within the 2nd Battalion. Wilf Todd 
remembered the manuals were held in the Company Office and were freely available for 
training sessions, although they had to be signed for and returned 93 
Regardless of any training deficiencies, there is general agreement that Allied armies 
were fighting what was regarded as the best fighting force in the world at that time, and 
were therefore at an immediate disadvantage. Robin Neillands wrote, `in terms of kit, 
training, tactical ability, tenacity and sheer guts, fighting without air cover or naval 
gunfire support and hampered by interference from Adolf Hitler, the German Army was 
undoubtedly the best army in the field'. 4 This excellence was remarked upon in 
contemporary literature which described German infantrymen as `good fighters. They 
will act quickly and shoot with all their weapons'. Naturally this literature did not 
portray the Germans as invincible but instead attempted to reassure British infantrymen 
92 Julian Thompson, The Imperial War Museum Book of Victory in Europe. The North-West European 
Campaign 1944-45 (London, 1994) pp. 9-10. 
93 Wilf Todd was shown `The Instructors' Handbook on Fieldcraft and Battle Drill' (10/42) during a visit to his home 9`h May 2005, which he clearly remembered and described as `basic' information. 94 Robin Neillands, The Battle ofNormandy, p. 407. 
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that `if you watch for your opportunity you should kill quite a lot of them' 95 The 
interviewees largely agree on the excellence of the opposition they faced. Doug Parker 
commented, `the German soldiers were very good. But we came across the Hitler Youth 
just over the Rhine at Goch. They wouldn't surrender so you had to kill them and that 
Was lt' 
96 
Yet even amongst members of the battalion there are those who held different opinions 
as to the capabilities of the German soldier. Harry Smithson considered that `luckily the 
British were trained to think and act alone. Whereas the German had to have someone to 
shout at him and kick him around. Alone he was nobody". 7 John Folley, while 
according `great respect' to the German soldiers as fighters, cast an interesting insight 
into why their resistance might have been so stubborn: `The SS troopers held strategic 
positions to observe their brothers at arms, the Wehrmacht troops, making sure they did 
not desert their post in the front line. I have witnessed the Wehrmacht soldiers retreating 
before us, deliberately mortared and killed by their own side, the SS soldiers'. 8 
Of course, not all units in the German army were well-trained and prepared to fight to 
support the idea of Aryan superiority; many units were of lesser quality, including some 
of those on coastal duties on D-Day, often from countries under occupation. Lt Col 
Renison came upon such troops after a leave in Paris when he stopped to view a 
Canadian prisoner-of-war cage, `full of a most dispirited crowd drawn practically from 
every race under the sun - certainly a fair proportion of them appeared to be of 
Mongolian origin. They were a very poor type compared with the Boche we had been 
meeting in Normandy'. 99 Alf Ackroyd echoed these sentiments during his interview: 
93 Both quotes from Popular Guide to the German Army. No 2. The Infantry Division. War Office 1941 
2. See also German Infantry in Action (Minor Tactics) War Office Feb 1941. 97 
Extract from interview with Doug Parker 17`h July 1999. 
97 Harry Smithson recollections sent to author by Smithson's family. 98 `A Brief Description of the Enemy we Fought' by John Folley, Special Collections, Leeds University 
(ARMY 069). 
99 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 73. 
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when you came across the German troops themselves it 
was very stubborn and very hard fighting. But prior to, 
shall I say, Troarn and Touf-reville, it had mostly been 
foreign troops I think what we had and sort of second rate 
troops. Most of the Germans though, they fought to the 
finish 
.. and they were very 
Bolshie prisoners. 100 
It should also be remembered that from D-Day onwards the German forces were 
primarily defending, from well-prepared and dug-in positions, which is an easier task, in 
military terms, than attacking. The Germans' defensive strength was remarked upon in 
Lt Col Renison's memoir when he cited the example of Overloon where they were 
extremely well dug-in, and camouflaged, and thereby almost impossible to locate. 
Renison also noted the ability of German troops to implement delaying tactics, thereby 
allowing others to pull back and re-group in preparation for a counter-attack. The 
German army, according to Richard Holmes, '0' consistently outfought the Allies when 
faced with similar sized units, and was capable of inflicting a higher casualty rate. 
'°2 
The German army was also held as being of equal priority to the other arms, in terms of 
men and equipment, unlike the British Army, which considered itself the `Cinderella' of 
the services. Recruits to the German army had been systematically attracted since the 
1920s, by means of increased pay, a dramatic improvement in living standards and a 
relaxation of the strict disciplinary system. 103 Holmes argued that since the German 
system sent the best men to the front, they had confidence in their abilities and training 
and were consequently granted authority and freedom to promote displays of personal 
initiative. Indeed one example of this initiative can be seen in the following German 
account, 
During this action I learnt the worth of these young 
Grenadiers... There was no firing as ammunition was 
short .... From my tank, Turmluk, I observed that from time 
100 Extract from interview with Alf Ackroyd 25th February 2002. 
101 Richard Holmes, Battlefields of the Second World War. 
102 In `A Genius for War' by Trevor Dupuy, he argued that man for man, the German ground soldiers 
inflicted casualties at about a 50 per cent higher rate than the British or US under all circumstances. 
Quoted in Holmes above, p. 33. 
103 French, Raising Churchill's Army p. 52. 
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to time one of our Grenadiers would dash to the next 
trench, to help the wounded or occupy the position - on 
their own initiative and without orders. 04 
Despite the best efforts of the Allied armies, the German army was capable of resisting 
to the last and could seemingly rise again, despite a series of crushing defeats, 
particularly at the `Falaise pocket'. Indeed Hastings wrote of the German army that its 
ethos was that of `a society fighting to the last to escape götterdämmerung"°5 and 
aware that the Allies were intent upon their unconditional surrender. In Hastings' 
reasoning, German tactics were `masterly', with strong defence, concentrated use of 
mortars and machine guns and quick counter-attacks when ground had been lost. They 
realised the need for infiltration, and standards of junior leadership were superior to that 
of the Allies. 
Neillands106 maintains that the Allies' tactical failures in Normandy would not have 
occurred if training had been more efficient and also cites a failure to push on to achieve 
more ground after battle successes. He argues that more night attacks and infiltration 
should have taken place, changes should have been made in infantry tactics and some 
means found of countering German weaponry. Certainly, German weapons were 
generally excellent, including the Schmeisser sub-machine gun, the MG42 (Spandau) 
machine gun, effective anti-tank guns, particularly the 88mm PAK43, and accurate 
mortars. 107 However, interviewees viewed most of their personal weapons as adequate 
for the task facing them, except for the notoriously unreliable Sten gun, and spoke 
highly of the Bren gun, as well as the 25-pounder support provided by the Artillery. 
Holmes concluded that in the Allied armies everyone believed themselves to be 
individuals with rights and `compounded by deficiencies in doctrine, training and 
1°4 Account of 12th SS Panzer Div. Fontenay le Pesnil 25th June 1944 by Ca twin Hans Siegel, the 
commander of 8t' Panzer Co, writing of the Grenadiers of 3`d Battalion, 26 Regt. Translated by Scott 
Flaying, of The Duke of Wellington's Regimental HQ. 
'°5 Max Hastings, Overlord D-Day and the Battle for Normandy, p. 317. 106 Neillands, Battle for Normandy p. 409. 
'°7 Of the MG34 and MG42, Sydney Jary wrote in 18 Platoon (Carshalton Beeches, Surrey, 1987), `the 
crushing fire power of these very rapid-firing guns' amazed him, p. 53. Capt Michael Bendix described 
the 88mm gun as `simply terrifying' SWWEC (2000-356). 
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equipment though they were, the relative military shortcomings of the British and 
American armies also faithfully reflected the better values of their societies, and we 
cannot wish for it to have been otherwise'. 108 It should be remembered that the Allied 
and German armies cannot be compared on an equal footing, since the Allies pursued a 
democratic ideal, whereas the German army was imbued with the beliefs of an 
authoritarian regime, particularly the Waffen SS. Indeed, as Nofi wrote of the German 
army: `One of the tragedies of the twentieth century remains the fact that the finest mass 
army in history was an instrument of evil'. 109 It must also be noted that the German 
army retained, and used, the death penalty, whereas the Army Act of 1930 removed this 
ultimate penalty for most offences while on active service in the British Army. 
In respect of the criticisms of infantry tactics, lack of night attacks and failure to push 
on to take more ground, "" it is impossible to assess the validity of these arguments 
based on the experiences of one battalion alone. When questioned, individual officers 
have appeared genuinely bewildered by these accusations! 11 However it is evident from 
Lt Col Renison's recollections, that the emphasis during the campaign in north-west 
Europe so far as the 2 °d Battalion was concerned, was on attack, followed by 
consolidation of the ground taken, in order to be certain that it would not be lost during 
German counter-attacks. Attacks also took place at Brigade level, with the South 
Lancashire and Suffolk Regiments, therefore any advance necessitated success by all 
three battalions, otherwise the leading battalion would be forced to wait for the others to 
catch up. The progress may not have matched the lightning advances made elsewhere, 
for example by Patton, yet the battalion members were proud that they had never 
retreated from an area captured; once taken it remained that way, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 3. 
los Holmes, Battlefields of the Second World War p. 37. 109 Albert A. Nofi, ed. The War against Hitler. Military Strategy in the West (New York, 1995) p. 107. 110 See, for example, Timothy Harrison Place's Military Training in the British Army 1940-44, Chapter 
Five, The Failure of Infantry. 
Interviews with Hugh Bone in July 2004 and Dennis Hallam in October 2005. 
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Also, it is important to recognise the great strides made in the area of training since the 
outbreak of the war. The men of the 2nd Battalion had benefited from the experiences of 
those serving in North Africa, Italy and elsewhere, and it is clear from existing training 
documents that the lessons learned were passed on to those training in the UK. ' 12 
The Allied forces, by 1944, were fighting to finish the war and return home, therefore 
many soldiers would understandably be unwilling to accept great personal risk. There 
was an understanding too that General Montgomery would not unduly risk their lives. 
Having witnessed the scale of losses during the First World War, while a platoon 
commander, 113 and mindful of the lack of reserves available, major pushes in Normandy 
were attempted by Montgomery using concentrated armoured forces, to conserve 
manpower. It is inevitable that the vast majority of British soldiers fought with an eye 
on the future and wished to return home at the end of the war unharmed. One 
interviewee admitted that he had always harboured that thought, until the battle at 
Schaddenhof Farm, when he expected to be killed: 
At Schaddenhof Farm that night we all knew it was the 
end. The surprising thing was that we all accepted it and 
because of that we fought better. Prior to that you fought 
but tried to save your life as well. But that night we 
thought it was our last night on earth, so we gave the best 
that we could. 114 
As well as understanding the viewpoint of average infantrymen, that they were engaged 
in a necessary job which needed to be completed in order that they could go home, they 
followed the same belief which permeated the whole British army, namely that superior 
firepower could be brought to bear on the enemy to ensure that much of the killing 
112 Discussion on lessons learned during the year of fighting from EI Alamein to Messina by 152 Inf 
Brigade. This report was disseminated widely, to HQ 21 Army Gp (G Trg), Staff College, the School of 
Infantry and Senior Officers School on 6'" November 1943. NA (W0231/16). 
113 Carlo d'Este, `The Army and the Challenge of War 1939-45', in The Oxford History of the British 
Army. ed. David Chandler (Oxford, 1994). In The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery 
ofAlamein, (London, 1958) Montgomery said of the First World War, `the frightful casualties appalled 
me'. p. 35. 
114 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
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would be accomplished before they would have to cross the battlefield. ' 15 In fact, while 
artillery support could prove life-saving, as in the case of the Corps artillery shoot on 
Schaddenhof Farm, which protected the beleaguered 2 °a Battalion, it could also prove a 
`straitjacket', hindering exploitation of opportunities and restricting battalion movement 
to a pre-ordained timetable. 116 
More forcibly, Holmes argues, `Allied training not only of conscripts but also of junior 
infantry officers, most notoriously in the US Army, was deficient to the point of 
negligence'. 117 Certainly the training experiences of the D-Day veterans of the 2nd 
Battalion do not bear this out. It is a fairer argument when applied blanket-fashion to the 
level of training received by the reinforcements and it is true that the standard of 
training was variable generally, as it relied on the individual abilities of instructors and 
officers to impart knowledge to the recruits. 
Officer Training. 
To assess how efficient was the training received by officers it is necessary to consider 
the experiences of `hostilities-only' officers of the 2 "d Battalion, as their training took 
place during the war itself and differed to that of pre-war regulars. During the Second 
World War, the number of regular officers totalled 14,000, whereas nearly a quarter of a 
million men were commissioned for the duration of hostilities, so that `the wartime 
officer corps was composed overwhelmingly of amateur soldiers'. 118 In early 1942, 
when Hugh Bone joined the 2nd Battalion at Watford as a junior officer, most of the 
senior officers were regulars and he realised that opportunities for promotion at that 
stage would be limited. However the battalion needed more commanders, particularly as 
the training for D-Day intensified and especially at a more junior level, and these were 
principally `hostilities-only' officers. Once the campaign in north-west Europe started, 
115 Hastings, Overlord 
116 Sydney Jary in Eighteen Platoon, p. 19. Also Peter Balfour, of the 3`d Bn Scots Guards - letter to his 
parents dated 14th August 1944. SWWEC (99.90). 
17 Holmes, Battlefields of the Second World War, p. 34. 118 David French, Raising Churchill's Army, p. 73. 
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the opportunities for more rapid promotion swiftly became apparent as a result of the 
high casualty figures among officers. 
As French maintains, `until 1942, there seemed to be ample evidence to support the 
charge that class bias was undermining the efficiency of the officer corps', ' 19 with new 
recruits largely from the middle and upper classes. Early in the war an entrant was 
selected for an OCTUi20 based on a recommendation from a Commanding Officer 
followed by an interview. From April 1942 the selection procedure changed to the 
WOSB (War Office Selection Board) system, processing over 100,000 potential officers 
by the end of the war and recognising that leadership skills were not dependent upon 
social class. Within this study, the officers referred to were principally from middle 
class families and followed similar educational paths before the war. They were often 
grammar school boys and post-war, took white-collar jobs in the financial and 
administrative sectors, with one, Hugh Bone, joining the Ministry. In this area of social 
background of officers, as in so many others, the 2°d Battalion fitted the norm of other 
standard county regiments in the campaign. 
Major Clive Crauford, who volunteered for the Army as an undergraduate at 
Cambridge, recalled his path to the infantry reflected that experienced by the rank and 
file. Having tried for the Royal Engineers and then the Artillery: 
they got me transferred to an Infantry OCTU, which was 
dealing with ignorant people who didn't know anything. 
So I got, well, I was just right for cannon fodder. You 
were told if you were fit and enthusiastic you were good 
enough for the Infantry, and I found it was really much 
more up my street than any of these other ones. 121 
All potential officers firstly attended an OCTU course. According to French, the 
OCTUs placed `too little emphasis on producing leaders' 122 and instead concentrated on 
producing perfectly turned-out private soldiers who then required additional intensive 
19 Ibid. 
120 Officer Cadet Training Unit. 
121 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5`h November 2000. 
122 French, Raising Churchill's Army, p. 75. 
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training upon reaching their units. Of course, this additional training would again be 
dependent on the quality of instruction they received at their regiment. Certainly Arthur 
Oates' experiences at his OCTU reflect this criticism. In a letter to Mater from 164th 
OCTU at Barmouth he wrote: 
It's all red tape - rolls of it. Cadets must wash their hands 
before entering the dining room - you have to lay on the 
road in a gym vest yet get checked when it looks grimy - 
all idiotic nonsense like that - it's 20 times worse that 
being in gaol. And all this time we're having a war - 
people are dying getting blown to Hell with Air Raids - 
and we've got to be meticulous about swaying our arms 
and wearing a spotless cap band. For God's sake write and 
tell me what to do about it before I turn "conchie". 123 
Yet within a week he felt `rather ashamed' of his letter and reassured his mother that 
`I'm not really so badly off as I made out'. The physical intensity of the course, together 
with the emphasis on `spit and polish', was `almost guaranteed to wreck one 
completely', however `with a bit of luck I shall survive'. 124 The letters of Arthur Oates 
are particularly interesting as a reflection on the standard of training at his OCTU, 
because he had already served in the ranks with the York and Lancaster Regiment in 
Iceland and would not have expected to repeat what was, in effect, his basic training as 
an infantry recruit. Despite Oates' successful completion of the course, the 
concentration on high standards of turn-out remained a source of irritation throughout: 
By the way - one's hair must only be 1 %i" long- and one is 
a "cad" if one nips a cigarette and sticks it in one's pocket. 
Cadets are not allowed to smoke at all in the streets. They 
sacrifice everything like knowledge of weapons - tactics 
and real war for this fetish of spit and polish and smartness 
on the square; a system which annoys everyone intensely 
- after all are we here to learn about the King's Review 
procedure or to learn how to win the war. 125 
His frustration is clearly aimed at how the time at OCTU was allocated, and was shared 
by John Scruton, who objected to being assembled every day for 15 minutes before the 
123 Arthur Oates letter dated 24.9.41 SWWEC (2003/2075). Oates' letters bear no trace of censorship 
during his course at OCTU. 
124 Letter to Mater dated 28th September 1941. 
'25 Letter to Mater dated 26`h November 1941 from the Cadet Club, Beach Hotel, Dunbar. 
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evening meal to learn the art of `small talk'. 
126 Oates considered that the course should 
be used to learn tactics and the role of an officer. 
127 However, correct turn-out is 
considered important for the maintenance of discipline and an important lesson for 
potential officers to learn, in order to impart these standards to the `other ranks'. Lt Col 
Renison's memoir supported his CO, Lt Col Dickson's keenness on smartness both in, 
and out of the line, when on 31st August 1944 the CO held a full battalion parade to 
inspect the state of battledress and uniformity of appearance, confirming `it certainly 
paid handsome dividends, in spite of mutterings by all and sundry'. 
128 
After OCTU Arthur Oates then attended a Battle School course and was shocked at the 
report he received on his performance: 
Then the bomb fell - my report arrived from the Battle 
School - and gosh! it stunk - it took the OM about 5 
minutes to tell me just what he thought about me. One of 
the nicest things he said was that I had too big an idea of 
myself altogether - and lots more. Result was that my 
beautiful job vanishes (in the carrier platoon) and I'm once 
again in a Rifle Coy playing stooge to all and sundry. 129 
Oates did not reveal what his report stated about his performance. However he had 
sufficient time before he went into action on D-Day to put right his deficiencies and 
prove his mettle as a platoon commander, as Oates' award of the Military Cross 
demonstrated. All bar one of his platoon were either killed or injured and, despite his 
own injury, it fell to Oates and the remaining man to blow a gap in the wire using a 
Bangalore torpedo. He followed the basic principle, understood by all successful 
officers, in leading by example. However by leading from the front, casualties among 
the officers were disproportionately high, and I would argue it was the high turnover, 
particularly of junior officers, that affected performance and morale in north-west 
`z6 John Scruton, privately held typescript notes. 
127 Oates had likened his previous service to that of a concentration camp, with reveille at lam, 9am PT, 
loam Drill, 11 am Bren Gun, through to 5pm. 
12g Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 63. 
129 Letter to `My Dear Audrey', Oates' fiancee, dated 4'h October 1942. 
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Europe, even more than the lack of officer training cited in existing secondary 
literature. 130 
At the Battle Schools, officers received `hate training', whereby attempts were made to 
`whip up among students an extreme hatred of the enemy'. 131 The ensuing public outcry 
caused this training to cease in May 1942. Oates had clearly received this training as a 
letter to his mother from Inverary included: 
Weather recently has been lousy but the first half of the 
week was grand - the scenery round here is really terrific 
if you have time to look at it - primroses and bluebells all 
over the place -I should have liked to send you some but 
somehow I don't fancy picking flowers is in accordance 
with my position - particularly as I'm supposed to be an 
exponent of the much discussed "Hate" training. 132 
The words `supposed to be' reveal the divergence between his training, and the views 
he actually held. This was true for most of those receiving hate training, which was not 
a success in this country, although among US troops there was generally a greater 
chance of instilling enmity against Japanese soldiers, as the attack on Pearl Harbor had 
resulted in shock and outrage across the USA. 
Junior officers were under pressure to perform from the outset of the Normandy 
campaign and found themselves leading platoons at the age of nineteen or twenty, 
hopefully with the experienced support of their Platoon Sergeant and Corporals, yet 
retaining the ultimate authority. Their role therefore could be difficult, but was made 
easier by fostering an understanding of the men under their command. Oates wrote to 
his fiancee, setting out his thoughts on the `other ranks': 
I have great faith in this same lower class - they're simple 
- gullible and full of a desire to get something for nothing 
- but they're hard as well - they don't whine - they can be 
punished for their own mistakes and they don't get caught 
twice - and they never forget. 133 
130 See Sydney Jary, Eighteen Platoon, pp. l and 14. 
131 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Armcy, p. 57. 
132 Letter to Mater from Oates, Dukes Camp, Inverary, dated 24 May 1942. 
133 Letter to Audrey dated 29th October 1942. 
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Oates led a platoon in a series of exercises at the Divisional Battle School in November 
1942. Clearly his poor performance during his own Battle School course still rankled134 
and Oates regarded this as an opportunity to try out his own ideas regarding treatment of 
his men and demonstrate his success to the Commanding Officer: 
My chaps here are doing marvellously and I'm making a 
shot at a report to show the CO he doesn't know what he's 
talking about - it's the first time I've been left alone 
sufficiently to try out lots of my theories - I've had this 
mob here for a fortnight without a single charge against 
any of them -I believe that they take more notice of me 
telling them what utter idiots they are at times than just 
giving them CB. I'm in a rather unfortunate position as I 
work harder than any of them but I've always got the 
argument that if I can do it - they can and they're just 
starting to believe it. They're a terrible mixture - Yorks - 
Irish - Scotch and Cockney - but they all understand 
Billingsgate. 135 
During the first half of 1943, Oates led a platoon through the fitness training which 
occupied much of the battalion's time in Scotland. He was also involved in the 
educational courses proposed by the Army to assist the `other ranks', who had often left 
school poorly equipped academically. According to Oates, they were also used to `fill 
in' time until the troops were sent overseas. 136 In a letter to his mother, Oates 
commented on his one-day training in giving lectures to his troops, an idea put forward 
by the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA) 137 whereby: 
I spend a day about 30 miles away listening to various 
professors and Army education officers and then have to 
give a 15 minute lecture on some obscure subject to a 
syndicate of very intelligent people who doubtless, know 
far more about it than I do -I don't fancy the job at all but 
it's all part of the day's work. So as usual I shall just have 
a crack at it. 138 
134 Oates was not alone in receiving an adverse assessment. See Sydney Jary, Eighteen Platoon p. 12. 
131 Letter to Mater dated 17th November 1942. 
136 Letter to Audrey 18th October 1942: `we can't possibly carry on our "bash on" system of training right 
through the winter so various educational courses have been thought of. 
137 For a thorough examination of ABCA and its development, see S. P. MacKenzie, Politics and Military 
Morale. Current Af, f airs and Citizenship Education in the British Army, 1914-1950 (Oxford, 1992). 
138 Letter to Mater dated 28`h June 1942. 
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These lectures were not regarded as important by those interviewees questioned on the 
subject and were seen as `time off' from their proper training schedule. 139 
Oates' officer training focused on physical fitness and smart turn-out, yet from his 
letters it is impossible to assess the amount of time he spent learning tactics for battle 
and leading his men on exercises designed to replicate actual battle conditions. His 
letters from the first six months of 1944, which would perhaps reveal more, no longer 
exist. However the memoir of Hugh Bone, the Battalion Signals Officer, is clearer 
regarding the imparting of tactics knowledge to his platoon. While the battalion was 
based on the Isle of Wight, he daily led his platoon: 
in field tactics and battle drill among the blackberries and 
trees and bushes around Osborne House, "Left or Right 
Flanking" attacks, or both, but never Frontal attacks. 
"Down, crawl, observe, fire" when fired on by an enemy. 
DRINK, mnemonic for targeting: designation, range, 
indication, number of rounds, kind of fire. 140 
Bone remembered the period before D-Day as comprising exercises and hard work, and 
recalled a platoon-leading competition whereby he had to identify an enemy position 
through binoculars and lead his platoon in an attack. Bone was fortunate in that the 
umpire was a battalion officer, who made up for Bone's poor eyesight by whispering 
the location of the position. Bone became known as `Basher' because he bashed on 
ahead of the other competitors and won the competition for the battalion. According to 
Bone, his own Battle School course aimed to prepare officers for actual battle 
conditions by exhausting them. He attended a course at Leighton Buzzard where `the 
officers were divided into groups of twelve and ordered to move everywhere outside the 
building at the double'. 141 The concentration on physical toughness meant that `by the 
end of the course half of the twelve officers in Hugh's section were either in hospital or 
139 Interviewees asked were Wilf Todd and Alf Ackroyd during the 2d Battalion Veterans' Group annual 
reunion April 2003. 
140 Hugh Bone An Ordinary Person, unpublished typescript, p. 28. 141 Ibid., p. 35. 
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laid up". 142 By keeping up pressure on the young officers, the Battle School courses 
were designed to induce a level of stress to replicate the pressures they would be under 
on active service. By far the most stress would be engendered by the confusion and 
chaos of the battlefield, when plans needed to be changed on the spot and with 
incomplete knowledge of the current situation. 
The Battle School courses, although not wholly favourably regarded, '43 appear to be 
successful in terms of battle inoculation. One Canloan 144 officer described his course at 
Barnard Castle as `the most efficient, imaginative and thorough educational experience 
of my lifetime'. 145 The Canloan officers had received officer training in Canada before 
volunteering for service in the British Army but, as in the British system, the quality of 
this training varied. Lt Len Robertson arrived at the 2 °d Battalion in the run-up to D- 
Day, having experienced no training on Landing Craft Assault, `however with the co- 
operation of the Navy we Canloans had a crash course, one day, plus the big exercise 
shortly before D-Day. On this exercise we led the platoons that we would be leading on 
D-Day' 
. 
146 
Dennis Hallam attended the Divisional Battle School course at Moffat. At the end of the 
course Hallam took part in a live firing exercise on St Mary's Loch with assault craft 
crossing the loch under fire from Bren guns. On landing, he had to cross barbed wire 
and obstacles, while ground charges went off to simulate explosions, a procedure which 
was `scary, yet exciting'. This demonstrates that officers did participate in exercises 
designed for battle inoculation, although Hallam maintains that whatever training he 
received, it could not prepare him for the real sights of battle, particularly seeing his 
first casualty. '47 
142 Ibid., p. 35. 
143 Sydney Jary, in Eighteen Platoon was highly critical of the battle schools. 
'44 Scheme whereby Canadian officers volunteered to be loaned to the British Army. 
145 prof Frederick Burd SWWEC (2001-1346). He described the course as a `life-saver'. 
'46 In a letter to author from Len Robertson dated 27th March 2000. 
147 Extracts from interview with Dennis Hallam 1" October 2005. 
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Jack Pearse, who served as Signals and Intelligence Officer in north-west Europe, 
attended his course at 54th Division Battle School on 13th February 1943, and his 
detailed notebook outlines the aspects covered on the course, including Fieldcraft 
(Principles, Battle Discipline), Platoon Weapons, Movement, Use of Fire and Smoke, 
Lines of Advance, Defence, Section and Platoon Attacks, Attacking a Pillbox, Clearing 
Woods, Villages and Water Obstacles and Orders. Pearse's officer training did not 
proceed smoothly and his letters reveal a difference of opinion with his CO. 
148 
Personality and procedural difficulties were by no means rare, particularly for the 
`hostilities only' officers who of necessity had to learn the `correct' rules for procedure 
which the regular officers, with their longer service, already followed. Dennis Hallam 
was unaware that he should have advised his CO of his forthcoming marriage. Clive 
Cranford inadvertently failed to show a superior officer sufficient `respect', which led to 
difficulties on arrival at the battalion when Crauford discovered this man was to be his 
Commanding Officer. Jack Pearse appealed against an adverse report submitted by his 
CO, which cited a lack of confidence in his personality and drive in the field in July 
1943.149 However Pearse not only led a platoon during the initial assault on D-Day, he 
went on to forge a good relationship with his new CO, Lt Col Renison, which continued 
post-war. Such difficulties could hamper the promotional prospects of the officers 
concerned, and thereby their opportunities for higher level training. 
On-going training during active service. 
Once on active service in north-west Europe the opportunities for on-going training 
were obviously more limited, but training both at individual and unit level by no means 
ceased. It is evident from an analysis of Lt Col Renison's memoir that training 
148 Letter from Jack Pearse to his wife Dorothy dated 31' May 1944 in which he writes `By the way, 
darling, you must forgive my reticence about that awkward difference of opinion with the old C. O. last 
year: but it wouldn't have been very helpful to you at that time, would it dear, and it's the only little bit I 
have never confided in you - forgive dear? ' Copy to author from Pearse's family. lag Jack Pearse's `Appeal in Accordance with Section 42 of the Army Act', dated 25th July 1943 from The 
Barony in Scotland. Copy to author from Pearse's family. 
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continued to be considered vital, post D-Day, and every opportunity was taken to 
improve skills, particularly during spells in so-called rest areas. For example, towards 
the end of August, when the battalion was based at Fresnes, he wrote `the accent in this 
area was very definitely on training and after the first two days companies submitted 
training programmes every morning. A whole day and night were spent on training with 
craft for assault river crossing'. '5° The river crossing training proved to be unnecessary, 
for the battalion was not used either for the crossing of the Seine or, later, the Rhine. 
Then in early September, whilst at Les Andelys Renison recorded: `we immediately 
started off on serious training with a 17 mile route march. The country was lovely, 
though much more open than Normandy and unfortunately for marching, much more 
hilly. The last pull up left quite a few on their knees'. lsl 
In December, the training emphasis was on the use of infantry weapons as `it was 
always noticeable how reluctant a man was to use his rifle in action, we eventually 
made it a rule that every man, immediately on being forced to cover by enemy fire, fired 
his rifle in the general direction of the enemy and we found this had quite a considerable 
effect on morale even if it did no damage to the enemy. It is the old question of being 
able to hit back'. 152 This situation was by no means restricted to the 2nd Battalion. A 
survey of more than 400 infantry companies concluded that between 1943 and 1945, on 
average, only 15 per cent of trained combat riflemen fired their weapons at all in 
battle. '53 Although none of the interviewees considered there had been a reluctance to 
fire, two, Wilf Todd and Alf Ackroyd, '54 did stress the pressure to conserve ammunition 
which ruled out indiscriminate firing. After an arduous battle, Alf Ackroyd was 
'50 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 66. 
151 Ibid., p. 74. 
152 Ibid., p. 179. 
153 Survey under the direction of US Army Col S. L. A. Marshall. Training was adapted so that by the 
Korean War at least 50 per cent were firing, even 100 per cent at some points. Quoted in Dyer, War, 
118. 154 
Both interviewees were asked during the 2°d Battalion Veterans' Group annual reunion April 2003. Alf 
Ackroyd supplied the information during the reunion. 
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annoyed to be castigated for not returning with the empty magazines for the Bren gun, 
such was the pressure on ammunition and equipment. 
The rest areas were also used for training those promoted in the field. An NCOs' cadre 
was set up in Les Andelys with Major `Banger' King in supervision. Clearly the term 
`rest area' is something of a misnomer. In Gemert in early December `our time was 
spent largely in cleaning up with a certain amount of drill and ABCA thrown in', 
lss yet 
the men appreciated the need to stay busy and focused: 
We had a few short rests but even when you came out you 
had to keep up discipline. You couldn't just lay about or 
do what you wanted to. You had to clean yourself up and 
sort your kit out. The Sergeant Major got hold of you. It 
was probably a good thing. It was part of the system. '56 
In Renison's opinion, the emphasis on Combined Operations training in the run-up to 
D-Day had deprived the battalion of higher formation training in other areas and he, and 
the Commanding Officer, started to put this in place just a month after the landings. On 
15th July the CO was told to study `the action of the battalion moving as a flank guard 
through wooded country protecting the flank of an attack across moderately open 
country'. 157 Initially Dickson and the Second-in-Command, Renison, studied the flank- 
guard as a cloth-model TEWT (tactical exercise without troops), illustrating that even 
senior officers continued to polish the skills learnt during OCTU, Battle School, and 
regimental training thereafter. Dickson and Renison had also spent an afternoon 
`refighting the battle of the Chateau de la Londe'. 158 By walking the battlefield159 it 
became easier for Renison to appreciate the difficulties faced by the battalion during the 
period before he joined and he wrote `it had looked so simple on the map at Army HQ - 
iss Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 171. 
Extract from interview with Doug Parker 17th July 1999. 
157 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 21. 
Iss Ibid., p. 21. 
159 This is an on-going feature of service in the British Army and officer cadets continue to visit previous 
battlefields to study the decisions made at the time and lessons to be learned. 
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but so difficult on the ground'. 160 The outlay of the ground and high corn had made it 
easier for the defenders, who inflicted high casualties on 8t' Brigade. 
The skills were also reinforced during NCO training. A flank attack towards Epron in 
July was later used as a cloth model exercise for NCOs as it was `strongly reminiscent 
of the "one leg on the ground" and covered approach of Battle School days'. 
161 In 
February 1945, Renison implemented a series of `Officers' Days' for discussions and 
TEWTs, including the use of Wasps, the flame-producing carriers, demonstrating that 
training was considered an on-going theme during active service. 
A lack of co-operation between armour and infantry has been cited in secondary 
literature as a problem during the north-west Europe campaign, hampering the progress 
of the Allied effort. 162 Certainly the interviewees mention tank support only rarely 
during battle situations. However Lt Col Renison did cite an instance of co-operation 
early on in the campaign, when tanks of the 13th/18`' East Riding Yeomanry rooted out 
snipers in the village of Touffreville. Towards the end of August, every company had 
the opportunity of a days training with a squadron of the Grenadier Guards. Renison 
recorded that Tollemarche, the Squadron Commander `was most co-operative and he 
and his troop attended an Officers' discussion one evening on Infantry and Tank co- 
operation. We all learnt a lot from this form of training. . . but above all we got to 
know 
them personally on all levels and that was worth a great deal'. 163 Clearly the building of 
personal relationships led to a greater understanding of one another's roles. Eliciting the 
assistance of tanks not in support of the battalion could be more difficult. 1M Renison 
cited an example at Venraij in October during heavy fighting when tanks refused to 
provide armoured support to assist the 2°d Battalion enter the town. Finally an `officer in 
160 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 20. 
161 Ibid., p. 17. 
162 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army. Place refers to Montgomery's `horribly 
misguided tank-infantry tactics', p. 174. 
163 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 66. 
164 P. E. G. Balfour of 3`d Tank Bn, Scots Guards, served in an independent tank brigade in support of the 
infantry. He argued that `tanks must support the infantry and not vice versa. This is where everybody else 
went wrong'. Letter to `Daddy' dated 9'h September 1944. SWWEC (99.90). 
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a flail tank offered to shoot "A" Coy down the street with the remark "if I start off down 
the street, the others will have to follow me for fear of mines"'. 
165 Successful tank and 
infantry co-operation appears to rest on sufficient opportunities to train and go into 
battle together. Where joint training did not take place, setbacks in operations would 
result in a drop in morale, recriminations by both parties and a loss of confidence and 
mutual 166 
By February 1945, in preparation for the Schaddenhof battle, Renison remarked on `the 
complete ease of co-operation' with the supporting armour, and he `arranged with the 
Squadron Commander to meet at Tac HQ as soon as possible to recce the ground and to 
have his troop commanders forward later on to tie up with the Coy Commanders'. 
167 
One of the training aspects discussed was that of signalling between the infantry and 
tanks. Renison considered signalling to the tanks, particularly regarding ceasefires, was 
most successful using the phosphorus smoke from the 77 Grenade. 
This need for close support also extended to the artillery. On 11th August the battalion 
worked temporarily with a Corps Regiment and Renison was of the opinion `we didn't 
know each others methods or each other and I must say that I never really felt happy 
until Burton Pirie and 302 Battery came back to us'. 168 This confidence in Pirie 
extended to leaving the Command Post in his hands at one point during the 
Schaddenhof battle as `we had worked together long enough to know each others minds 
and Burton was always an invaluable source of advice and encouragement to me. I 
never had to make up a fire plan, it was always there ready for me to vet'. 169 As in the 
case of tank and infantry co-operation, it was only when the different arms had the 
165 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 122. 
166 Armour - Co-operation with other Arms -a report summing up communication difficulties between 
tanks and infantry. Findings of Colonel R. J. Colwell. NA (WO232/38). 
167 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 237. 
168 Ibid., p. 156. 
169 Ibid., p. 249. 
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opportunity to work closely together over time, that they operated efficiently as a team, 
rather than as separate entities with differing aims. 
In conclusion, infantry training has been widely criticised in academic studies and has 
been held up as a major reason for what is deemed to be the poor performance of the 
British Army, particularly in Normandy. The British infantryman and Allied soldiers 
more generally, have not been regarded as equal in ability to the Wehrmacht soldier and 
this, combined with faults in strategy, has been argued to be a prime reason why 
German forces were able to frustrate the Allied advance. 
Within secondary literature, the 2 °d Battalion is not singled out for particular criticism, 
except that put forward by the Commandos concerning D-Day, which will be covered in 
the next chapter. However, as a Line Infantry Regiment, these criticisms do encompass 
the 2°d Battalion. In relation to the interviewees, neither the D-Day veterans nor the 
reinforcements felt that they had received inadequate training. Some of the longer- 
serving soldiers considered there to be a difference, in that the reinforcements, naturally, 
were inexperienced. However the pressure on manpower was such that training was, out 
of necessity, confined to eighteen weeks and this was a very short time to learn the 
skills required for front-line service. In terms of training, the 2 °d Battalion infantrymen 
received the same levels of training as all regiments based in the UK during the period 
between Dunkirk and D-Day and underwent stringent additional training in preparation 
for leading the assault on Queen Red beach on 6th June. This particular training was of a 
very high standard. The interviewees praise the training they received and consider it 
adequate for the reception they faced in north-west Europe. None of them were of the 
opinion that additional preparation was necessary and reinforcements often remarked, 
unasked, about the efficacy of the informal `buddy system' which operated on their 
arrival at their new section. It is only when considering the length of time available to 
the pre-D-Day infantrymen, and the specialist courses they attended, that the differences 
87 
become clear and the evidence suggests that those within the battalion who were trained 
for D-Day were better prepared to face the different challenges within the north-west 
Europe campaign. Certainly, for the longer-serving interviewees, their prolonged period 
of training formed an important part of their wartime experiences. 
For those joining the battalion prior to D-Day, there was sufficient time to build a sense 
of regimental loyalty and pride; 170 for reinforcements, this pride and knowledge of the 
Regiment's history had to be learned during active service. Yet the real loyalty for all 
infantrymen was to their immediate comrades, those within their own section, who 
would remain watchful while they slept and cover them while in action and this will be 
considered in more detail in Chapter Four. It is true that not all members of the battalion 
would exercise initiative, or even take an active part unless forced. However they were 
outnumbered by the larger numbers of men willing to do their duty under good 
leadership. This good leadership was exercised by officers obliged to learn new military 
skills during short but intensive OCTU and Battle School courses. The quality of 
leadership would vary, but was largely commended by those who witnessed it at first 
hand, the `other ranks'. Of those officers named in this chapter, several were awarded 
the Military Cross for skills in patrolling, bravery during the D-Day landings, and 
successful leadership during particular actions. '7' The junior officers were, on average, 
from social backgrounds not unrecognisable to the men they commanded, and the 
young officers in the 2"d Battalion appear largely to have been afforded both respect and 
affection from the men they commanded. 
Despite arguments pointing to the inadequacy of training I would reiterate that overall, 
the infantry, including those in the 2°d Battalion, carried out their role well under 
difficult circumstances. They made the necessary progress in the north-west Europe 
170 For a discussion on the importance of regimental pride, see James Lucas, The British Soldier (London, 
1989) pp. 23-24. 
171 Dennis Hallam, Arthur Oates, Reg Rutherford and Clive Crauford. The Canloan officers were 
similarly successful - Len Robertson and Jim Fetterly were also awarded the Military Cross. 
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campaign across difficult terrain, against a skilful and determined defender and 
achieved the desired outcome, if not according to the initial timetable, as will be shown 
in Chapter Three. The evidence suggests that under such testing conditions the infantry 
should be accorded much credit for fighting well and continuing to fight while 
physically and mentally pushed to the brink. The 2 °d Battalion's major initial task, 
towards which all the training had been directed, was the invasion of the Normandy 
coast, and this fell to the longer-serving servicemen. An examination of how well the 
operation was tackled by the battalion will demonstrate the strengths of combined 
operations training, which enabled the infantry of the battalion to successfully take its 
objectives on D-Day. 
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Chapter 2- D-Day. 
Once it became clear that the 2 °d Battalion would be part of the initial assault on the 
Normandy coastline, training intensified, until the infantrymen were at peak readiness. 
Having already assessed in the previous chapter that the training was sufficient, at least 
for the initial operation, this chapter assesses the role of the battalion during the 
landings and how successfully its tasks were carried out. This is important in light of the 
criticisms levelled at the battalion in secondary literature, particularly during the assault, 
but also as part of the 3rd Division's `failure' to take its prime objective of Caen on D- 
Day. The criticism of the battalion's performance on the beach comes wholly from the 
Commandos, who crossed the beach after the initial companies of the 2 °d Battalion had 
landed. Patently, as special forces are considered to receive first-class training and are 
widely held to be superior troops, any arguments put forward by the Commandos will 
be given credence. Their comments are therefore assessed for validity, before I go on to 
consider the criticisms of the P Division more generally, in its failure to take Caen. 
Before assessing the role of the 2 °d Battalion specifically, it is important to consider 
how D-Day is, and has been, historicized within secondary literature since the war's 
end. Not only was the Normandy invasion the most ambitious and dangerous operation 
for the 2 °d Battalion during the Second World War, it was also the riskiest operation for 
the Allies, due to the scale of the undertaking, the risk of its being discovered before D- 
Day and the knowledge that its failure would preclude any repeat of the landings on a 
similar scale for some considerable time. The avalanche of secondary literature has 
reflected this appreciation of the vital nature of D-Day, and its successful outcome. The 
major change in how the operation has been depicted came in the 1980s, with a move 
away from the views of great commanders, strategy and technology, towards the 
personal experience of the individual. Holmes recognised this change of direction when 
he wrote: `for the last twenty years, the historiographic pendulum has swung away from 
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a top-down view of warfare, towards the worm's-eye view of the squaddy, the poilu, the 
dog-face, the landser - the man at the point of the battering ram'. 
' This significant 
change, together with an analysis of the longer-term trends will now be considered in 
more detail. 
The Historicization of D-Day. 
D-Day, as in the case of other momentous events in history, has become elevated within 
British national consciousness to transcend its original , importance, and it is perhaps 
now seen, in this country, as not only the most important event within the Second World 
War, but perhaps the best known military operation of the twentieth century. This is 
due, in no small measure, to its coverage in films, documentaries and books issued post- 
war, particularly the films `The Longest Day' (1962) and `Saving Private Ryan' (1998) 
and the continuing avalanche of documentaries covering every aspect of the operation 
on terrestrial and digital television channels, particularly the History and UK History 
channels. Its depiction, and the coverage attaching to it, now reaches viewers who may 
have no surviving relations from the wartime years and whose only knowledge is that 
provided by the mass media. In Britain D-Day is generally regarded as a hugely 
successful operation in which the Allies held the moral high ground and which signified 
that the military reverses were at an end. It was a day in which the Allied nations could 
celebrate a great step forward in winning the war. Yet D-Day has not always been 
regarded so triumphantly and those looking at the facts closely would discover that 
nowhere were the objectives met on the first day. 
The first part of the chapter sets out to examine the secondary literature pertaining to D- 
Day, firstly during the immediate post-war years and then the subsequent changes in 
perception and emphasis, as more information entered the public domain. This analysis 
seeks to explore how D-Day has been elevated beyond its original significance and 
1 Richard Holmes, Battlefields of the Second World War, p. 38. 
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reveals what it is about this operation that has merited such a reaction. Certainly, many 
D-Day books include a well-rehearsed list of facts and figures, in order to emphasise 
what a vast undertaking it was, and thereby how vital it was that the operation should be 
a success: 
D-Day was the greatest amphibious operation the world has 
ever seen, a truly staggering feat of logistics which 
involved putting ashore in Normandy a total of 176,475 
men, 3,000 guns, 1,500 tanks and 15,000 other assorted 
vehicles. Some 11,000 ships were committed to the 
invasion force; 10,500 air sorties were flown. 2 
The statistics are impressive and are often cited to justify the coverage of the event, yet 
for those living through the Second World War and experiencing it first-hand, the idea 
that D-Day was perhaps the most momentous day of the war may have fewer advocates, 
and it may be argued that there are other, equally important phases, that should be 
commemorated, both in Britain and, differently, elsewhere. The list might include, for 
Britain, Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, the fall of Singapore, El Alamein, the Italian 
campaign and VE Day. Alternatively, we may consider that Pearl Harbor, the battle of 
Stalingrad, the Holocaust, the war in the Pacific, or Hiroshima and Nagasaki merit more 
consideration that the invasion of north-west Europe. This is all true when considering 
vital campaigns for national defence or indeed events of tragic significance, but D-Day 
was different; it was a turning-point. Not only was it the first day in an eleven-month 
struggle, it also signified a return to the coast of France and a fatal blow to the 
dominance of Germany on the continent. It was vitally important that the Allies made a 
successful landing and gained a foothold that could not be dislodged. 
For months in the lead-up to the invasion, newspapers had speculated as to the timing of 
the opening of the `Second Front'. This operation was to prove a huge boost to national 
morale, as the years of 1941 and 1942 had witnessed a series of military setbacks for 
Britain and the first hope of turning the tide had not appeared until October 1942, with 
2 Russell Miller, Nothing Less Than Victory. An Oral History of D-Day (London, 1993) p. xiii. 
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significant progress at El Alamein. The British Government hoped that success on D- 
Day would provide a clear signal that the end of the war was in sight and that this 
morale-boost would sustain the population during its continuing hardships and 
shortages on the Home Front. The then Queen Elizabeth wrote `I can recall the immense 
relief and pride felt by all those at home'3 when D-Day was announced. This view did 
not take into account recent military advances in North Africa, the Far East and Italy, as 
well as naval progress in the north Atlantic, but reinforced the importance of Operation 
Overlord as a symbol that the tide had turned. 
Certainly, those taking part in the invasion were aware that the operation was an historic 
event. Bill Millin recalled hearing Lord Lovat's address to the Commandos at the final 
briefing on 5t' June 1944: 
I wish you all the very best of luck in what lies ahead: this 
will be the greatest military venture of all time, and the 
Commando brigade has an important role to play ... A hundred years from now your children's children will say 
"They must have been giants in those days. 
This knowledge of being involved in `history being made' was not confined to those 
serving in the special forces. Major `Banger' King's reading from Shakespeare's Henry 
V, to his troops of `A' Company, the 2°d Battalion, on the run-in to the beach, has been 
included in secondary literatures as an example of `one of the dramatic stories of D- 
Day', 6 and emphasises his own awareness of how important the operation was, both at 
the time and how it would be seen afterwards if there was a successful outcome. King's 
speech to his troops is one of the few references to actions of the 2 °d Battalion in the 
wealth of secondary literature. It is oft-quoted because it was unusual and contributed to 
the `glamorous' aura of the operation, from the readers' point of view. During the 
3 Colonel Michael Dewar and Major General Julian Thompson, eds. Foreword to D-Day Fifty Years On, 
(Tri-Service Publications, 1994). 
4 Piper Bill Millin, Invasion (Dawlish, 1991). 
S See Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day (London, 1960) pp. 148-149 and R. McNish, Iron Division p. 98. 6 Patrick Delaforce, Monty's Ironsides. From the Normandy Beaches to Bremen with the 3ti Division, 
p. 27. 
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course of the day, Jack Pearse, also of the 2 °d Battalion, kept reminding himself that he 
was `seeing history in the making', while being in the midst of the action. 7 
Not only was D-Day important for morale, it was also vital politically, as Stalin called 
for the invasion in order to tie up German units and relieve pressure on Russia's 
resources. It is only in the last ten to twenty years that the true breadth of Russian 
involvement and sacrifice has received proper credit within secondary literature, since 
proper examination of the archives has been achievable only since the fall of 
Communism 8 However, authors in the early post-war years did recognise that D-Day's 
success was only achievable because of Russia's efforts. 
Operation Overlord became known as D-Day straight away, yet in military terms D-Day 
is the launch date of any operation, not just 6 June 1944.10 Thus there were many D- 
Days prior to the invasion of France, yet secondary literature usually uses this title to 
refer to the Normandy landings, in preference to its operational title. 
There have been several distinct phases in the development of secondary literature 
relating to the invasion, each presenting D-Day in a different way and, in time, creating 
a public demand for new perspectives and new material, particularly after the two major 
films were screened. In brief, the trends have been firstly to portray the operation as just 
one phase in a longer-term campaign. Secondly, the first Regimental and Divisional 
accounts were published, which incorporated service on D-Day into a wider 
interpretation of actions in which the various units fought. Thirdly, the main 
commanders involved, issued memoirs setting out their own versions of events. General 
7 Jack Pearse of B Company, 2d Battalion East Yorkshires, quoted in Frank and Joan Shaw, We 
Remember D-Day, p. 265. 
8 Many recent books have benefited from this access. For example, Antony Beevor, Stalingrad (London, 
1998) and Rodric Braithwaite, Moscow 1941, A City and its People, (London, 2006). Also pictorially, 
Will Fowler, Eastern Front, The Unpublished Photographs 1941-1945 (London, 2001) which used the 
Kiev archive, previously inaccessible. 
9 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London, 1953). 
10 The invasion of Sicily the previous year had also been referred to as D-Day. John Gunther, D-day. 
(London and New York, 1944). 
94 
Eisenhower's account was entitled Crusade in Europe, " an indication of how he 
regarded the war, and specifically the north-west Europe campaign, as being morally 
just. During this early phase it also became popular to produce documentary-type books 
of the invasion, which told the story of D-Day from the viewpoint of individuals from 
both sides, woven together to give an overview of the progression of the invasion. 
Cornelius Ryan's The Longest Day is the best known of these works. The 1980s 
witnessed the beginning of the next trend, that of displaying personal testimonies 
instead of a more detailed explanation of the logistical build-up, political manoeuvres 
and general background to the operation. Much greater emphasis was placed instead on 
the actual seaborne and airborne landings, and the personal accounts added the human 
element, and dominated the content, to a greater extent than in earlier works. In recent 
years, particularly during the 50th and 60`h commemorations of D-Day, authors have 
attempted to supply fresh approaches to the invasion, some more successful than others. 
Each of these trends will now be examined in more detail. 
In the early post-war years, some publications focused on an unquestioning and 
nationalistic pride in Britain's achievements on D-Day. One example is that of 
Invasion! The D-Day Story June 6 1944 by John St. John Cooper, which provided a 
largely pictorial representation of events, backed by `bullish' language and failing to 
mention determined enemy opposition; instead captioning an image of wrecked German 
tanks as a `Wizard Prang' and describing the British assault as going in `with cold fury 
and determination'. It presented a patriotic, unquestioning tribute to Allied efforts and 
its purpose was to portray `the valour and sacrifice of free men who took part in this 
great invasion for the liberation of Europe'. 12 
At that time little was known in the public arena of the elements of logistics, or the 
deception work, although these were vital ingredients in determining the success of the 
11 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, 1948). 
12 John St. John Cooper, Invasion! The D-Day Story June 61944 (Beaverbrook Newspapers, 1954). 
(Introduction section, no page numbers). 
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operation. Other works, whilst acknowledging its importance, set D-Day within the 
context of the progress of the war as a whole. One influential work was that of The 
Struggle for Europe by Chester Wilmot, published in 1953. Whilst placing D-Day in its 
rightful place as the first day in a longer term battle, which came under the heading `The 
Battle of Normandy', Wilmot did agree that preparations for D-Day had occupied 
strategic thinking, in that `during the four years between the evacuation of Dunkirk and 
the invasion of Normandy the problem of crossing the Channel, in one direction or the 
other, exerted a decisive influence on the conduct and development of the war'. 13 
Wilmot produced his detailed work during the early period of the Cold War, amidst an 
atmosphere of distrust and fear of the Russian `menace'. He attempted to show how the 
events of the Second World War led inexorably to the post-war divide, and how the 
Allied failure to fully exploit gains on the battlefield enabled Russia to make significant 
advances into Germany. By his limited coverage of the actual landings, 14 Wilmot 
demonstrated that the planning and deception stages of the operation were the most 
crucial aspects to ensure its success. Close Allied co-operation during this phase was 
also vital and the Battle of Normandy `provided its single greatest victory'. 15 This 
victory was by no means assured at the time. As B. Liddell-Hart argued, `The ultimate 
triumph has obscured the fact that the Allies were in great danger at the outset, and had 
a very narrow shave'. 16 
When the first official history of the period was published the same year as Wilmot's 
work, it reflected the same dominant trend that continued through the 1960s and 1970s, 
that of placing D-Day within a longer-term context. '7 Tasked with producing a clear 
picture of the contribution of 21st Army Group to the progress of the Allied campaign, 
13 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London, 1953) p. 12. '4 Wilmot dedicated only 47 pages out of 717 to the landings, whereas 62 pages were set aside to describe 
the planning phase alone. See also B. H. Liddell-Hart's History of the Second World War (London, 1970). 15 Wilmot, p. 12. 
16 B. H. Liddell-Hart, History of the Second World War, p. 543. 17 See ed. Ronald Lewin, Freedom's Battle Vol III The War on Land 1939-45 (London, 1969), a year by 
year account. For 1944, only one account, by Douglas Grant, recalled the action on D-Day. 
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North covered the operations engaged in by this army group, and assessed their overall 
significance. Within this framework, North reasoned that with regard to D-Day `the 
achievement was considerable; but, unhappily, it was not enough, 
18 and that `the D-Day 
operational plan as a whole had collapsed'. 19 Therefore the greater proportion of the 
book, of necessity, related to the wider campaign and the subsequent eleven months 
2° It 
is interesting that the official sources did not claim overriding success for the operation. 
The aforementioned criticism is indeed more damning than in subsequent texts, which 
usually concentrate on the failure to take Caen, but look more sympathetically at the 
difficulties faced on the beaches. 21 
Post-war, in the first ten years, a number of Regimental and Divisional works appeared, 
each commissioned by the separate regiments, to provide a record of their activities 
during the hostilities. Each regimental account provided a different picture of D-Day, 
depending on the number of battalions within the regiment, and their areas of active 
service. For example, both the Green Howards and the East Yorkshire Regiment had 
battalions serving in the BEF in France, in North Africa and Sicily and in India and 
Burma, as well as on D-Day and the north-west Europe campaign. Consequently, this 
campaign was placed in its proper context as just one area of service among many. 
Referring to the East Yorkshire Regiment's service on D-Day, the author22 did make 
reference to the fact that it was the only regiment to field two battalions for the initial 
assault and he concluded that, for the 2°d Battalion, the invasion had proved `just like a 
training show - only easier', 
23 which is an opinion not likely to find backing amongst 
those taking part, in view of the high casualty figures. The author of the Green 
18 John North, North-West Europe 1944-5. The achievement of 21"Army Group (London, 1977) p. 46. 
19 Ibid., p. 50. 
20 North dedicates just 16 pages to D-Day out of a total 249. 
21 Another example of the official literature is that of Major L. F. Ellis CVO CBE DSO MC, History of 
the Second World War - Victory in the West. Volume 1. The Battle of Normandy (London, 1962). 
Essentially a reference book, it has become an important source for subsequent writers of the invasion. 
' Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment. 
23 Ibid., p. 179. 
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Howards' history24 made it clear that his role was to concentrate purely on recounting 
the actions of the 6t' and 7t' Battalions, and produced a more detailed chapter, assisted 
by his having contacted the Company Commanders and the Commanding Officers to 
request help in reconstructing an accurate version of events. 5 Naturally, Synge also 
included details of CSM Hollis' actions during the assault, which led to his award of the 
VC, the only VC awarded on D-Day. Both Regimental accounts used stirring language 
to record the events on D-Day and portray the battalions as having achieved their main 
objectives without undue effort. Synge wrote of the 6th Battalion Green Howards `the 
day had been one of many heroic deeds', 26 and Nightingale recorded of the 5th Battalion 
East Yorkshire Regiment: `like its sister Battalion, the 2°d, a few miles to the East, the 
veteran 5`h had played a glorious part in this momentous operation'. 7 
Divisional records usually follow the same format as the regimental accounts and 
incorporate D-Day into a wider framework. The importance that is placed on service on 
D-Day is dependent on the different overseas campaigns in which the Division took 
part. For example, within the Divisional history of the 3rd Division, 28 D-Day is accorded 
a greater emphasis, because during the Second World War, this Division served only in 
the BEF in France, before returning to the Continent as part of Operation Overlord. 
Accordingly, Scarfe gave details of the combined operations training for the assault and 
wrote of the progress of the advance on D-Day by each unit of the Division, 
acknowledging that the experiences of the Division during D-Day could easily have 
made a book in themselves. Again, he did not focus on problems, other than the 
congestion on the beach, and offered no criticism of the delays in advancing towards 
Caen, other than the masterly understatement `it was not 9 Brigade's day' 29 
24 Capt W. A. T. Synge, The Story of the Green Howards 1939-1945 (Richmond, 1952). u Both authors complained about the brevity of their main source, the Regimental War Diaries. 26 Synge, The Story of the Green Howards, p. 296. 
27 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 182. 
28 Scarfe, Assault Division. 
29 Ibid., p. 88. 
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Naturally the commanders involved in the operation, including Generals Eisenhower 
and Bradley, and Field Marshal Montgomery, also produced books shortly after the end 
of the war, 30 putting their version of events into the public domain and justifying 
decisions that had been made. These books attempted to set out the views of the 
commanders, to persuade the reader that theirs had been the right way to proceed, based 
on what they knew of the situation at the time. 
In his capacity as Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, Eisenhower also 
wrote an official report on the progression of the campaign from D-Day to V. E. Day 
which was published in 1946. Within the report, the rivalries and disagreements are 
glossed over, yet glimpses remain. For example, in Montgomery's memoir he states that 
it was his recommendation that the number of divisions involved in the landings be 
increased from three to five. In Eisenhower's report he is at pains to stress that he asked 
Montgomery to check the plans in December 1943 since he considered that the initial 
assaulting forces were insufficient and the front would prove too narrow. It may appear 
a small point, but this is an early indication of the instances of claiming of credit and 
criticisms of each other's performance that characterised the memoirs of Montgomery 
and Bradley in particular. In respect of the operations in Normandy, there was much 
subsequent criticism of the seemingly `lacklustre' performance of British and Canadian 
forces in the early stages31 and in the different memoirs the writers are swift to justify 
their actions. Montgomery attracted much adverse comment for the failure to take Caen 
and the inability to stage a rapid break-out on the eastern flank. In his memoir, 32 
Montgomery explained his plan had always been to tie up German forces in this area, 
30 General Omar Bradley produced A Soldier's Story (New York, 1951), General Dwight D Eisenhower 
wrote Crusade in Europe and Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery published Normandy to the Baltic 
(Germany, 1946). 
31 Some writers have included an analysis of D-Day, as part of their argument that the Allies defeated 
German forces only when they were able to bring a material superiority to bear, for example Carlo d'Este, 
Decision in Normandy and Max Hastings, Overlord D-Day and the Battle for Normandy For a full 
account of the development of the historiography of the British Army during the Second World War, see 
David French, Raising Churchill's Army. The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945. 32 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG. 
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thereby allowing American forces to break-out on the western flank, arguing `all our 
work was linked to this basic plot, which I explained at many conferences from 
February onwards' 33 Such tensions reflect Holmes' viewpoint that `the friction was 
more the product of individuals wrapping swollen egos in their national colours. High 
responsibility can bring out the worst as well as the best in people ... '34 Certainly, 
in 
the planning stages of D-Day, the Allied co-operation was generally good and problems 
tended to occur because of the differing priorities of the three Services and the 
competition between them. 
Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay's diary of 1944 was not made generally available to a 
mass audience until the 50th anniversary commemorations 35 The diary is an interesting 
document in that Ramsay did not have time to alter his entries for a wide readership, as 
he died in January 1945, although of course he exercised choice in what he recorded at 
the time. It has influenced how D-Day is regarded because it reveals the scale of the job 
facing Ramsay, the difficulties he faced, the different personalities and the strain of his 
position, which frequently left him exhausted. His role was all-encompassing: 
Ramsay faced the most formidable challenge of his career. 
He had to transport across the Channel the largest armada 
the world had yet seen, put it ashore on the beaches of 
Normandy, and keep it supplied from the sea as it began to 
penetrate inland. The stakes could not have been higher, 
both military and political 36 
This edited diary clearly demonstrates the level of planning undertaken and the 
attendant problems, for example, his entry for 8th April 1944 read, `the US were 
tiresome, demanding flotillas of M/S (minesweepers) which they knew I cannot 
provide'. 
7 
33 Ibid., p. 223. 
34 Richard Holmes, Battlefields of the Second World War, p. 24. 
35 There was a biography of Ramsay issued earlier; W. S. Chalmers, Full Cycle: The Biography of 
Admiral Sir Bertram Home Ramsay KCB, KBE, MVO (London, 1959). 
36 Robert W. Love Jr. and John Major, eds. The Year of D-Day. The 1944 Diary ofAdmiral Sir Bertram 
Ramsay (Hull, 1994) pXXXV. Of course the editors exercised their own choices in terms of extracts for 
inclusion. 
37 Ibid., p. 53. 
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From the 1950s onwards, as writers continued to portray D-Day as one facet of the 
north-west Europe campaign, a small series of documentary-drama works were 
published which produced a very different picture of D-Day as heroic, tragic and 
ultimately successful, by weaving together personal stories and historical fact. The most 
well-known example is that of Cornelius Ryan's The Longest Day. 38 Ryan attempted to 
recount the invasion from the viewpoint of those who served in it, from both sides, and 
regardless of rank. In so doing, he incorporated conversations which may have taken 
place and devoted more attention to the `glamorous' units taking part, including the 
Commandos, the British and American airborne, those in the midget submarines, and 
the Rangers. The result was enthusiastically greeted by Lt General James Gavin, who 
wrote `you will be spellbound, as I was, by this magnificent telling of a glorious and 
tragic story' 39 
This was the fast work about the operation which secured a mass-market and was 
instrumental in determining how D-Day was perceived nationally. Inevitably, given the 
style in which the book had been written, it was turned into a film of the same name, 
which reached a wide audience. 0 Well-known film stars of the day, including Henry 
Fonda, John Wayne, and Richard Todd, participated in establishing the Ryan book as 
the `definitive' version of the invasion in public consciousness. Thus, the invasion was 
now considered to be more important than, and separate from, the remaining eleven 
months of battle. In achieving this level of renown internationally, those who served on 
38 Although not a novel, this work is written in a similar style. There are novels using D-Day as a back- 
drop, including The Sixth ofJune by Lionel Shapiro (Companion Book Club, 1957), where the finale is 
the invasion itself. Written at the same time as The Longest Day, in a similar format, was David 
Howarth's Dawn of D-Day (London, 1959). 
39 Ryan, The Longest Day, front cover. 
40 The film was released in 1962 and had more than 40 well-known actors starring in it. Promotional 
`taglines' included `this is the day that changed the world' and `when history held its breath'. 
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D-Day became elevated to the status of heroes in the eyes of the public. More 
specifically, those who were depicted in the film, became instantly well-known 41 
Despite the notable exception of Ryan's work, the general trend towards setting D-Day 
in a longer term context continued until the 1980s, when new publications which dealt 
with the operation in isolation first appeared in large numbers. 2 These works were not 
the first, yet it was during this period that the trend became apparent and was linked 
with a move towards catering for a mass-market, rather than considering the operation 
in academic terms. Not only did new books feature purely the initial landings, a new 
emphasis was placed upon individual reminiscences as the main source. The trend also 
shifted from the importance of the commanders and the `greats' towards an 
acknowledgment of the historical value of the `led' who had until then been largely 
voiceless. This move heralded a new wave of literature dedicated to the experience of 
the individual and many books have since been published on D-Day in this format, of 
variable quality. 43 
This new tide of literature has also singled out D-Day as being an important event by 
use of increasingly elaborate language. References are made to its being `a pivotal day 
in human history'44 and `the single most crucial military mobilization of the last 
century', 45 as if justifying the place this operation has in public consciousness. 
Authors writing about the invasion, have made full use of the available oral and written 
testimony of veterans of all units. However not all veterans have been offered the 
opportunity, or have wished to record their experiences, and what is available in the 
41 Bill Millin, Lord Lovat's piper, was shown crossing Pegasus Bridge. His own memoir, Invasion, makes 
mention of the film's effect. The introduction reads `Most people will remember him from Cornelius 
Ryan's book The Longest Day, and the film of that name'. 
42 One of the first books to consider D-Day in its entirety was the excellent Invasion '44. The full story of 
D-Day, by John Frayn Turner (London) published in 1959. In 1972, Spearhead of Invasion D-Day by R. 
W. Thompson, (London), covered just the operation itself, and made no mention of personal experience. 
43 See Russell Miller's Nothing Less than Victory. The Oral History of D-Day, which provides a 
comprehensive overview but, in my opinion is not above criticism. Also We Remember D-Day, by Frank 
and Joan Shaw, published for the 50" anniversary, which includes 130 accounts, predominantly British. 
44 Jonathan Bastable, Voices from D-Day (Newton Abbot, 2004) p. 9. 
45 Martin W. Bowman, Remembering D-Day. Personal Histories of Everyday Heroes (London, 2004) 
Flyleaf. 
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public domain is a scattering of testimonies across units and the different services 
involved on D-Day. This material is regularly used in different books and some veterans 
have achieved public recognition due to the regular publication of their memoirs and 
oral recordings 46 
This new emphasis began with Philip Warner's book The D-Day Landings in 1980, in 
which he argued for a change of emphasis towards the recollections of the ordinary 
soldier: 
On 6t' June 1944 there took place the greatest seaborne 
invasion in the history of mankind ... In a war which saw 
one massive military action after another ... D Day stands 
supreme. It has been celebrated as a triumph of planning, of 
international co-operation, of combined operations, of 
political foresight. In this maelstrom of analysis, self- 
congratulation and euphoria one fact seems to have been 
glossed over. It was made possible by the ordinary man 47 
One interesting fact that emerged through individual accounts is that for some of the 
servicemen D-Day was not the most momentous operation in their service, nor the most 
arduous. For one, D-Day `did not produce the fear and frustration that we were later to 
experience at Arnhem' which entailed `back-to-the-wall fighting', 48 and another 
described Operation Overlord as `one of the most pleasant operations' of his service, for 
which he received a Mention in Dispatches, yet `I got nothing for months of grilling 
convoy work with plenty of danger' 49 
There remains an appeal for many, in reading personal accounts of the landings. They 
offer an immediacy not found in studies of strategy and planning, a glimpse of the 
horror, the tragic and the comedic. When reading books in this style, it becomes clear 
that there are common threads running through the individual recollections, which 
46 Memoirs quoted regularly include those by Bill Millin, Lord Lovat's piper who landed on Sword 
Beach, Capt Ian Hammerton, who landed in a flail tank as part of 22°d Dragoons, 79th Armoured Division 
and Lance Corporal Pat Hennessy of 13th/18`h Royal Hussars, who landed in a duplex drive tank. 
Hennessy's account, for example, is included in Russell Miller's Nothing Less than Victory. The Oral 
History of D-Day, Robert J. Kershaw's D-Day. Piercing the Atlantic Wall and Tim Kilvert-Jones' Sword 
Beach 3" British Infantry Division's Battle for the Normandy Beachhead (Barnsley, 2001) among others. 47 Philip Warner, The D Day Landings (London, 1980) p. 11. 
48 Ibid., Quote by Mr B. A. Tomblin, Glider Pilot Regt p. 57. 49 Ibid., Quote by Mr P. S. Evetts, former Lt. RNVR pp. 70-71. 
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reflect the feelings of pride, fear and comradeship among those taking part. It is usual to 
read of the awe inspired by the numbers of ships involved or the sight of the glider- 
borne troops landing on the evening of D-Day, or to find memories of the terrific noise 
of the ships' bombardments, the shock of seeing the first casualties, and feelings about 
the first contact with enemy forces, who often formed small groups of prisoners. 50 
Moreover, the same conclusions can be drawn, irrespective of how many books in this 
format are referred to: namely, that the landings on Omaha Beach came close to 
disaster, that those on Sword Beach were hazardous, while troops on Gold, Juno and 
Utah Beaches, despite opposition, were able to make good progress inland. Some books 
emphasise the role of the special forces, the paratroopers and the Commandos, during 
the invasion, 5' while authors often edit the extracts to emphasise the dangers or how the 
casualties were incurred. 
The quest for battlefield realism was epitomised by Steven Spielberg's film `Saving 
Private Ryan' (1998)52 which, although a fictionalised storyline, opened with a graphic 
thirty minute depiction of the horrendous conditions on Omaha Beach. This was 
followed three years later by the mini-series `The Band of Brothers'53 based on Stephen 
Ambrose's book of that name, again with realistic battle sequences. This focus on 
realism is very much a present day trend, sparing the viewer nothing of the graphic 
nature of the injuries, and the fear, as well as depicting what it was, and is, like to 
operate under battle conditions. 
Increasingly, since the 1980s, secondary literature has included due emphasis on the 
role of deception work, undertaken to mislead the Germans as to the Allies' true 
intentions. As more documents were released into the public domain, it became 
S0 See, for example, Jonathan Bastable, Voices from D-Day and Russell Miller, Nothing Less than 
Victory. The Oral History of D-Day. 
51 Warner has chapters on `Invasion from the Air' and `Marines and Commandos', while Bowman 
includes a section on `The Jocks and the Green Berets Forge inland'. 
52 The film was released in 1998 and the story was written by Robert Rodat. It featured a fictional search 
for a paratrooper of the US 101' Airborne Division. www. imdb. com 
33 The Band of Brothers book was written in 1992 and the mini-series premiered in 2001. 
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apparent what an essential role deception played in ensuring the landings were 
successful. Christina Goulter wrote: `because of the sensitivity of the subject, especially 
the work undertaken by double agents and other operatives, the full story of the Allied 
deception and intelligence work has not been told until recently'. 54 
Operation Bodyguard was the overall plan to convince the Germans that any invasion 
would not happen until late summer 1944, and that the likely landing areas would also 
encompass Norway and Greece. To this end, fake concentrations of armour, and bogus 
wireless telegraphy were created, and the work was given vital support by fifteen double 
agents, including `Garbo' and `Tricycle'. Up until July 1944, the German High 
Command still anticipated a large-scale landing would take place in the Pas-de-Calais 
area and withheld possible reinforcements in anticipation of a further invasion. This 
more recent understanding of the scale of the deception work by the Allies has therefore 
changed the prevailing view and coverage of D-Day. From focusing on the operation as 
predominantly a success for military hardware and soldiering, secondary literature now 
gives due credit to the extraordinary measures carried out in secret, to allow the armed 
forces sufficient time to become established in Normandy. 
As more anniversaries take place, it has become clear that the available personal 
testimony has reached a natural plateau with the advanced ages of the participants. With 
this in mind, secondary literature published for the 60th commemorations, tended to 
portray D-Day in its entirety, with fewer, and shorter, extracts from individuals, 55 while 
a number still followed the personal experience route. 56 What most of this these latter 
books share, are references to commemorative aspects, either in the Foreword or as a 
concluding section, and are often accompanied by images from the Normandy 
54 Christina JM Goulter, `The great shadow-boxing match', p. 65 in The D-Day Companion, ed. Jane 
Penrose (Oxford, 2004). See also Mary Kathryn Barbier, `Planning, High Command, and Deception', in 
Everyone's War, the Journal of the Second World War Experience Centre, issue no 9, D-Day. ss For example, Dan Parry, D-Day: 66 44 The Dramatic Story of the World's Greatest Invasion (London, 
2004). 
56 Examples of the latter include Peter Liddle's D-Day, by those who were there (Barnsley, 2004), 
Jonathan Bastable, Voices from D-Day and Martin W. Bowman, Remembering D-Day. Personal 
Histories of Everyday Heroes. 
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cemeteries. 57 Whereas books written during the Cold War period often pointed out the 
lessons to be learnt from D-Day, 58 in the last twenty years the message is that of 
remembering the sacrifices made and urge: `Do not forget what happened. Do not forget 
why it happened' 59 
As new opportunities to record personal testimonies are now increasingly limited, future 
literature will, of necessity, involve a revisiting of existing testimonies or republishing 
existing texts, a trend which commenced with the most recent commemorative 
literature. Naturally new volumes will be issued on each major commemorative 
anniversary, and some of the older publications were re-issued for the 60th anniversary, 
with new covers 60 These re-issued volumes are designed to capture fresh, younger 
audiences, yet the need to re-issue existing literature reflects the dearth of new 
information available. There are simply not enough new ways to portray D-Day to 
satisfy the unending interest. Publishers look for new approaches, yet there are few 
novel ways remaining to present the landings. Two recent works that presented a fresh 
view of the invasion are David Stafford's Ten Days to D-Day, 61 and The D-Day 
Companion, 62 edited by Jane Penrose. Stafford considered all the facets of the build-up 
to the invasion, but not the amply-covered invasion itself, while Osprey Publishing 
commissioned Penrose's volume specifically for the 60`h anniversary commemorations, 
featuring articles on all major aspects of D-Day by well-known academics. Other works 
published for the 500' and 60th commemorations have focused either on the individual 
beaches, regions in Britain, 63 or occasionally individual units, TM although these latter 
57 See Martin Bowman, Remembering D-Day. Personal Histories of Everyday Heroes, and Derek Blizard, 
The Normandy Landings, D-Day, The Invasion of Europe 6 June 1944 (London, 1993). 
s$ For example, in the Foreword to John St. John Cooper's book, Invasion! The D-Day Story June 61944, 
Viscount Montgomery took the opportunity to write that the war had been won, but not the peace, and 
that `the key to collective strength is unselfish solidarity'. 
s9 From Frank and Joan Shaw's We Remember D-Day, p. ii. 
60 One of those books republished was Philip Warner's The D-Day Landings. 
61 David Stafford, Ten Days to D-Day. Countdown to the Liberation of Europe (London, 2004). 62 The D-Day Companion ed. Jane Penrose (Oxford, 2004). 
63 For example, eds. Ian Greig, Kim Leslie and Alan Readman D-Day West Sussex (West Sussex, 1994). 
64 One example is Eagles and Bulldogs in Normandy, 1944 by Michael Reynolds (Staplehurst, 2003). 
106 
works are rarer as there are few units which have detailed personal testimonies from 
many of the participants. This dearth of British and Canadian personal testimonies, 
particularly on film, is reflected in the TV coverage for the 60`h commemorations, by 
the documentary channels in particular, who produced programmes concentrating on 
machines and craft used in the landings, the Mulberries, or those performing specialist 
roles, backed by a predominance of American personal experiences, as often the 
programmes are made in the US. 
Increasingly, there is also a new focus on travel guides to the Normandy beaches, to 
cater for the large numbers of visitors to the area, combining a look at the seaborne and 
airborne landings in the region, with a series of maps and suggested routes. 5 These 
guides provide the same material as other books, albeit in a different format. However 
they present the invasion to a new audience, those who perhaps would not learn about 
the operation except as part of a holiday, and those who wish to know the basic facts 
without looking at the build-up, logistics, or strategy. 
Considering the level of interest in the invasion, it can be frustrating for writers trying to 
generate a similar knowledge of later phases of the campaign. James Jay Carafino 
expresses this view in After D-Day - Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout: 
Operation Cobra proved to be one of the most climactic 
operations of World War II; yet, ironically, it is also one of 
the least remembered. The Normandy D-Day invasion has 
assumed almost mythic proportions in U. S. military history, 
generating volume after volume of research and study, but 
Cobra has never been the dedicated subject of a major 
work. 66 
Carafino included 'D-Day' in the title of his work to capture the attention of potential 
readers, however the book covers the subsequent campaign, not the landings. Clearly in 
65 Examples include, Major and Mrs Holt's Battlefield Guide to the Normandy Landing Beaches 
(Barnsley, 2000), Tim Kilvert Jones Sword Beach. 3" British Infantry Division's Battle for the Normandy 
Beachhead, part of a series covering each of the landing areas, and Ken Ford's Sword Beach (Stroud, 
2004), again part of a series. 
66 James Jay Carafino, After D-Day - Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout (Boulder, Colo, 
2000) p. 1. 
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the US there is a similar situation regarding interest in D-Day surmounting the later 
battles. 
The plethora of modem volumes, produced for a mass readership, provide a different 
emphasis on D-Day depending on whether they are aimed at an American or British 
audience, with, of course, an American audience being potentially so much larger. In 
US-published volumes, greater emphasis is placed on the American beaches, 
particularly the dramatic landings on Omaha. By adopting this skewed version of 
events, the British and Canadian beaches thereby appear `unchallenging' in comparison 
to the American sector, which is clearly false. 67 Many of the recent works are dominated 
by illustrations and here too, there is a pressure to discover hitherto unpublished 
images 68 As is the case for oral and written sources, most works rely on the same 
photographic images, which become familiar due to their over-use, in particular, the 
short series of images by Robert Capa of the troops sheltering on Omaha Beach, Lord 
Lovat and the Commandos landing on Sword Beach, and the Commandos coming 
ashore at Juno. The images that are well-known tend to be held by the IWM, 
Bundesarchiv and US National Archives. 
Since the Normandy landings there has been a gradual evolution in the way Operation 
Overlord has been presented within secondary literature. In the early post-war years, D- 
Day was not covered in isolation, but as part of a longer-term campaign and also as part 
of the progression of the entire war. The dramatic work `The Longest Day' signalled the 
change to a focus on D-Day as having an importance in its own right. For the books that 
now had D-Day as their entire focus, differences began to appear in how predominant 
the seaborne and airborne landings were, in terms of numbers of pages allotted to each. 
These differences tended to occur depending on which markets the books were aimed 
67 Stephen Ambrose, D-Day June 6,1944. The Climactic Battle of World War 11 (London, 2002) is one 
example. 
68 Examples of the heavily illustrated works include Derek Blizard, The Normandy Landings. D-Day. The 
invasion of Europe 6 June 1944, and Stephen Badsey, D-Day. From the Normandy Beaches to the 
Liberation of France (Surrey, 1994). 
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at, for example, mass audiences demanded a greater concentration on the landings as 
opposed to the build-up and planning stages. The demands of a mass-market resulted in 
an avalanche of works, and the 1980s witnessed a change in emphasis towards the 
recording of D-Day in terms of personal accounts. This trend has remained dominant, 
however each commemorative anniversary also results in a search for new angles, with 
varying degrees of success. It is clear that the number of works available is both a 
trigger for greater public interest, and has been generated in response to the demand. 
This public interest shows no sign of abating, particularly during commemorative 
anniversaries and in response to films such as `Saving Private Ryan'. D-Day retains a 
firm grip on the public imagination. 
109 
i 
Z 
0 
C. ) 
W 
Cl) 
U) 
W 
U 
CCM 
L) E- = ä 
Cz U- 
E 
O 
z 
" cc III 3 CIO - C 
IE 
z 
MIKE w 
LOVE 
aä 
KING " 
JIG 
32 
rp w " 
rc 
J 
"y 
paýý 
ý. ý 
EASY 
DOG 
i 
45 
1. 
\ '. 
a 
ý"m 
CL CL 
cä fl 
W 
m 
ý\ `' 
m 
rýý wý 
z W 
V 
All Cyz 
ý_ 
_ý 
ý_ 
\ 
JijP 
f 
R U 
d 
m 
0 W 
Rw 
W 
2 
CL 
2 
C 
Sword Beach 2nd Battalion Objectives 16th June 1944 
Ill 
PHOTOGRAPHED FROM 2ND BATTALION WAR DIARY NATIONAL ARCHIVES 
The role and effectiveness of the 2 °d Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment on D-Day. 
For the 2 "d Battalion infantrymen, D-Day was the spectacular moment that their training 
had been directed towards. For the interviewees who had served during the landings, it 
was apparent that D-Day was the most important operation of their army service, and 
took up a greater proportion of the interview's duration than any other single day of the 
north-west Europe campaign. These interviewees clearly wanted to bear witness to their 
involvement in this historic event, particularly in light of their being overlooked in 
existing literature, and being criticised by the Commandos for alleged shortcomings 
during the landings. 
In order to assess the validity of the criticisms, it is important to establish firstly what D- 
Day entailed for the battalion. The level and quality of manpower right through the 
ranks had to be at its peak for the landings. The Commanding Officer, Lt Col Hardy 
Spicer, was replaced by Lt Col Hutchinson for the D-Day operation. His was not the 
only replacement. Other officers too were changed for reasons such as age, as the 
overwhelming need was for officers who were fit and suited to battle conditions. 
Additional officers and men were brought in for D-Day, with the battalion swelling 
from around 800 to 1000. During the last six months the impetus was towards 
maximising numbers. In January, five new Lieutenants were taken on strength from 165 
OCTU and in February two Majors and a Captain were received. 69 Four Canloan7° 
officers arrived at the battalion on 24th April, which allowed them very little time to 
become familiar with the men they would be commanding. This situation was not ideal, 
but demonstrates the lack of available officers, in particular junior officers, within the 
infantry. 
69 From 2d Battalion War Diary NA, 23`' January, 2°d February and 7" February 1944. 
70 The four Canadian officers who arrived first at the 2"d Battalion were Capt James McGregor and Lts. 
`Robbie' Robertson, Hugh Neily and Stirling Reid. Capt McGregor was killed on D-Day. 
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Secondary literature often focuses on the logistics of the landings and the detailed 
planning which took place. 7' The plans of the battalion were a microcosm of those 
formulated at higher levels and the Operation Order No. 1 is a precise document 
outlining the tasks for each company. Security regarding the orders was extremely tight 
with the copies being kept under lock and key and guarded. No marks were to be made 
on the maps and portions of the Order not required ashore were to be burned before 
embarkation. The War Diary includes a breakdown of the objectives as well as the 
`intention' which was that the `2°d East Yorkshires Battalion Group will land on Queen 
Red Beach at H plus 5 minutes, destroy the beach defences, capture CROSSLEY 3816 
and secure RUGGER 399148 and CRICKET 404146'. `A' and `B' Companies would 
land in the initial assault, with `C' and `D' Companies landing twenty minutes behind 
them. It was the task of `A' Company to land about the middle of Red Beach, swing 
west and destroy the beach defence codenamed `Cod', together with `C' Company the 
South Lancashire Regiment. Cod was a formidable strongpoint, comprising twenty 
separate positions, including a 75mm gun, two 50mm anti-tank guns, and five different 
machine gun posts. 72 On D-Day, this strongpoint was not fully subdued until 10am and 
casualties were heavy. `B' Company would land on the left of Red Beach and swing 
east to destroy all beach defences except `Cod'. It would hold the defensive position 
codenamed `Skate' until No. 4 Commando passed through. The role of the follow-up 
companies, `C' and `D', was to assist the forward companies on the beach if needed, or 
to assemble at point `Pike' to move inland straightaway. Once inland, the companies 
would attack the strongpoints `Sole' and `Daimler'. The planners considered these 
objectives sufficient progress for the battalion to achieve on the first day. It was the role 
of the other, follow-up battalions within the Division to progress towards Caen. 
71 Robert W. Love Jr. and John Major, eds. The Year ofD-Day. The 1944 Diary ofAdmiral Sir Bertram 
Ramsay provides a good insight into the work involved. n From D-Day Then and Now, Vol. 2 (London, 1995). 
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Landing with the four companies were teams of engineers to assist with mine clearance 
and demolition of beach obstacles, a demolition team from the Pioneers and duplex 
drive tanks of the 13th/18`h Royal Hussars. Specialist AVREs, among the series of 
vehicles nicknamed `Hobart's Funnies', 73 would also land in the early minutes to assist 
in destroying the defences and clearing mines, although these AVREs were not under 
the command of, or in direct support of, the battalion. The section of Sword Beach, 
Queen Red, to be targeted by the battalion stretched from Riva-Bella and La Breche on 
the left, to Lion-sur-Mer on the right. The 1st South Lancashire Regiment would land 
alongside at Queen White. The 2 °d Battalion had a difficult role in that they faced attack 
from two flanks, from the left and the front, as in the initial phase they were the far-left 
troops of the entire invasion force. 
The War Diary provides a formal, yet sparse account of the progress of the battalion on 
D-Day and the difficulties facing it but cannot demonstrate the confusion about the 
ever-changing situation and balancing of conflicting priorities, the role of the individual 
infantryman, or the sights and sounds of battle. It also shows the importance of 
traditions within the Regimental system; an importance not just for the officers but a 
feeling which permeated all the ranks; that of Regimental pride and loyalty. A prime 
example is detailed on the entry for 5th June, when `Lt Col C. F. Hutchinson presented 
(the Glenearn's) Capt Hutcheson with a silver bugle inscribed with the Regimental crest 
and in return the ships company presented the battalion with a pike which bore the 
Regimental badge of the Royal Marines. The Battalion HQ flag made by the ladies of 
Waterlooville was then attached to the pike and an anchor signifying the part played by 
the HM Navy sewn to the flag'. To the members of the battalion, this combining of 
emblems showing the respect and comradeship between the different participants, was 
very significant. Having trained together for many months prior to the operation, the 
73 The `Funnies' of the 79`h Armoured Division on Sword Beach, included flail tanks from the 22"a 
Dragoon Guards, Crocodile flamethrower tanks and the AVREs (Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers) 
which were armed with Petard mortars. 
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sailors on board the Glenearn and the soldiers of the 2 °d Battalion in particular, had had 
the opportunity to gain an understanding of each other's roles, epitomised by Rear 
Admiral Talbot's pre-invasion message to all in `S' Force: 
The 31d British Infantry Division has been entrusted to our 
care. They are old friends of ours; we have grown up 
together; we have come to look on them as our own. Let 
every officer and man in the Force feel a personal 
responsibility for the comfort, safety and maintenance of 
his "opposite number" in the 31d Division. And, above all 
FIGHT; FIGHT to help the Army, FIGHT to help 
yourselves; FIGHT to help your ship; FIGHT to the very 
end. 74 
Many of the interviewees spoke particularly of the battalion flag made by the ladies of 
the WRVS in Waterlooville during their stay in the area in the run-up to D-Day. They 
wanted me to understand their gratitude and feelings of pride. 5 It is also significant that 
within a limited War Diary D-Day entry, this act was recorded in detail. 76 
There is no doubt that the interviewees recognised how important their role was on D- 
Day and knew that it was a momentous operation, for speculation had been rife in 
newspapers and there had been a general air of expectation throughout the country for 
some months. They were also aware that casualties were expected to be heavy for the 
assault troops as they had been warned in briefings. Despite this awareness, some were 
disappointed to be designated `left out of battle', having trained for the landings for so 
long. Jack Reid recalled seeing men in tears, 77 while Arthur Smith, who could have 
been left out on medical grounds, successfully appealed to his officer to be included. 78 
Clive Crauford, at that time a Captain, was not happy to be part of the follow-up wave: 
I am not in the least bit proud of what I personally did on 
D-Day... being out at sea while your friends are off 
storming the beach... you can't help feeling a bit of a rat. 
It's hell, all your friends are there, and facing the 
music... so I wasn't the least bit happy at what I was 
74 Message from Rear Admiral A. G. Talbot in Stephen Badsey, D-Day. From the Normandy Beaches to 
the Liberation of France (Godalming, 1993). 
75 The flag is now on display at the Prince of Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire Museum in York. 
76 2nd Battalion War Diary 3'd June 1944. 
" From interview with Jack Reid 0 July 1999. 
78 From interview with Arthur Smith 27th September 1999. 
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doing.. . and if I got ashore, I'd never 
been in action 
before.. . was I going to be up to the 
job anyway? I think 
most people felt like that ... We just hadn't proved 
ourselves. 9 
Not all the infantrymen were keen to be part of this historic day. Arthur Lumb 
remembered one man faking illness, 80 `he said he had bad stomach pains so they put 
him in a padded cell in an asylum. They had to do because he'd been briefed about 
where we were going and what time and everything. About a fortnight after we'd landed 
he was brought back to the battalion'. Arthur Smith saw another being put under special 
guard, feeling that `his nerves must have got the better of him' 8' 
The War Diary recorded that maps were distributed to all commanders of craft on the 
5', followed by a visit by the Commanding Officer to all companies and a short 
blessing by Reverend Victor Price, who was a popular padre with the troops, and who 
took over the medical attention of the casualties when the Medical Officer was killed 
during the landings, despite being injured himself. The War Diary does not provide 
details of what the padre said in his address but one interviewee remembered that the 
service `was very well attended'. 82 Wilf Todd remembered that the service was 
preceded by another speaker: `Before it got dark they mustered everyone on the 
welldeck. The captain of the Glenearn, Capt Hutcheson, gave us all a talk. He told us 
about PLUTO83 and the Mulberry harbours. He said that he'd like to lay another 
pipeline to pump beer across to us! '84 
The War Diary recorded that the convoy set sail at 9pm on the 5t', after a day's 
postponement due to the poor weather conditions and the next entry is for the 6`h June at 
4.30am when the landing craft were loaded and the assault companies were cheered by 
the remainder of the battalion who were waiting their turn to be loaded. By 6am the 
79 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5th November 2000. This is a typically modest response - 
Crauford took an active role on D-Day in subduing the gun emplacement `Daimler'. 
80 Extract from interview with Arthur Lumb 1' May 1999. 
81 From interview with Arthur Smith 7th November 1999. 
82 Extract from interview with Peter Brown 19th September 1999. 
83 Pipeline under the Ocean. 
Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
116 
assault companies were ready for the run-in to the beach. Nothing is outlined of what 
happened on board HMS Empire Battleaxe or HMS Glenearn, during the night of 5-60' 
June, for it does not immediately concern the military performance of the battalion. 
However that night is remembered vividly by several of the interviewees for differing 
reasons. For Dennis Hallam it was the rough sailing conditions, " whereas three of the 
respondents recalled an accident on board the Glenearn which resulted in the death of 
Sgt Eric Ibbetson: 
One of the section commanders in `D' Company, a 
corporal, had put a magazine in his Sten gun and put it on 
the table. As the ship changed direction the gun fell on the 
floor. The gun went off and several rounds ricocheted 
round the steel bulkheads where we were. A lad got hit in 
the heel. It was his 21St birthday that day. Another lad, a 
sergeant, bled to death when a bullet cut his femoral artery 
86 in his thigh. 
Some whiled away the long wait by sleeping, preparing their weapons or reading; others 
made their own entertainment. George Burnham recalled playing pontoon and winning 
around a thousand fiancs 87 
One significant facet of the interviews was the expression of fear, or lack of it, during 
the crossing and preparations for the landing. Clearly some of the interviewees had been 
asked this previously, by family members or friends, or, in one case, by a newspaper 
reporter. George Burnham pre-empted the question by saying: 
you are probably going to ask me "were you frightened"? I 
don't know. I think well, I think probably a lot of us were 
too young to be frightened to any great extent. You see 
twenty year old, you are probablgy full of it. You didn't 
know what you were going into... 8 
Burnham was not alone in his lack of fear; Peter Brown wrote `looking back it is 
difficult to imagine how nearly one thousand young men, mainly between the ages 
85 Dennis Hallam wrote `I still remember with absolute horror the night of 5-6th June 1944 when the 
Channel was so beastly to me! It was a positive pleasure and relief to hit the terra firma of the beach. A 
bit of an exaggeration but you will know what I mean! ' in a letter to the author dated 0 June 2005. 86 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
87 Each man had received specially printed invasion money. 88 Extract from interview with George Burnham 266' February 2000. 
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eighteen to twenty five, could face what awaited them with so little emotion. No-one 
was under any illusions that their chance of coming through unscathed was rather 
slight'. 89 The lack of visible emotion is likely to be connected with the difference 
between an operation and an exercise - up to this point none of the interviewees had 
seen active service and had yet to assimilate the knowledge that fire would be aimed at 
them with the intention to kill. However it may also be a result of a difficulty in re- 
capturing emotions after a sixty-year interval. Certainly Wilf Todd's letter to his wife, 
written shortly after his wounding on D-Day, sounds a very different note: `I prayed that 
night as I have never prayed in my life' and as he climbed aboard his LCA `my heart 
was beating like a trip hammer' 90 
For the inexperienced infantrymen, this was their first action and two of them 
mentioned that the landings induced a brief feeling of `dislocation' from their 
surroundings. Alf Harrison remembered `your mind goes blank for a few seconds. Then 
you come to and you say "I have got to get off here" and away you go' 91 It is clear 
from the interviews that none of the interviewees recall being immobilised by fear or 
unable to carry out their duties. That may not apply to all the 2°d Battalion soldiers on 
Sword Beach, but certainly the veterans interviewed felt confident in their allotted roles 
and equipped by their training to carry them out. The Regimental Diary gives an 
overview of the performance of the battalion on the beach, however it is the 
interviewees who afford the opportunity to assess the readiness and confidence of the 
men involved. 
By 6am on the morning of the 6th June the two assault companies were lined up in their 
craft ready for the run-in, yet there is no recorded time of arrival on the beach. H-Hour 
was due to be 7.25am and this must have been fairly accurate as the first signal from `A' 
89 Peter Brown's privately held memoir. 90 Extract from letter written by Wilf Todd to his wife, addressed to `Sweetheart' dated June 1944, copy 
supplied by family. 
91 Extract from interview with Alf Harrison St' November 2000. Wilf Todd attributed his feeling of 
dislocation to the terrific noise during the landings, during an interview 1" May 1999. 
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and `B' Companies, was received at 7.35am reporting `heavy opposition but operation 
proceeding to plan'. When the two reserve companies and Battalion HQ landed at 
7.55am they reported difficulties with underwater obstacles and that `crossfire and 
sniping was fairly considerable and accurate enemy mortar and shellfire was causing 
some casualties'. By this time, the high tide was covering many of the obstacles which 
had been designed either to cause damage to the incoming landing craft below the water 
line, or explode the craft when they triggered mines attached to the top of the defences. 
On landing, `C' Company was dispatched to position `Sole' and `D' Company lost its 
Company Commander when a mortar bomb landed amongst Company HQ. The move 
to `Sole' was undertaken across marshy ground and was slowed by the terrain and the 
fact that it was under mortar fire throughout. Several interviewees recalled the progress 
across this flooded area, with the water absorbing some of the blast from the mortar fire. 
The position `Sole' turned out to be more heavily defended than previously thought, but 
was secured by `C' Company assisted by `A' Company, who had by now cleared the 
beach, according to the War Diary. An officer serving with 13`h/18`h Hussars, who 
witnessed the attack, confirmed that in attacking `Sole' the 2°d Battalion `showed great 
dash'. Once `B' Company rejoined the battalion, the attack on position `Daimler' was 
prepared, led by `A' and `C' Companies supported by 76 Field Regt and B Sqn 13'h/18th 
Hussars. Clive Crauford, of `C' Company, described Daimler: 
They were called "hedgehog positions" in the jargon, and 
hedgehog was a damn good name for them because it fairly 
bristled with everything unpleasant. . . it was protected by three pillboxes each presumably with an automatic weapon 
in and a few men, the equivalent of a section I suppose, and 
you had to overcome the three pillboxes before you could 
get the central emplacement. Beyond that there was a 
minefield. On the outside perimeter of the whole outfit was 
barbed wire. 3 
92 Capt J Neave SWWEC (2003-2309). 
93 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5th November 2000. 
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With the help of the artillery, the pillboxes were taken, leaving the central emplacement 
vulnerable. Clive Crauford climbed through the gun aperture at the same time as his 
batman dropped a grenade in through the top. Fortunately Crauford was protected from 
the subsequent blast by the gun shield and called on the gun crew, who were sheltering 
in an inner compartment, to surrender. There were few casualties within the 2°a 
Battalion from this action and 70 prisoners were taken, as well as enemy weapons. 
After this action, the battalion moved to St Aubin d'Arquenay and eventually dug in to 
the west of Hermanville. The following day, `D' Company rejoined from the canal and 
river bridges codenamed `Rugger' and `Cricket', having been relieved by 6`h Airborne 
Division. Thus, at the close of D-Day, the 2 °d Battalion had taken all its objectives, with 
artillery and armoured support. 
In the Regimental War Diary there are no mentions of the attacks on position `Cod', nor 
that on `Skate'. This is surprising, given that `Cod' was such a large, well-defended 
objective and specific mention was made of it in the Operation Order. I can trace from 
other, secondary literature, 94 that the attack on `Cod' was successful, but it is difficult to 
discover what part the 2 "d Battalion played in this, as well as establishing whether the 
battalion made an attack on `Skate' at all, and if so, what part the battalion played. 
However, one of `Banger' King's letters to his batman's mother, 95 reported that his 
Company had cleared a 200 yard wide gap in the defences `through which poured the 
reserve companies - Commandos - and it seemed to be about half the British Army' 
before clearing machine-gun nests and a 50cm gun, probably referring to part of the 
`Cod' strongpoint. 
The Diary provides an overview of the day's events, yet does not focus on the 
overcoming of the beach defences. None of the interviewees mentioned `Skate' by 
name, although Alf Ackroyd described overcoming a defensive position at the top of the 
94 Tim Kilvert-Jones, Sword Beach. 3'd British Infantry Division's Battle for the Normandy Beachhead. 
Also Michael Reynolds, Eagles and Bulldogs in Normandy, 1944. 
95 Letter from Major `Banger' King to Blenkorn's mother dated 6`h July 1944 (IWM 93/39/1). 
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beach, without knowing its codename. There is only one account from an `A' Company 
officer in the public domain, however this does not refer to the attack on `Cod', which 
was `A' Company's objective. 96 This account concentrated on gapping the copious 
barbed wire which proved problematic for many troops involved in the initial wave. 
Some were equipped with `Bangalore torpedoes', sections of piping which were 
screwed together and pushed under the wire, which was then destroyed by an explosive 
charge. However, individual sections of piping became lost as men became casualties 
and it was a hazardous operation to perform while under fire, as noted in the example 
set by Lt Arthur Oates, outlined in Chapter One. 
According to the evidence supplied by the War Diary, the interviewees and personal 
written accounts, the battalion was successful in carrying out the tasks it was set for D- 
Day. After the operation, The Snapper carried an article by `A Military Observer', 
quoting RSM William Palmer as saying `they were wonderful, every man of them. I've 
done twenty one years' service in the Army, and I was never so proud of my lads than I 
was that morning -a morning I'll never forget' 97 As Company Commander of `A' 
Company, Major `Banger' King wrote to his batman's mother `I cannot express too 
deeply my admiration for the men I have been commanding. When we landed at H- 
Hour on D-Day they went straight in over the beaches in spite of a murderous fire'. 8 Of 
course, all these sources have an element of self-interest, but so too do the 
aforementioned critical accounts of the Commandos. To justify their existence they had 
to be seen as superior troops - their formation was due to the direct support of Winston 
Churchill in 1940 and the Army Commandos were not destined for longevity, being 
disbanded at the end of the war. Hastings argues that by 1944 the special forces were 
not as highly regarded by High Command, and to an extent were not seen as relevant to 
96 I was unable to trace any interviewees from `A' Company and there are no accounts in the public 
domain except that of Arthur Oates (SWWEC). 
" From The Snapper Vol XXXIX No 7, dated July 1944. The Military Observer was Hugh Gunning. 98 Letter from Major `Banger' King to Blenkhorn's mother dated 6th July 1944. 
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the landings since many of the raids they had taken part in up to that point, had proved 
unsuccessful. They had a great deal to prove during D-Day. There are numerous 
personal accounts by former Commandos in secondary literature, which 2 °d Battalion 
members have not had the opportunity to counter, as there have been few opportunities 
to air their opinions in the public domain. 
The main criticism is that the 2 °d Battalion remained on the foreshore, instead of 
pushing through and off the beach straightaway. Secondly, that riflemen of the battalion 
proceeded to `dig in' as protection against small-arms and shellfire in preference to 
clearing the area and thirdly, that poor training contributed to the high casualty rates, 
since by `bunching' together they presented an easier target. Brigadier the Lord Lovat 
went further and accused the battalion of failing to take objectives. In describing the 
scene on landing he wrote: 
Barely clear of the creeping tide, soldiers lay with heads 
down, pinned to the sand. Half-way up the beach, others 
dug themselves into what amounted to a certain death- 
trap... My 0 group did well through the soft sand and 
flung themselves down behind the nearest pillbox taken 
single-handed by Knyvet Carr. The job had been the 
responsibility of the East Yorks... During the saturation 
bombing, Monsieur Lefevre, a Resistance leader ... cut 
cables connected with flame-throwers in the beach 
defences. He did more than the 8th Brigade, who landed to 
our immediate front. A poor showing in the last rehearsal 
was faithfully repeated on the battlefield. We passed 
through them, leaving platoons scrabbling in sand where 
the shelling hit hardest. '°° 
The same accusations, that the East Yorkshire troops were digging-in on the beach and 
failed to display `dash' have been reinforced by Commandos from the ranks in various 
books about the landings, '°' so that inevitably it becomes the accepted version of 
99 Max Hastings, Overlord D-Day and the Battle for Normandy, p. 37. 100 D-Day Then and Now Vol. 2, p. 540. Brigadier the Lord Lovat was in command of 11' Special Service 
Brigade. 
101 See Martin Bowman's Remembering D-Day. Personal Histories of Everyday Heroes, the criticism by 
Private Bill Bidmead of A Troop, No. 4 Commando p. 113. Also Nigel Cawthorne, 6June 1944. D-Day: 
Dawn of Heroes (Devizes, 2004) p. 76 and Ian Dear, Ten Commando 1942-1945 (London, 1987) p. 1 16. 
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events. In particular, this charge has been repeated in Cornelius Ryan's The Longest 
Day, which is, as has been noted, one of the most influential works in establishing how 
D-Day has been historicized in the public arena. Extracts from the work were 
reproduced in newspapers, including The Hull Daily Mail, which featured a piece from 
Ryan's section on Sword Beach: 
In the Ouistreham half of Sword, men of the 22nd East 
Yorkshire Regiment lay dead and dying from the water's 
edge all the way up the beach. . . 
it seems likely that the East 
Yorks suffered most of their two hundred D-Day casualties 
in these first few minutes. . . 
Some saw "bodies stacked like 
cordwood" and counted "more than 150 dead". . 
Corporal 
Fred Mears of Lord Lovat's commandos was "aghast to see 
the East Yorks lying in bunches ... It would probably never have happened had they spread out". As he charged up the 
beach 
... 
he remembers cynically thinking that "they would 
know better the next time". 102 
It is true that the casualty figures sustained by the 2°d Battalion during D-Day were 
high, and higher than those sustained by many of the individual units on other beaches, 
except for Omaha: 5 officers and 60 `other ranks' were killed, and 4 officers and 137 
`other ranks' were wounded, around one-quarter of the battalion's strength. However 
the troops had been briefed that their role would inevitably result in such figures. The 
difficult circumstances on the beach explain why the numbers were high, as opposed to 
the accusations of `bunching' levelled by the Commandos. As Ron Major wrote, `the 
Commandos who followed us were surprised at the mortality rate and put it down to 
inexperience. This wasn't the case. We had been well trained. But heavy artillery and 
machine gun fire was pouring down on us. There just wasn't anywhere to go'. 103 The 
interviewees and memoirs of the 2"d Battalion veterans confirm that many of the 
casualties were incurred as the troops left the landing craft, before they had had the 
opportunity to cross the beach. 104 The casualty figures in the first assault craft were 
102 Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day, p. 184. 103 Ron Major, IWM (95/23/1). 
1°4 Interviews with Alf Ackroyd 10`" February 2002, Wilf Todd 0 April 1999 and memoir of John Folley (Special Collections, University of Leeds ARMY 069). 
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particularly high. Reg Rutherford, a Platoon Commander from `B' Company, recalled 
that two-thirds of his platoon became casualties in the initial landing, leaving just eleven 
men available to advance inlandlos 
One must also not overlook the fact that the 2nd Battalion were not the only soldiers 
landing on Sword Beach in the early stages. The role of some of the troops on landing, 
such as the engineers and beach party, was to remain on the beach to ensure the swift 
and safe passage of those following,. Arthur Oates' account recorded `Beach Group 
bunching badly and taking casualties' and it is possible that in their charge across the 
beach, the Commandos may not have been able to differentiate between the units 
already there. Certainly the casualty rate among the engineers was high, as they had the 
dangerous task of dismantling the sea defences, including the mines endangering the 
safe passage of the landing craft. 106 Among 629 Field Squadron, 20 per cent of the men 
were lost, including many who drowned attempting to remove the aforesaid mines. '07 
The emotive text by Ryan sparked a restrained response from Capt Arthur Oates of the 
2 °d Battalion to The Hull Daily Mail: 
The general impression is one of a `blood bath' and a 
suggestion that casualties were caused by careless 
fieldcraft. 
1. Mr Ryan refers to the 22°d Battalion, East Yorkshire Regt 
and to the best of my knowledge such a unit never existed. 
2. Casualties were less than had been anticipated and I 
cannot imagine that anyone who landed at any proximity to 
H-Hour could have spared the time to count `150 dead' 
which were `stacked like cordwood'. 108 
Captain Oates' daughter remembers how angry her father was after reading Ryan's 
presentation of the battalion's performance on D Day, despite his rather measured letter. 
However, the impression given in the Ryan book has become widely accepted as 
los Alf Ackroyd retains a full list of all those in Rutherford's platoon on D-Day and what happened to 
each of them, confirming the casualty figures. See Appendix C. 
106 In Patrick Delaforce's, Monty's Ironsides, he quotes casualty figures of 117 for the assault engineers of 
5ARE and 22nd Dragoons had 42 casualties. '07 Brigadier John Brown SWWEC (2002-1766). 
108 Letter from Arthur Oates to The Editor, The Hull Daily Mail dated 1e May 1960. 
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historically accurate and contributes to the marginalisation of the role of the 2nd 
Battalion on D-Day. Ryan rightly acknowledged `there will always be differences of 
opinion about the nature of the fighting on Sword'. 109 He wrote that Brigadier E. E. 
Cass, in command of 8t` Brigade had defended the 2nd Battalion, arguing that they had 
already left the beach by the time the Commandos landed. It is probable that most had 
indeed left the beach before the arrival of Lord Lovat's 1" Special Service Brigade, as 
his Brigade came in to the beach at H+75 minutes. However, No. 4 Commando landed 
at H+30 minutes and at this point many East Yorkshire infantrymen were still on 
Sword, including Cpl Alf Ackroyd of `B' Company, who considered the Commandos 
heroes as they stormed across the beach. His account demonstrates the difficulty of 
advancing while under aimed small arms fire: 
When the Commandos landed behind us we were still 
pinned down on the beach. They come out in a rugby 
scrum and stormed over the wire and got through.. . Where these Commandos went was about fifteen yards at 
the most to the right of where I was... In fact when the 
Commandos went Jack said "well, I am going to try it". I 
said "well, keep your behind down", and he jumped up, 
got about two paces, and he was shot through his behind. 
The other lad did the same thing, and he got shot in the 
behind, as far as I can remember. .. Anyhow we got through the barbed wire to the back of the trench, partly 
because of these Commandos had made way. ' 10 
Jack Pearse, a Platoon Commander in `B' Company was among the first to land, and 
wrote of his anxiety when he discovered the landing craft beside his had failed to reach 
the beach and his platoon was now covering the exposed left flank of the invasion. He 
recorded: `my fears are eased: a boat-load of Commandos lands to strike off left along 
the beach without obvious trouble"" t1 before he was ordered to lead his platoon through 
a cleared beach exit on to the coastal road. Both accounts therefore confirm the presence 
109 Ryan, The Longest Day, p. 184. "o Extract from interview with Alf Ackroyd 10th February 2002. 111 Extract from Jack Pearse's recollections of D-Day, given to author by family. Also re-printed in Frank 
and Joan Shaw, We Remember D-Day, pp. 264-265. 
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of some 2nd Battalion troops on the beach at the time of the arrival of the Commandos, 
as they were still involved in clearing the beach defences when the Commandos landed. 
The Commandos' spirited dash across the beach was a great achievement, although it 
was also to result in significant casualties of their own. Dunning recorded that of the 
177 French Commandos landing with No. 4 Commando, only 114 arrived at the 
assembly point, the remainder became casualties of the small arms, mortars and shellfire 
taking a similarly heavy toll on the 2nd Battalion infantrymen. It surely cannot be argued 
therefore that the high casualty figures were due to incompetence on the part of the 2nd 
Battalion infantrymen. High casualty figures were also experienced by the 5t' Battalion 
of the East Yorkshire Regiment, as 85 `other ranks' were lost on the beach at Gold 
alone, when `D' and `C' Companies crossed the beach under fire from an anti-tank gun 
at La Riviere and heavy small arms fire. Unlike the adverse comments regarding the 2°a 
Battalion's performance, there is no criticism attached to this battalion in secondary 
literature as it was recognised that the casualties were a direct result of the enemy 
firepower on the beach. 
One account by a Commando recalled that the 2"d Battalion infantrymen were 
`committing suicide by trying to dig in where they were', yet his own efforts to rouse 
them revealed that two were dead and the third was injured! 12 This is a similar outcome 
to that recalled by Hugh Bone. Bone could not make a quick exit from the beach 
because of the heavy wireless sets. It only took a few minutes for him to get off the 
beach, but he had to return to try and gather a wireless team. He found several casualties 
sheltering near a tank, `I felt a little callous when I found out that nearly all of them had 
been hit and some were dead', but `by persuading a couple of blokes with shrapnel in 
their legs and feet that they were good for a few hours yet, I got my wireless lifted'. 113 
1 12 James Dunning, The Fighting Fourth. No. 4 Commando at War 1940-45 (Stroud, 2003). Extract by Capt Murdoch McDougal. 
113 Extracts from Lt H. T. Bone's letter to his mother dated 4th July 1944, IWM (87/31/1). 
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Interestingly, Piper Bill Millin recorded that he witnessed several Commandos 
sheltering behind a wall, while `other Commandos were attempting to dig in'. 114 
I would argue that these attacks on the 2nd Battalion are over-critical and self-serving as 
they fail to take into account the work already undertaken by the two leading assault 
companies before the arrival of the Commandos, together with armoured support. lls 
The objective of No. 4 Commando was to destroy a battery and the garrison in 
Ouistreham while the remainder of the Brigade, landing forty-five minutes afterwards, 
was to reach the 6U' Airborne Division and help hold the bridges spanning the River 
Orne and Caen Canal. Thus their own tasks on D-Day were very different from those of 
the two leading companies of the 2°d Battalion, whose objectives entailed destroying 
beach defences. 
The adverse comments about the performance of the 2°d Battalion are unusual in that 
infantrymen are usually more supportive of each other's efforts in personal accounts, 
given that the difficult nature of their roles is mutually understood and forms a bond of 
shared experience. One infantryman who considered the criticism of the battalion's 
performance to be incorrect was Lt P. Webber of the 2°d Middlesex Regiment, who 
wrote `perhaps I should say that it is quite inaccurate to state, as I have read, that the 
East Yorks on the left were pinned down on the beach for some time. They were 
certainly not there when we landed, only dead and wounded'! 16 
However Dunning's book offers a clue to the expectations that No. 4 Commando held 
regarding the conditions they would find on the beach on arrival and thereby their 
dissatisfaction that these expectations were not met. After returning from an `0' group 
prior to the operation, Captain Alastair Thorburn appraised his troops of their own role, 
before explaining `that companies of infantry would land before the Commando to clear 
114 Bill Millin, (Piper to Lord Lovat) Invasion (privately published memoir, 1991) p. 69. "5h ur Oates' account included `Could not move for machine gun on revolving tower - firing on beach. Banger got a tank to fire and silenced machine gun'. 116 From Philip Warner, The D Day Landings, p. 190. 
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the beach of obstacles, knock out four strongpoints and lay white tapes for No. 4 to go 
through on their way to the objectives in the town', 117 intimating that opposition would 
virtually have ceased on the beach by the time of their landing and cleared exits would 
be available for the Commandos. This timetable allowed just thirty minutes for 
approximately two hundred men of `A' and `B' Companies of the 2 °d Battalion to 
accomplish the clearing of four strongpoints and swathes of barbed wire entanglements, 
while the engineers had to clear a multitude of beach defences of their mines and clear 
safe paths off the beach, all of course with armoured support. Considering the amount 
of fire on the beach and the rapidly rising tide, this was unrealistic in the time allotted. 
In the initial phase, some of the armoured support had been timetabled to arrive before 
the infantry to account for some of the defences firing directly on the beach. However 
due to the heavy seas, the duplex drive tanks of the 13th/18th Hussars landed at the same 
time as the assault infantry. Also, the second wave of `C' and `D' Companies were due 
to land just ten minutes before No. 4 Commando, leaving a critically small number of 
men to undertake the tasks allotted in the first twenty five minutes. 
Much credit is due to the two initial assault companies of the 2"d Battalion on Sword 
Beach as their efforts ensured that many from the two follow-up companies were able to 
make a similar dash across the beach to that achieved by the Commandos. Arthur Smith 
of `C' Company, remembered the speed of those leaving his landing craft in crossing 
the beach. Carrying a wireless set slowed him down, but the others `were off like the 
clappers and we'd a job to keep up with them y'know'. 118 This aspect was always 
stressed in briefings - the wounded were to be left to the care of medical personnel, 
while the men were ordered to get across the beach as quickly as possible. Indeed 
several of the interviewees have emphasised the strong warnings against stopping for 
117 James Dunning, The Fighting Fourth, p. 123. 
118 Extract from interview with Arthur Smith 27th September 1999. 
128 
any purpose. 119 For the small proportion of the battalion who may have remained 
trapped or trying to find shelter on the beach this condemnation by the Commandos 
appears harsh when taking into consideration the confused circumstances and level of 
fire to be found there. The infantry on Omaha Beach also attempted to take shelter 
among the obstacles, yet their situation is generally viewed with sympathy because of 
the horrendous conditions under which they landed. 
The criticisms by the Commandos have become the accepted version of events due 
largely to the* lack of opportunity for 2 °d Battalion members to put forward their own 
views, as well as the dearth of coverage of the battalion's performance during D-Day in 
secondary literature. Peter Brown is one who feels this strongly: `Whenever the 
landings on Sword Beach is mentioned in post-war literature it is always implied that 
the assault was made by the Commandos. Little mention is made of the fact that the 
beach had already been cleared by the East Yorks and the South Lancs'. 120 More 
typically, no opinion was expressed during the interviews, as I did not pose a specific 
question about the criticisms. Many veterans had undertaken little or no post-war 
reading and were perhaps unaware of the comments made, or were philosophical about 
them. 121 It should be noted that although the criticisms of the 2nd Battalion's 
performance have come wholly from the Commandos, not all the Commandos felt 
similarly. R. Pidgley, who landed with Lord Lovat, paid tribute to the 2°d Battalion, 
describing the infantrymen as `brave' and that `our lot owe these lads a great deal'. 122 
Having considered the criticisms of the performance of the 2nd Battalion by the 
Commandos, it is also necessary to assess the more widely held, and generally accepted 
view that the 3`d Division failed in its objective to take Caen on the first day and thereby 
"9 Interviews with, amongst others, Arthur Smith 27th September 1999 and Alf Harrison 5`h November 
2000. 
120 peter Brown privately held memoir. 
121 I spoke to Wilf Todd about the criticisms made by the Commandos, during the annual veteran reunion 
in April 2005 and he replied, `well they would say that, wouldn't they! ' 122 R Pidgley, One man in his time plays many parts (West Sussex, 2003) SWWEC (2004-2578). 
129 
strike a significant blow to the opportunities of German forces to counter-attack rapidly 
and in strength. 123 As the 2°d Battalion formed part of the 3'd Division, together with two 
other Regiments in 8th Brigade and two further Brigades (9t` Brigade and 1850' Brigade) 
its performance is also judged to be lacking. The role of the 2"d Battalion did not entail 
making any further move beyond St Aubin d'Arquenay on D-Day as the gaining of the 
objectives it had been set was considered sufficiently demanding for the initial period. It 
was also anticipated that casualties would be heavy and that the battalion would not be 
in a position to proceed further without reinforcements. 
The objective of taking Caen on the first day fell to 185th Brigade (comprising 2 °a 
Warwickshire Regiment, 1 S` Norfolk Regiment and 2 "d KSLI) supported by the 
Staffordshire Yeomanry, yet the planners had set an ambitious target which depended 
on all elements of the landings working in concert to ensure success, a pattern repeated 
later during Operation Market Garden. The first problem arose with the congestion on 
Sword Beach caused by the rising tide, which resulted in a landing strip of 30 feet 
instead of 30 yards and which thereby held up the progress of 185`x' Brigade's armoured 
support. By the time the tanks were free of the beach the initial impetus had been lost. 
By late afternoon 2 1St Panzer Division effected a counter-attack near Periers ridge which 
was beaten back by the KSLI and Staffordshire Yeomanry, although this delayed their 
advance further. 
9`h Brigade (comprising 2°d Lincolnshire Regiment, 1St KOSB and 2 °d RUR) had been 
tasked to reach Carpiquet and possibly assist in the taking of Caen in order to close the 
gap between the British and Canadian forces landing on Sword and Juno Beaches. 
However, after coming ashore at lpm, the Brigade was re-directed to assist 6th Airborne 
in holding the vital bridges, an order which was not delivered due to the injury of 
123 In Major General David Belchem's Victory in Normandy (London, 1981)p. 109, he wrote `The record 
of 3 British Division is the most disappointing of all the assault sectors', describing the progress of the 
division as overcautious. See also Hasting, Overlord D-Day and the Battle for Normandy. 
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Brigadier Cunningham. There elapsed some considerable time before his Second-in- 
Command, Colonel Dennis Orr took over and the Brigade made a move. 
From a study of the evidence it is clear that the objective of taking Caen was doomed as 
soon as the usual confusions and rapid changes of war presented themselves. An 
advance of ten miles by one Brigade to take a defended city, after an arduous Channel 
crossing was ambitious, if not over-ambitious, and was not helped by the difficulties in 
effecting infantry - tank - artillery co-operation during the hectic early hours of the 
landings. Criticism has been levelled at the cautiousness of the 1850' Brigade 
Commander, Brigadier KP Smith OBE, and the Divisional Commander Major General 
TG Rennie DSO, MBE. 124 While unqualified to judge the capabilities of these two 
Commanders, it is difficult to justify Smith's delay of one hour in calling an `0' Group 
on landing, or appreciate Rennie's reluctance to take a firmer role in the handling of 
185th Brigade once the delays became apparent. The operational order had highlighted 
the need to act with speed and boldness and certainly the speed was lacking. 
Despite the accusations, it must also be stressed that at the end of D-Day the overall 
picture in the Sword Beach vicinity was heartening, especially when taking into account 
that 3`d Division was the only Division to meet a major armoured counter-attack that 
day. 125 All the beach defences had been cleared, the 2 °d East Yorkshire Regiment had 
taken the strongpoints `Sole' and `Daimler', the Ist South Lancashire Regiment had a 
firm base in Hermanville and the 1St Suffolk Regiment had secured Colleville and 
cleared the strongpoints `Morris' and `Hillman'. The Division had effected a bridgehead 
that was four miles wide and five miles deep, which was an admirable achievement 
considering the opposition which existed in this sector. It should also not be overlooked 
that a successful outcome to Operation Overlord had never been a certainty and senior 
124 Sir Robin Dunn MC, Sword and Wig - memories of a Lord Justice. Dunn witnessed chaotic battalion 
movements during Exercise Leapyear and considered Brig Smith should have been replaced prior to D- 
Day. 
'u Eversley Belfield and H. Essame, The Battle for Normandy (London, 1965) p. 61. 
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commanders expressed fears up until the eve of D-Day. 126 Furthermore, on none of the 
landing beaches were all the D-Day objectives met within the initial 24 hours. 127 
In this chapter I set out to assess the role of the 2 °d Battalion on D-Day, taking into 
account the criticisms levelled at it by the Commandos, which have been so often 
repeated in secondary literature that they have become accepted as fact. More widely, 
the criticisms of the 3`d British Infantry Division's performance have encompassed the 
2 °a Battalion, since it formed one-third of 8`h Brigade. It is apparent that the objectives 
of the battalion, to secure the defensive positions of `Sole' and `Daimler', were taken, 
together with the support of others, including artillery and tanks. So too was the beach 
strongpoint of `Cod', in conjunction with the 1st South Lancashire Regiment. `D' 
Company also reached the canal bridges `Rugger' and `Cricket'. Other beach defences 
were cleared, yet it is impossible to assess the extent of the battalion's involvement in 
each case. This is not unexpected, as the different Regiments and Arms had been trained 
to act in support of each other for Operation Overlord, even if the reality was of 
competition and garnering of credit between some units. Such competition is an 
inevitable product of the Regimental system. The available evidence shows that the 2nd 
Battalion performed well on D-Day in capturing its objectives, especially taking into 
account the conditions on the beach. Although most of the assault troops led a spirited 
dash across the foreshore, some were forced to take cover from the shellfire due to the 
nature of their roles in destroying barbed wire, attacking beach strongpoints and 
carrying heavy equipment, and due also to the high numbers becoming casualties on the 
beach. 
D-Day was by far the most trained-for, and risky, operation for the infantrymen of the 
2°a Battalion and forms the key central memory for the interviewees who took part in it. 
126 Max Hastings outlined the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke's, misgivings in 
Overlord D-Day and the Battle for Normandy, p. 19. 127 See Tim Kilvert-Jones, Sword Beach 31d British Infantry Division's Battle for the Normandy 
Beachhead 6 June - 10 June 1944 and William Buckingham, D-Day. The First 72 Hours (Stroud, 2004). 
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They are aware of its historic nature, and wanted to bear witness to the part they played 
in the invasion. They also know of society's continued interest in D-Day, which is 
catered for, and encouraged by, the wealth of secondary literature dedicated to it. This 
chapter has considered the criticisms of the battalion's performance by the Commandos. 
In the next chapter the role of the 2 °d Battalion during the remainder of the north-west 
Europe campaign is examined in light of accusations of an `unspectacular' performance 
by the 3`d Division and, more generally, by the British Army. 
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Chapter 3- From D-Day to Bremen with the `Unsaectaculars'- the roles of the 
infantrymen of the 2 °d East Yorkshire Regiment, 8th Brigade, P Division. 
Although the D-Day operation was hugely significant within the history of the 2nd 
Battalion, it was only the first day of a long period of active service before Germany's 
surrender in May 1945, with the battalion seeing action in France, Belgium, Holland 
and Germany itself. During this period the 3Id Division took part in some of the major 
`pushes' although it did not have a central role in the `high-profile' operations such as 
Operation Market Garden, nor did it take part in the Battle of the Ardennes. During the 
Normandy campaign, the main operations were led by armour in the British sector, with 
the infantry in support to consolidate any gains, due to the shortage of infantry 
reinforcements. There was little public knowledge of the Division's movements during 
this period, and this led to the men of the Division being deemed the `Unspectaculars' 
by the press, according to Lt Col Renison. This chapter looks at the role of the 2nd 
Battalion within the Division, and assesses whether the battalion merits this soubriquet. 
Its performance will be considered in relation to the argument put forward in secondary 
literature' that the British Army failed to achieve the anticipated progress, despite the 
Allies' overwhelming material advantage. 
For this chapter, the interviews were a useful corroborative source, confirming the 
sequence of events portrayed in the War Diary. Yet their main importance lay in 
providing a clear impression of the conditions in each region and how they impacted on 
the course of the battles, and on the interviewees personally. Moreover, each interview 
added something of historical value to the sparse primary records. For example, Alf 
Ackroyd's detailed recollections of the attack on Touffreville plainly showed the 
difficulties experienced during the advance, which culminated in Major `Banger' King's 
`rugby scrum' approach on the village. Alf Ackroyd's interview highlighted the high 
1 For example, Carlo d'Este, Decision in Normandy, and Max Hastings, Overlord. 
134 
casualties caused by snipers and mines, which were noted in the War Diary, and which 
could lead to an advance stalling. Having lost all bar two men of his section in the initial 
stages of the advance to these dangers, he caught up with Major King in time to take 
part in the attack on the heavily defended farmhouse by around fifteen men, who were 
prompted by King to charge across the farmyard. This charge, and its successful 
outcome, became well-known in the battalion, as one of the stories recounted about 
King and his determination to win the battle. However it was not recorded in the War 
Diary. Alf Ackroyd's account, as one of the few men taking part in the `rugby scrum', is 
therefore important in order to reconstruct what is known of the battalion's 
performance. The interviews did not contradict any of the facts outlined in the War 
Diary which, in line with its remit, 2 concentrated on the actions of the battalion, rather 
than the individual. Instead, they added many layers of rich detail that enhanced the 
Diary and provided the viewpoints of the infantrymen. 
As one example, the interviewees had strong views on the civilians they encountered in 
the different countries they experienced as `liberators', and, in many cases, destroyers. 
As a group, their views are remarkably homogenous, in that they were ambivalent about 
the French, hugely positive about the Dutch and suspicious of the German civilian 
population. The cultural differences became apparent shortly after the initial landings: 
Alf Ackroyd remembered: 
we were proper embarrassed because at one side of the 
road there was a couple of ladies talking, and as they 
crouched against the wall all of a sudden a Frenchman 
comes riding down the street on his bike. Jumps off. 
Throws his bike against the wall. Turns his back on the 
ladies and urinates straight in front of them. 
Some of those interviewed considered that their views were formed by the amount of 
contact they had with the different nationalities, in that they were sometimes billeted 
with Dutch families and were made to feel very welcome. Under some circumstances 
2lnstructions for the Preparation and Disposal of War Diaries, 1944, pp. 2-3. 3 Extract from interview with Alf Ackroyd 25`4 February 2002. 
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Dutch civilians put themselves at personal risk to help the 2 °d Battalion infantrymen, 
even though they were advised to remain in their cellars. As the 2°d Battalion fought 
through Germany, strict non-fraternisation rules came into force. The interviewees 
found it relatively easy to abide by the rules in relation to German adults, but more 
difficult with the children, who asked for the soldiers' sweets and chocolate. 
France. 
For the infantrymen of the 2 °d Battalion, their pride in the events of D-Day was quickly 
matched by a realisation that the invasion marked the beginning of their involvement in 
a longer-term campaign, necessitating a psychological re-adjustment. 4 On Lt Col 
Renison's arrival at the battalion on the 2 °d July, he noted: `I soon realised that the fact 
that the Battalion had landed on the extreme left beach at H-Hour on D-Day was the 
ruling thought and source of pride in everyone's mind and coloured their whole 
consideration of the campaign. As a newcomer it had to be recognised and allowed for 
in every action'. 5 For many months the focus in training had been on the initial landing 
and clearing of the beach defences; now the normal infantry skills of advancing behind 
a barrage, patrolling and digging-in would once again come to the fore. 
The Regimental historian, Lt Col Nightingale, concluded that for the East Yorkshire 
Regiment, the Normandy campaign formed a `story of hard-slogging and constant 
moves into and out of more or less static and inconclusive battles'. This situation was 
the same for other British units and was due to Montgomery's intention to hold the bulk 
of German armour against the British and Canadian front, allowing the Americans to 
break out to the south and eventually encircle the German forces. In tying down the 
German armour, the British were doomed to battles which `lacked spectacular or 
4 Sir Robin Dunn MC of 7th Field Regiment noted: we had `to brace ourselves for what we all knew was 
to be hard fighting ahead', Sword and Wig - memories of a Lord Justice, p. 63. Also Norman Scarfe, 
Assault Division and Eversley Belfield and H. Essame, The Battle for Normandy (London, 1965) p. 56. 
s Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 9. 
6 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 183. 
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decisive results'. 7 Divisions were often involved in holding the line and remaining static 
for periods, to enable other divisions to take the lead, depending on what operations 
were being planned. This was standard practice and does not imply that a particular 
division did not take full part in the campaign. 8 
The original D-Day objective of taking Caen was another month away from success. In 
the early days after D-Day the 2 °d Battalion regrouped after its substantial losses during 
the landing and took no part in the initial battles for Caen, as these early battles were 
primarily fought by follow-up units. On D+1 the battalion received 3 officers and 60 
other rank reinforcements. This did not bring the battalion back up to strength but it was 
usual for infantry Regiments to operate below strength during the campaign. 
Following D-Day, the 2°d Battalion's first action was the attack on the Chateau de la 
Londe at first light on 28th June, so the battalion had had some time out of the front line. 
This action formed the battalion's subordinate role in Operation Epsom, the wider 
attempt to secure the encirclement of Caen, which resulted in high casualty figures for 
those at the forefront, primarily 43«d, 15th Scottish and 11th Armoured Divisions, 10 but 
matched by greater losses among German forces. The offensive fought by the three 
assaulting divisions, was a `grim rather than a spectacular battle' 11 and was halted after 
casualties mounted, particularly at Hill 112. 
At the strongly defended Chateau de la Londe, the 2 °d Battalion was to attack on the 
right, with the Suffolk Regiment attacking on the left, going through the South 
Lancashire Regiment. The South Lancashire Regiment had taken La Londe originally 
on 22 °d June but a strong counter-attack forced a withdrawal. Now two battalions were 
7 Ibid. 
8 For example, Nightingale revealed that 50`h Division was fulfilling a holding role for a month from 18th 
June, p. 191. 
9 Lt Col Martin Lindsay DSO, So Few Got Through (London, 1946) p. 67. Between the 8th and 23rd 
August 1944 Lindsay's battalion lost 15 officers and 150 other ranks and had just one subaltern left - the 
4 rifle companies were amalgamated into one. In Sydney Jary's 18 Platoon, between 14th and 18th July, 
12 officers and 479 reinforcements were received and the battalion was still under-strength. 'o In Max Hastings Overlord p. 143, he argues that Montgomery's plan to capture and encircle Caen was 
admirable, but it went wrong in its execution. 
11 Belfield and Essame, The Battle for Normandy, p. 107. 
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ordered to put in a new attack. The East Yorkshire and Suffolk battalions faced 5th 
Company 192°d Panzer Grenadier Regiment, over 30 tanks, a platoon of engineers and 
Headquarters company of 22°d Panzer Regiment. 12 During the advance, `B' Company of 
the 2°d Battalion would be on the right, with `A' Company on the left and `C' Company 
as follow-up. The start line, a track parallel to Le Landel wood, was under fire and 
casualties were taken immediately. As both companies reached their objectives, `A' 
Company was counter-attacked by tanks and infantry and some were taken prisoner, 
although most escaped in the confusion. The chaotic nature of events at this time is 
reflected in the different versions given by the interviewees. 13 It is impossible to gain a 
coherent idea of the movement of the battle, yet the different accounts give a good 
insight into the reality of coming up against German tanks with no anti-tank guns 
immediately available to deploy against them, and of the scale of the casualties 
incurred. For example, Lt Jim Fetterly, who was awarded the Military Cross in this 
action, wrote of his platoon's role: 
I counted five enemy tanks in our front. We were aware 
that if they broke through there was little to stop them from 
going right to the beach. I sent a Sergeant back to report our 
position at the Chateau and to have artillery do a shoot on 
our front. They did. When the guns opened up, the ground 
shook and sod flew. None of us expected to survive. I lost 
my revolver and broke the glass on my watch. I counted 
twelve fighting men and all others nearby were either 
wounded or dead. '4 
Although the War Diary states that Fetterly `personally accounted for a German tank 
commander who was unwise enough to call upon his platoon to surrender', Fetterly 
himself made no mention of this in his letters; instead he referred to the capture of the 
tank, equipped with the new 88mm gun, which, he was told, later went on display in 
Trafalgar Square. '5 
12 McNish, Iron Division, p. 108. 
13 For example, the interviews with Clive Crauford, and Alf Ackroyd, and letters from Jim Fetterly. 14 Letter from Jim Fetterly to author 10th March 2000. 
15 Ibid. 
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Both companies, with the assistance of `C' and `D' Companies, took their objectives 
and the Chateau, which was considered the key to the road to Caen, now remained in 
British hands. For the 2 °d Battalion, having faced a number of German tanks, with no 
armour support, the successful attack was certainly a significant achievement, albeit at 
the expense of heavy casualties. The War Diary recorded: `Later, this strongpoint was 
reputed to be the "bloodiest square mile in the whole of Normandy"'. 16 The 2d 
Battalion suffered losses of 98 killed or wounded in this action, bringing the total for 
June to 368, which equalled almost a complete turnover of the four rifle companies. In 
the Regimental History, Lt Col Dickson paid particular tribute to the bravery of the 
signallers and the stretcher-bearers, '7 whose role necessitated their spending long 
periods out in the open, and who were therefore at additional risk of injury. Dickson 
also wrote a personal note of recognition to Pte Hart, a stretcher-bearer, thanking him 
for his efforts's which read `Well done boy! You have done your best and helped us, 
saved many mens (sic) lives. Thank you for all you have done to help us. Good luck'. 
The Chateau de la Londe action was arduous and had taken its toll on those involved, 
both mentally and physically. Indeed, McNish describes it as `some of the Division's 
costliest fighting'. 19 As a result of the strength of opposition and the casualties incurred 
during the fighting, the Corps Commander called off the planned Operation Aberlour 
against a series of defended villages including la Bijude and Authie which was to 
involve 9`h Brigade and 9t` Canadian Brigade. 
The experience of the 2°d Battalion at the Chateau was similar to that of the other two 
battalions of the Brigade, the Ist South Lancashire Regiment and Ist Suffolk Regiment, 
and the latter now has a memorial to its infantrymen at the site, having `lost 161 killed, 
16 War Diary 28th June 1944. 
17 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, pp. 187-188. Major General G. C. A. Gilbert also paid 
tribute to the stretcher bearers, deeming them `heroes' in his interview. SWWEC (2002-1696). 
18 The Prince of Wales' Own Regimental Museum. Written on a Field Medical card and dated 21'` July 
1944. 
19 McNish, Iron Division, p. 108. 
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wounded and missing'. One Suffolk soldier wrote, `of my platoon, which numbered 33 
on D-Day, only five were left' 2° The importance of this battle was also demonstrated 
later when Lt Col Dickson and his Second-in-Command, Renison, spent an afternoon 
going over the ground at the Chateau and looking at the difficulties of advancing 
through high corn. For both men, the Chateau's vital strategic importance for the 
Germans in holding up any advance towards Lebisey or Caen could easily be seen. 
Although ultimately a successful action for the 2°d Battalion and the 1St Suffolk 
Regiment, existing Divisional histories concentrate only on the role carried out by the 
Suffolks, who captured the Chateau itself. 21 This is due to a reliance within this 
literature, on the lengthy Regimental history published by the Suffolk Regiment, 
22 
which inevitably leads readers to assume that the 2°d Battalion played a minor role in 
the action. This demonstrates how regiments who issued detailed histories portraying 
their battalions in an uncritical and successful light, could perpetuate this same image 
through subsequent Divisional histories, while those who produced brief histories are 
overlooked. Scarfe concluded that the battalion history of the South Lancashire 
Regiment was `a regrettably naked narrative'23 and there is a similar lack of information 
regarding the 2°d Battalion, leading to its being relegated to a subordinate position 
within existing Divisional literature. 
At this stage in the Normandy campaign, it was already clear that the German forces 
had recovered from the shock of the initial assault and were, as Lt Col Hastings 
described, `fighting to the death'24 amongst ideal country for the defenders, with its 
thick leafy cover, high hedgerows and deep ditches. In such close country, `tanks were 
20 Private R. Harris, B Company, 1" Suffolk Regiment, from Philip Warner, The D-Day Landings, p. 187. 
21 Scarfe, Assault Division, McNish, Iron Division. 
22 Colonel W. N. Nicholson CMG DSO, The History of the Suffolk Regiment 1928-1946 (Ipswich, 
undated. ) Naturally more emphasis is placed on the battalion which captured the chateau, rather than on 
the battalion which took part in the fighting in the lead-up to its capture. 
23 Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 182. 
24 Lt Col R. H. W. S. Hastings p. 5. Short Account of 6'h Bn Ops. June 1944. Green Howards Regtal 
Museum. Ref M58(a). 
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useless except to hold off enemy counter-attacks'. 5 Although the initial weeks 
following the invasion were spent strengthening and extending the beachhead, there was 
still insufficient space for the necessary construction of a number of airfields, and 
General Montgomery's lack of progress territorially, attracted criticism from senior 
airmen. He faced increasing pressure to take Caen and hence head south to the open 
country known as the Caen-Falaise Plain 26 
Straight after the Chateau battle, the battalion moved back to Mathieu (code-named 
Gazelle) to rest and receive reinforcements. Here, the men were able to take their first 
showers and change their clothing. On the 7`h July the battalion moved back to a wood 
to the west of the Chateau, in support of the 9t` Brigade and 59th Division who were to 
advance towards Caen. This position had been under shellfire since D-Day and the area 
was littered with dead cattle. Memories of the dead animals are a feature of both the oral 
interviews, and secondary literature27 on the period. The following day, `A' and `D' 
Companies entered Epron, where close-quarter fighting took place, and 73 POWs were 
taken, enabling 59th Division to proceed. The operation was used later as a cloth 
exercise for NCOs as it demonstrated the benefits of approaching from a flank rather 
than incurring the casualties suffered by the 59th Division as they attacked frontally over 
a crest. Some authors have argued that a lack of infiltration on the part of the Allied 
armies, a skill much-employed by the Germans, was one of the problems hampering the 
progress of the Allies. 8 Yet here is an example of a silent attack which involved taking 
six or eight German posts from the rear in what appears from the primary sources to be 
a routine operation. The battalion did not take part in the last push to Caen, Operation 
Charnwood, which was led by other units of the 3`d British Division as well as the 3`a 
u Ibid., p. 6. Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon, described Normandy as `a defender's paradise', p. 6. 26 Belfield and Essame, The Battle for Normandy, p. 98. 27 For example, interviews with Wilf Todd, Arthur Smith and Dennis Hallam. Other sources include the 
letters of Hugh Bone IWM, Frank and Joan Shaw, We Remember D-Day, and Robin Neillands, The Battle 
o$fNormandy 1944. 
2 Hastings, Overlord, p. 316. 
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Canadian Division, although at this point other divisions, including the 59`h, were only 
just becoming involved in their first action in Normandy. The losses incurred by the 2nd 
Battalion to this point were by no means unusual in terms of the Normandy campaign 
and were due to the campaign having entered its second phase, that of a `full-blooded 
war of attrition'29 to wear down the German forces. 
Following the fall of Caen, the 2nd Battalion moved to the east side of the River Orne in 
support of 60' Airborne Division. Renison wrote of Field Marshal Montgomery's plan, 
that Montgomery intended to move `all his armour over to the left where the country 
was open and rolling in an attempt to break the Caen hinge by an attack between Caen 
and Troarn directed on Bourguebus' 30 At just outside Escoville, at Le Mesnil, the 
battalion had a good view of the landing sites of the gliders that had landed on D-Day. 
Their arrival is a feature both of the oral interviews and secondary literature on D-Day, 
as the sight acted as a boost to morale. 
On 18th July the battalion attacked the village of Touffreville, known to the battalion as 
`Toffeeville', supported by a squadron of tanks from the 13th/18`h Hussars. This village 
was on a direct road to Paris and the action formed part of a larger Divisional attack 
with 8t' Brigade on the right, and 9t' Brigade on the left of the battalion, the latter 
heading towards Troarn. The attack was preceded by an aerial bombardment, an 
artillery concentration, and was followed by a tank attack by 7t', 11th and Guards 
Armoured Division. `It was hoped that the armour would effect a complete 
breakthrough' 31 
29 Belfield and Essame, The Battle for Normandy, p. 131. 30 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 21. 
31 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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The battalion's attack formed part of Operation Goodwood whereby the three armoured 
divisions would head south, astride the Caen-Falaise road, tying up all the available 
German armour. 32 This was the largest operation launched by the British during the 
Normandy campaign and involved about half the 2 °d Army. 33 The aerial bombardment 
created massive craters south-east of the villages of Banneville, Sanneville and 
Touffreville, which caused a lot of difficulty for the infantry. The Suffolk and South 
Lancashire Regiments made swifter progress due to the success of the aerial bombing. 
However the bombs had missed Touffreville and the German forces there were 
unscathed and ready to mount a strong defence. 4 `B' and `C' Companies of the 2"a 
Battalion came under fire from the start and began taking casualties, and the opposition 
was dug-in to a number of well-camouflaged weapon pits. When `B' Company was 
held up, after Major Modin, the Company Commander had been killed, `C' Company 
went round the right of the enemy to approach from the flank and `this they 
accomplished with considerable dash, bombing their way from slit to slit'. 5 During his 
interview, Major Crauford was more honest about the quality of the opposition `C' 
Company faced in these trenches: `it was another one of these rotten battalions 
consisting of a few pressed men from all the occupied places in Europe' and once 
captured `they all came out saying "me Austrian, me no German, me Czech, me no 
German". One of them actually had the effrontery to say to me "me no German, me 
American". That takes a bit of beating' 36 Here then, is an example of an interview 
which qualifies the unusually effusive vocabulary of Lt Col Renison. 
Although Touffreville was taken by 6pm, the strong German resistance resulted in 104 
casualties, which totalled the complement of one rifle company. As well as 90 POWs, a 
32 David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them. The British Army in the Second World War (London, 1983) 
F; 333 
Belfield and Essame, The Battle for Normandy, p. 134. 34 McNish, Iron Division, p. 112. 5 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 24. 
36 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5`h November 2000. 
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large quantity of German equipment was captured, including an enemy headquarters, 
complete with telephones and typewriters, which led Lt Col Renison to conclude that 
the opposition was at battalion strength, which probably accounted for the high battalion 
casualty figures. Lt Col Dickson argued that `this battle was one of our hardest in every 
way'37 and certainly it is clear this action was a successful one for the battalion, in that 
the objective was taken, and the battalion duly played the role asked of it within the 
wider operation. 
Following the action in Touffreville, the battalion moved to the nearby brickworks, and 
came under constant shell and Nebelwerfer fire, which caused heavy casualties. The 
shellfire and wet weather affected morale, with the War Diary recording these `made 
life dismal' 38 This move was due to the dispositions of the other forces in the area and 
how they had fared in the last major push. The armour had been held up and 9th Brigade 
had not reached Troarn. The engagements of the battalion to date typified the small but 
steady gains of the British Army in Normandy as a whole. Nowhere were huge gains 
being made in terms of territory; rather there was a series of close-quarter battles across 
the region. 39 Operation Goodwood had ground to a halt, with the armoured divisions 
facing strong anti-tank defences, supported by Tiger tanks, and lacking air support due 
to the low cloud. The ensuing losses, including around 200 tanks and 1,500 casualties 
on the first day alone, 40 caused congestion to build and the advance halted after six 
miles. Despite the Allies' best efforts, at this point `the Germans appeared intact, even 
aggressive'. 1 Although the 2"d Battalion's small part had been successful and the 
Division had protected the eastern flank of the armoured advance, overall the operation 
in terms of significant progress, was a failure, succeeding only in holding German 
37 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 199. 311 War Diary 20-25`h July 1944. Sydney Jary wrote in 18 Platoon `Morale was always higher during an 
attack. Sitting around being shelled is not an occupation to be recommended', p. 49. 39 Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, p. 331. 40 Belfield and Essame, The Battle for Normandy, p. 141. 41 Ibid., p. 335. 
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armour east of the Orne but not striking either a decisive blow or enabling the armour to 
make significant gains. At this point, major operations were led by armour, deemed 
replaceable, as the shortage of infantry reinforcements became increasingly apparent 42 
The holding of the bulk of the German armour east of the Orne, facilitated the 
successful American break-out during Operation Cobra, which aimed to capture St Lo, 
Coutances, then head south towards Vire and Mortain, as well as Avranches, and from 
there to take Cherbourg. 3 By 25th July 645 German tanks faced the British and 
Canadians, while 190 faced the US troops. 
At the end of July, Operation Bluecoat was launched south of Caumont, involving XXX 
Corps and VIII Corps in a slow yet constant progress through central Normandy, which 
did not involve the 3rd Division in the initial stages. Six divisions were involved at the 
start of the offensive, yet the men of the infantry divisions were already tired, and once 
again the battles were to prove `a tedious and costly business. On 3 1St July the 2nd 
Battalion returned across the Orne, to Beuville, where a large draft of reinforcements 
arrived from the 7t' Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment and `magnificent stuff they 
afterwards proved themselves to be'. 6 The 7t' Battalion was not the only battalion to be 
disbanded during the campaign, as manpower deficiencies necessitated frequent re- 
organisations. Divisions too, met the same fate. Several, including the 8t`, 12`h, 23`d and 
66`h were disbanded in 1940, and others, including the 38th, 45t', 76th and 80th, existed 
until 1944. 
The 2 °d Battalion then came under orders to move to Mauger, on the extreme right of 
the British 2nd Army, to take up its role in Operation Bluecoat in the breakout of the 
British lines towards Beny Bocage. Lt Col Renison recorded that he was aware of 
Patton's left hook advance, although `as yet we certainly didn't realise the implications 
42 Hastings, Overlord, p. 238. 
43 Ibid., pp249-50. 
44 McNish, Iron Division, p. 113. 
4 Belfield and Essame, The Battle for Normandy, p. 186. 46 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 39. 
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of what was happening, nor how the grouping of the German forces was playing the 
game that Monty had planned for'. 7 It seems that ideas about the grand strategy never 
reached the battalion level, although later on in the campaign, in Germany, the 
Divisional Commander, Major General Whistler, addressed all the officers in the 
battalion about the forthcoming battle for Bremen. 
On the 11t` August, the battalion took part in a Brigade attack along the Vire- 
Tinchebray road, with US troops on the right and 185th Brigade on the left. In this 
instance 8th Brigade was the third of the three brigades to be committed to battle. During 
the previous three days the initial advances had been made by 185th and 9th Brigades. In 
this instance, the 2°d Battalion War Diary records that the enemy, although not strong in 
numbers, put up a determined defence. Lt Col Renison's memoir provides a valuable 
insight into the difficulties of advancing in this area. The German troops were 
paratroopers `and were adept at the hide and seek game amongst the high hedges'. 8 As 
darkness fell, the two sides were so close that they were `literally lobbing grenades over 
the hedge at each other' 49 The move towards the encirclement of the Germans, which 
would culminate in the eventual closure of the Falaise Gap on 21s' August, had 
commenced, and the Germans were putting up strong resistance. Having reached la 
Saliere Grande, the troops discovered the area to be heavily mined and booby trapped. 
These areas tended to lead to high casualties depending on the type of mines used - the 
`schu-mine' was particularly difficult to avoid as it was wooden and tended to cause 
injuries to the feet and lower limbs 50 Two Lieutenants from the battalion were killed 
here and `B' Company lost all its stretcher bearers to injury, making it difficult to 
recover casualties. A counter-attack on the two leading companies, `A' and `B', came to 
nothing, which led the recorder of the War Diary to conclude `it was no doubt part of 
47 Ibid., p. 41. 
48 Ibid., p. 48. 
49 Ibid., p. 48. 
50 Interview with Wilf Todd 4'' April 1999 and recollections of Brian Guy, 246 Field Company RE. 
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the enemy's delaying action, rather than an attempt to regain and hold lost ground' 5' 
This was a well-known German tactic, used to good effect in this campaign, allowing 
the main part of the German forces to withdraw. 
At this stage, Renison argued `no-one quite knew the reason for our being there until 
later on when we found out that the German armoured counter-attack toward Montain 
and Arromanches was at its height and there was a considerable danger of Patton's 
slender life line being cut'. 52 The 3rd Division was ordered to attack southwards to draw 
off the German forces and enable the Americans to continue their advance unhindered 
by additional German units. The two major British and Canadian offensives of this 
period, Operation Totalize on 7t' August and Tractable on 14`h August, both towards 
Falaise, did not involve the 3Id British Division and thereby the 2 °d Battalion. Both 
operations progressed slowly, permitting German forces to escape encirclement and the 
Canadian 1St Army has attracted criticism for the slowness of the advance. 53 Secondary 
literature on the battle for Normandy, for reasons of clarity and length, focuses on these 
two main operations and does not refer to the smaller-scale actions of the British 
infantry during this period. 
On the 13th August, still proceeding along the Vire-Tinchebray road, `C' Company 
patrols discovered an 88mm gun which was fired on and damaged, preventing its 
removal. Lt Col Renison specifically mentioned the action of Clive Crauford as `against 
all orders for Company Commanders', 54 he crawled forward to the edge of the wood to 
discover the exact location of the gun. This is an example of officer bravery and leading 
by example, although it was not mentioned during Crauford's interview. That evening, 
the battalion received orders that a push was to be made to keep contact with the 
withdrawing Germans, which involved the battalion in an attack on a ridge, with a 
51 War Diary 11* August 1944. 
52 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 44. 
53 Hastings, Overlord, p. 305. 
54 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 52. 
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squadron of tanks in support. `A' and `D' Companies took the ridge, although there was 
only one officer left with `D' Company and `A' Company had no officers at all, the 
leadership having devolved upon CSM Webb who `did a fine job of work' SS Clearing 
up remnants of the enemy continued all night. The Adjutant, Captain Ron Brown, 
captured one German, and the War Diary makes specific mention of Major `Banger' 
King who `came up on the ridge with the rations in carriers almost as soon as the 
leading troops, and throughout the night toured the area, ensuring that all were fed'. 56 
`C' Company captured a German officer whose nominal company roll displayed fifty 
names, nearly all of whom had been killed or captured. 
This action showed how the advantage lay with the defenders in Normandy. A small 
group of well-sited Germans could hold-up the advance of a battalion quite easily, 57 
indeed in this area the 1St Suffolk Regiment had suffered around one hundred casualties 
as the Germans were holding a high ridge with a clear view of all the approaches and 
were able to accurately direct their shellfire. The Regimental History of the Suffolk 
Regiment for this period, recorded that the attack of the 2°d Battalion had stalled early 
on, while the Suffolks `undeterred', had `gone on, constantly opposed by enemy fire; 
but coolly and efficiently dealing with the firers' 58 However the War Diary of the 2 °a 
Battalion made no mention of the attack `stalling', merely confirming that the ridge 
objective of the battalion had been successfully taken by nightfall. The Suffolks' natural 
Regimental pride and competitiveness is further reflected in the Commanding Officer, 
Lt Col Gough's letter, in the Suffolks' History declaring that he had been told the 3rd 
Division was the best in France and the 1St Suffolk Regiment the best in the Division. 59 
ss Ibid., p. 54. 
56 War Diary 13th August 1944. 
57 Lt Col R. H. W. S. Hastings wrote, `the individual German behind a hedge with a spandau was a 
difficult man to dislodge', p. 7. Also Belfield and Essame, The Battle for Normandy, p. 186 provided a 
description of the various German delaying tactics. 
58 Nicholson, The History of the Suffolk Regiment, p. 121. 59 Ibid., p. 123. 
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The collapse of the German defence in this area and their rapid withdrawal came as a 
surprise to Brigade HQ, who now ordered the 2 °d Battalion to advance by carrier to 
occupy Montsecret and Fresnes by first light on 16th August. There was no defence of 
the area and the few remaining Germans surrendered. The area was littered both with a 
large amount of German transport and equipment. It was here that the war temporarily 
left the 2 °d Battalion out of the general advance. Lt Col Renison wrote: `the war was 
already leaving us far behind as the battle of Normandy raced on to the climax of 
Falaise'. 60 
At the close of the battle for Normandy, the casualty figures totalled 300,000 losses for 
the Germans and almost 210,000 for the Allies, and to the British during this period had 
fallen `some of the hardest and least obviously rewarding parts of the fighting' 61 
The troops remained based at La Miniere from the 20th August, where they trained in 
river assault crossings, close co-operation with tanks, and exercises on a platoon and 
company basis. Fifty new reinforcements arrived, followed by a further 144 men on 26th 
August. These reinforcements came as a result of the break-up of 59`h Division and one 
of the Brigades of 50t Division. Lt Col Renison discovered later that these troops 
successfully occupied `a surprising number of the higher ranks in the battalion'. 2 At 
this point in the campaign the 2 °d Battalion was over-strength, an unusual position and 
one that would not last through the forthcoming actions. A Reinforcement Company 
was therefore temporarily established, commanded by two officers of the former 7 `h 
Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment. Of course, the fact that so many reinforcements 
were needed shows that for long periods the battalion fought understrength. 
Based at Barou-Norrey-en-Auge, the battalion carried out further searches for German 
vehicles and equipment, and Lt Col Renison wrote: `the battle of Normandy was over - 
60 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 61. 
61 Belfield and Essame, The Battle for Normandy, p. 219. 62 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 68. 
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we expected the battle for the Seine to be ahead'. 3 An opposed crossing of the Seine 
proved unnecessary as the Germans had been routed at Falaise and had not yet 
reorganised. By now, Renison concluded, `we were already over 100 miles from the 
battle 64 and the Divisional Commander, 'Bob' oWhistler lamented, `it is almost 
unbelievable to be out of the battle to this extent. It feels hundreds of miles away' 65 
It was at this point that Major King wrote to his recuperating batman in hospital: 66 `we 
are having a so called rest. At any rate it's a change not to be hearing guns all day and 
night. Dunno how long it will last, but I can't believe they would allow an attack to go 
anywhere without us taking a prominent part in it'. King considered the battalion had 
seen its fair share of action up till that point and was generally at the forefront of the 
advances. 
At the beginning of September, the battalion had a long move by transport to east of Les 
Andelys on the Seine, 25 miles south-east of Rouen, to St Jean de Frenelle. By this 
point the battalion was so far back, that on the move up they passed RHUs67 and a 
General Hospital, which are usually found well to the rear of the front line. However, 
the 2nd Battalion was not the only unit to be left behind. 68 The logistical difficulties 
meant that not all units could advance at the same time and there was an overwhelming 
need for more port and road capacity, 69 primarily for the delivery of fuel. This period 
was used for serious training, including a 17 mile route march, drill, patrolling and 
practice on a newly built range. 
63 Ibid., p. 62. 
64 Ibid., p. 66. 
6s Sir John Smyth VC, Bolo Whistler. The Life of General Sir Lashmer Whistler (London, 1967) pp. 124- 
125. Diary entry for 30th August 1944. 
66 Letter from Major King to Blenkhorn dated 29th August 1944. 
67 RHU - Reinforcement Holding Unit. 6" In So Few Got Through, Martin Lindsay complained, `I greatly fear that the war in Germany may be 
over while we are back here and out of it' in a diary entry 20th September 1944 p. 87. 69 Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, p. 340. 
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Belgium. 
After a brief stop at Soignies in Belgium, the battalion received orders to cross the 
Escaut canal after 9t' Brigade, to help establish a bridgehead and widen the salient 
currently held by the Allies. This canal crossing was the Division's only concerted 
battle between mid-August and the taking of Overloon in mid-October. 70 The role of the 
3rd Division was to cover the right flank of XXX Corps, who were in turn responsible 
for the relief of the airborne divisions. This action formed part of the larger Market 
Garden operation, which was an attempt to cross the Rhine and go on to threaten the 
Ruhr. `A' Company of the 2 °d Battalion crossed the canal by assault boat as the bridge 
was damaged, while `B' Company crossed by bridge once it was repaired, fired on by 
machine guns. Around five machine guns on the canal bank were then silenced by `A' 
and `B' Companies. Much of the resistance had come from an SS Officer Cadet Unit 
who were, `determined to die for their Fuhrer' according to the Commanding Officer, Lt 
Col N. J. Dickson, who added `see that you assist them in their determination'. 71 On the 
morning of 20th September, 32 of the officer cadets surrendered. Despite successfully 
crossing the canal, the battalion effectively played only a minor role in the ill-fated but 
newsworthy Market Garden operation, which was dominated by US and British 
airborne divisions, with XXX, VIII and XII Corps, and not 1 Corps, forming the ground 
troops. 
Holland. 
On the 260' September, with the Germans withdrawing the previous afternoon, the 
battalion arrived in Gernert in Holland, and the troops received a tremendous welcome. 
The Regimental History recorded this entry into Holland as `unspectacular from a 
military point of view', 72 since the Germans would patently fight a series of delaying 
70 Scarfe, Assault Division, pp. 140-141. 
71 From the Regimental History of 2nd Battalion The East Yorkshire Regiment 6h June 1944 to 8`h May 
1945 p. 16. 
72 Ibid., p. 17. 
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actions, using the canal system as a barrier, until a new line could be established using 
reinforcements and the remaining troops available after the closure of the Falaise Gap. 
Therefore there would be no swift advances or capitalising on quick gains, it was to be a 
return to the stubborn defence by the Germans witnessed earlier in the campaign. Wilf 
Todd remembered seeing an American Division passing through, heading towards 
Overloon, 73 `While we were at Gemert an American armoured division came up 
through our lines with sirens going and headlights on the tanks, in usual American 
fashion. Three days later they were back, with the Germans chasing them! -)74 The 
withdrawal of the 7t' US Armoured Division, which had severely under-estimated the 
numbers of German troops they would be facing, 75 left the ensuing battles to be fought 
predominantly by the infantry, an `unenviable task' 76 
October saw the 2"d Battalion involved in some of the heaviest fighting since the end of 
June, amid continual rain and mud. On the 9th October the battalion was ordered to 
prepare for an attack on the town of Overloon, which was `the beginning of an operation 
by 8 Corps to clear the enemy salient west of the R. Maas 77 and was codenamed 
Operation Aintree. While the 3`d Division was to tie up all possible German forces, 
three other divisions would then attempt to cut off any enemy retreat to Roermond and 
Venlo 78 Heavy rain79 put back the attack until noon on the 12th and the plan was that 
the 2°d Battalion would proceed on the left, while the 1St Suffolk Regiment would attack 
on the right. The East Yorkshiremen had to advance through woods to cross the 
73 The American 7th Armoured Division suffered 450 casualties trying to clear this area west of the Maas 
before it was withdrawn. After taking over the area, 3'd Division lost 3 times as many men in clearing 
Venraij and Overloon. McNish, Iron Division, p. 119, Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 157. 74 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 4t' April 1999. 
75 A. Korthals Altes and N. K. C. A. In't Veld, The Forgotten Battle. Overloon and the Maas Salient 
1944-45 (Staplehurst, 1995). The US troops thought they would be facing 2-3,000 Germans, in actuality 
there were 15,000. 
76 Ibid., p. 72. 
"2°d Battalion War Diary 9t' October. 
78 Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 157. 
79 In A Canloan CW'icer, R F. Fendick described the weather while at Overloon as `raw and cold and wet 
and one could never get properly dried out. The woods were sodden and dripping and the ground was 
little more than a bog'. Unpublished memoir SWWEC (2001-1255) p. 123. 
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Vierlingsbeek road, north and east of Overloon. 80 The night before the attack, Lt Col 
Renison wrote of a typical incidence of `chickenshit'8' whereby an unattended candle 
set fire to a barn. Despite it being nearly midnight, Brigade HQ insisted on a Court of 
Enquiry straightaway, and Major King had to listen to the evidence. The outcome was 
forwarded to Brigade that same night, but nothing came of it. The unfortunate culprit, a 
platoon sergeant, was killed in the next day's action. 
The following morning, the 2 "d Battalion's leading companies, `C' and `D', were held 
up by the enemy in the `dog-shaped' woods, while suffering shelling and mortar fire. 
Although each of these forward companies had a troop of tanks in support, the armour, 
which also included flame-throwing Crocodiles, faltered due to the high number of 
mines, which in turn created difficulties for the infantry, as the attack had been planned 
around tank back-up. Despite discovering a large number of mines on the left, the 
forward companies started sending back German POWs. `D' Company reached the 
south-west corner of the woods by 2pm but could not advance further, as they had lost 
their officers and CSM, and were being commanded by a corporal. 82 `B' Company was 
sent to push through the remaining men of `D' Company and advance further, while `C' 
Company was fighting on the edge of another large wood south of the town. The 
difficulty experienced by `D' Company is one example of an attack stalling when the 
leaders became casualties, but there are many such examples involving other British 
units during this campaign, leading Timothy Harrison Place to conclude correctly `most 
men did not command sufficient initiative and military knowledge to make useful 
battlefield decisions when beyond immediate contact with a commander'. 83 However 
the lack of military knowledge was as a result of men generally being unaware of 
objectives unless they were officers or NCOs. 
80 Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 160. 
81 Paul Fussell, Wartime - Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War (New York, 1989). 82 It was common for an advance to stall when a platoon became leaderless. Martin Lindsay, in So Few 
Got Through wrote `our experience is that once the leaders get hit, the attack pegs out', p. 215. 83 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army 1940-44. From Dunkirk to D-Day, p. 54. 
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The 2nd Battalion appears to defy another of Place's arguments that too much reliance 
was placed on advancing under a barrage, as there are examples in the War Diary both 
of this type of advance, and also other occasions where the companies relied on their 
own firepower, particularly in flanking attacks. In `set-piece attacks' there would be a 
fireplan drawn up before the action. However during the attacks themselves, companies 
would often be in situations where artillery support was not feasible, due to the location, 
or perhaps being too close to the enemy. This ability to assess a changing situation and 
act accordingly, particularly by Lt Col Renison, perhaps accounts for the battalion's 
success in gaining its objectives, and holding them, throughout the campaign. Certainly 
I would take issue with Place's argument that `firepower made tactical skill 
unnecessary'. 84 Although firepower was immensely important to the successful 
prosecution of the campaign, tactical skill was an essential component in finishing a 
battle in the Allies' favour. 85 At some point the infantry will always have to advance to 
take and hold the ground and this was often accomplished without using `the artillery as 
a crutch'. 86 In contrast to Place's view of the infantry, Harry Smithson wrote: 
once on the move I only went to ground when under 
extreme small arms fire, hit the ground, roll over, or crawl 
to a good position and begin to fire, then move by ones, and 
groups, always covered by withering fire of the others. It 
was the only way, otherwise one could have stayed there all 
day, or weeks, like the 1914-18 war. 87 
By 6pm the 1St Suffolk Regiment had two companies within Overloon and the fighting 
shortly ceased. The Germans continued to shell and mortar the 2nd Battalion positions 
all night. During the subsequent two days, both 185`" and 9`h Brigades continued 
`mopping up' activities around the town and nearby woods, demonstrating that it was 
" Ibid., p. 174. 
85 However, due to casualties in experienced platoon commanders and NCOs, skill in tactics would be 
affected, with more reliance on firepower, according to Martin Lindsay, So Few Got Through, p. 224. 86 Ibid. 
87 Harry Smithson's recollections. His rank during the campaign is not known, although he served in the 
Army for 7 years, reaching the rank of CSM. 
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the overall quality of the troops within a division that counted, rather than a single 
battalion. The casualties to the 2 "d Battalion in this action totalled 49. 
On the 16`h October, the battalion received fresh orders to attack Venraij, with 
themselves on the left and the 1St Suffolk Regiment on the right. Three supporting tanks 
of the Coldstream Guards became bogged down in the mud and the 1St Suffolk 
Regiment was held up by heavy mortar and machine gun fire. The 2 °d Battalion came 
under Nebelwerfer fire and did not set off until 5pm, waiting for the Suffolks to 
advance. From Venraij, the battalion area was under observation and `it was one of 
those cases of hanging about waiting with nothing to do under fire, when nerves get 
very strained'. 88 `B' Company then crossed the stream and headed left, followed by the 
rest of the battalion which reached Brabander. Progress was slow as the tracks were 
difficult to follow and sniping in the vicinity `made people rather jumpy in the dark'. 89 
The following day the attack on Venraij continued, with `C' Company on the left, 
heading for a road junction towards the north-east of the town, and `A' Company on the 
right, making for the church and market square. `D' Company would follow `C', to 
cover the gap between the two forward companies. This is the classic set-piece battle 
with two companies forward, a procedure that Hastings argued too much reliance was 
placed upon. 90 Certainly the 2°d Battalion War Diary confirms this system formed the 
central practice followed by senior Regimental officers. However it was a system that 
appears to have worked for the battalion. During the advance, Brigade was informed of 
the good progress being made, but the battalion was told to wait because the 1" Suffolk 
Regiment and 185th Brigade needed to overcome opposition in their areas. Renison 
considered this hold-up an `annoyance', but it demonstrates how swift advances could 
be checked by the British Army belief that all gains must be consolidated to prevent a 
successful counter-attack. If the battalion had carried on, then the possible gains could 
88 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 118. 
89 Ibid., p. 119. 
90 Hastings, Overlord, p. 146. 
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have been considered `spectacular', yet the military doctrine followed by the British 
Army at this time necessitated waiting for other units to catch up. The risk in terms of 
possible casualties outweighed any strategic gains at this point. 
During the afternoon of the 17th, `C' Company became held up but reached the 
objective, and `A' Company entered the town and began the dangerous task of fighting 
from house-to-house. As it started to become dark, `D' Company, under Capt Reg 
Rutherford, had also reached the town and decided to push on past their objective, 
reaching the town centre before any other troops of the battalion, in the knowledge that 
`A' Company had become held up before the market square. During the night German 
patrols continued to enter the town and `D' Company troops found themselves engaged 
in continued fighting until 4am. By first light the remaining Germans had withdrawn 
and the battle was over, at the cost of nine `other ranks' killed, forty-one, including one 
officer, wounded, and eleven men missing 91 The interviewees recall the action in 
Venraij was particularly intense, with all their training coming into play. 92 
This Operation, named Aintree, provided a good example of the methods of attack 
adopted by the British infantry during the campaign. It was usual procedure for 
Divisional level attacks to involve two Brigades while the other was held in reserve, 
allowing the men of one Brigade to have some measure of rest, 93 while all the battalions 
involved in the two attacking Brigades, worked in concert to achieve the overall 
objective. To capture Venraij, 185`x' Brigade had been ordered to attack the north side of 
the town, at Brabander, while 8thBrigade had advanced from the west to attack the 
southern side of Venraij. Although the 2°d Battalion was the first to have platoons 
entering Venraij, this achievement was only possible because three other battalions were 
engaged around the town at the same time. During the battles for Overloon and Venraij 
91 High casualty rates can be found in most infantry battalions serving in this campaign. P. E. G. Balfour 
of the Scots Guards wrote `every time I see an infantry battalion I know well, I am appalled at the number 
of new faces' in a letter to `Ma' 6m November 1944 (SWWEC 99.90). 
92 For example, interviews with Wilf Todd and Peter Brown. 93 Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 181. 
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every battalion of the Division had been involved at some point and the casualties 
overall proved heavy. 94 The Commander of VIII Corps, Lieutenant General O'Connor, 
wrote congratulating the 31d Division troops at the cessation of these actions on their 
`very fine performance', 95 singling out 1850' Brigade for particular praise. Scarfe argued 
that 80' Brigade deserved similar praise for making their own advance without the 
anticipated armoured support. 96 The Divisional Commander described the troops of 3rd 
Division during this period of fighting as `desperately gallant soldiers with a wonderful 
spirit', having concluded that the conditions under which they had fought were `quite 
bloody'. 7 The Overloon and Venraij battles were a prime example of battalions and at a 
higher level, brigades, working together to successfully take their objectives. The 2nd 
Battalion took a full part in the taking of both towns and it was a considerable 
achievement, as it was for all those serving in the 3`' Division during this period. 
On the 190' October, Lt Col Dickson left the battalion due to continuing ill-health and Lt 
Col Renison took command. The same day the battalion moved to the St Servatius area 
of the town, relieving the 2nd Warwickshire Regiment. The area was under enemy 
shellfire and the mental institution of St Servatius needed to be evacuated as the water 
tanks had been destroyed. This planning was entrusted to Major `Banger' King. There 
were sixteen large buildings connected by glass verandahs. On the 21st seven hundred 
patients were evacuated to St Anna's, a mile and a half away, then during the next four 
days two thousand two hundred refugees, stretcher cases and attendants were moved 
without casualty. This was an achievement considering that `during the whole 
evacuation the battalion were in contact with the enemy, whose forward posts were only 
94 McNish, Iron Division, p. 122. 
95 Quoted in Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 172. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Sir John Smyth, Bolo Whistler, pp. 135-136. 
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200 yards distant, and who had the main road approach to the asylum under fixed 
line 
fire from machine guns'. 8 
During the following few days the battalion was put under the command of 11`h 
Armoured Brigade, of 159th Division, and moved to the area Deurne / Griendtsveen to 
fill the gap between units of 11ý' Armoured Division during the German threat at Meijel. 
It fell to the 15`h Scottish Division to put in a counter-attack against the Germans, 
supported by mortars of the 2nd Battalion. Although not outstanding work, being by its 
nature static and unglamorous, a letter from Major General GPB Roberts DSO MC to 
Major General LG Whistler DSO, Commander of 3`d British Infantry Division, spelled 
out his gratitude to the 2nd Battalion: `They occupied an unpleasant area for rather a 
long time with never a grumble. They did some excellent patrols under most unpleasant 
conditions'. 
On the Is` November, the battalion moved to relieve the Pt Hereford Regiment at 
Griendtsveen and remained there for a week, enduring bad weather and enforcing a 
system of standing patrols by day and roving patrols by night in an area of peat-bogs, 
marshes and flooded fields. '°° On the 10th, the battalion went into reserve at Overloon 
and rejoined the 3`d Division, 101 however an incident on the 19th illustrates that there are 
no `safe' areas within shelling distance of the front lines. A shell landed on `A' 
Company's cook-house, causing three casualties, and then a sniper hit two soldiers in 
the same company, killing one. 
On the 22°d November, the battalion moved into Smakt, which proved to be a heavily 
mined area, and discovered the bridge was rigged with a 500 kilogramme bomb. `D' 
Company sent out a patrol to see if the village of Maashees had been evacuated and 
when it was found to be free of Germans, the rest of the Company followed, with `C' 
98 Appendix A, Evacuation of Refugees from St Servatius, 2°d Bn War Diary 1' to 31' October 1944. 
99 Regimental History pp. 18-19. 
10° Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 233. 
101 It was not unusual for infantry battalions to be seconded to different Divisions, both for the 2d 
Battalion and within the British Army as a whole. 
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Company moving up closer to the village and `A' and `B' Companies defending Smakt. 
`We were rather amused a few nights later to hear the BBC announce that British forces 
had entered Maashees', 102 remembered Lt Col Renison. The 2°d Battalion was fortunate 
to have reached the Maas without having to take part in further battles. 
The months of December and January proved considerably quieter for the 2°d Battalion. 
This enforced rest was due to the need for the Allies to make the port of Antwerp 
serviceable and build up supplies ready for the push into the Ruhr, the industrial 
heartland of Germany. At the beginning of December the battalion went into reserve in 
Gernert and the War Diary records that each company held a dance before taking part in 
a march past on the 10th, with the salute being taken by the Divisional Commander, 
General Whistler. The following day, Field Marshal Montgomery visited the battalion 
to award decorations to five men of the battalion, including Military Crosses to Major 
Crauford and Lt Oates. In Gernert the battalion also received two large drafts of 
reinforcements which brought it back up to the War Establishment; some had served in 
the Chindit Expedition but there were also `a lot of very young boys'. 103 
Lt Col Renison also attended a Divisional meeting of Infantry Battalion Commanders to 
discuss the issue of leave to the UK. It was decided that the vacancies for leave would 
operate via ballot, with everyone who had served in the theatre for six months being 
eligible. Lt Col Renison was pleased that the allocation of vacancies allowed around 
one hundred for the battalion for the month of January, although `what did cause a good 
deal of dissatisfaction later was the fact that many of the Lines of Communication units 
who didn't land until July or even August were getting leave before some of our D-Day 
survivors'. 104 The difficulty was due to the overall shortage of infantry available. Within 
the battalion Lt Col Renison decided that all who landed on D-Day would have leave 
first, with the remainder of the allocation decided chronologically, ensuring that those 
102 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 165. 
'°3 Ibid, p. 171. 
104 Ibid., p. 183. 
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who had served longest would go on leave first. The issue of leave was a very sensitive 
one, and Renison's option was considered the fairest. 105 
On the 12th, the battalion moved to Haps, where the Brigade Commander issued more 
awards, and on the 21s' of the month, the battalion returned to Smakt, with `C' 
Company in Vierlingsbeek and `D' Company in Maashees. At this time the Germans 
were attacking through the Ardennes in what later became known as `the Battle of the 
Bulge'. Twenty German divisions, including twelve Panzer divisions, advanced 
westwards against a thinly held American front of four divisions on the 16th December. 
Lt Col Renison was on leave in Brussels and recorded that the local population felt that 
the Germans were returning, and the Allied forces would be unable to halt the advance. 
Although some British units were moved, in case they were needed to reinforce the 
American defence, the 3`d Division had no part to play in this battle, just as it had had 
no involvement in the clearing of the Scheldt to open the port of Antwerp. 106 In the 
event, the German advance petered out by Christmas and a successful counter-attack by 
American and British forces started at the end of December, which also did not involve 
the 2°d Battalion. On Christmas Day `the enemy sent Xmas greetings in the form of 25 
shells in Smakt area, no casualties'. 107 Some of `A' Company's buildings caught fire 
and were ablaze all night and three enemy patrols crossed the Maas. The battalion had 
printed its own Christmas card1°8 which was designed by the Intelligence section 
following a battalion competition and many troops sent them home to their families. 
Some of the interviewees had kept their cards, which showed a map of Europe and 
some of the main actions the battalion had been involved in. Arthur Oates disapproved 
of one of the actions being listed: `The Xmas card was just a few of our spots ... We 
105 Martin Lindsay, in So Few Got Through, wrote that leave vacancies for January and February, in his 
Division, were cut, as allocations for the Lines of Communication troops had been under-estimated. He 
called this explanation `tactless' when the infantry considered themselves to be more in need of a leave at 
home, due to the arduous nature of their role, p. 161. 
106 Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 180. 
'o' 2°a Battalion War Diary 25`' December 1944. 
los A copy of the card is at Appendix D. 
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thought they could have left off the beach landing scene though as it was hardly a 
pleasant topic and not fit for holiday times'. 109 
The War Diary recorded that the forward companies sent a platoon at a time to the rear 
to enjoy a Christmas dinner. What the Diary did not relate, for it was outside its remit, 
was that Christmas on the Maas was a low time for many. This was contrary to Lt Col 
Renison's memoir, which recorded `the spirit was grand everywhere'. "0 Lt Jim Fetterly 
remembered being in charge of the festivities; 
Christmas Day on the Maas was a sad time. Every man got 
a bottle of beer. Some did not drink. Each received a can of 
plum duff. My responsibility was to get as many men 
together as possible for an hour and a meal. After 
conversations a lad asked if I would sing a song. I'm no 
singer but I did the first verse of 0 Canada. Everyone cried 
including myself as we felt a bit lonely. ' 11 
The Commander of the 3`d British Infantry Division sent out a Christmas message to the 
troops, particularly to the men of the Rifle Companies, of whom he wrote: `In spite of 
heavy casualties, they have never failed to take their objective and retain it. Their 
determination and steadiness under fire has been beyond praise'. 112 
On the 28th December, six civilians crossed the Maas and gave information about 
German forces and how they were concentrated east of the river. Then, on the 1St 
January the Germans fired tracers and coloured lights `presumably celebrating the New 
Year'. 113 The Germans kept the battalion on alert by keeping up extensive patrolling 
across the Maas, although the battalion had been ordered not to reciprocate. Lt Col 
Renison considered the enemy here to be `full of guts' 114 despite being generally 
considered second-grade troops and in relatively low numbers. German units had 
launched a successful bid to occupy some woods close to the Ist South Lancashire 
109 From a letter to Mater dated 66' January 1945. Arthur Oates' papers SWWEC. 
"o Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 191. 
111 Extract from letter to author from Jim Fetterly 9`h January 2000. 
112 Regimental History p. 20. 
113 2°a Battalion War Diary 1" January 1945. 
114 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 196. 
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Regiment position in Wanssum on the Allied side of the river and although the Germans 
subsequently withdrew across the Maas, it had been intended to re-establish a 
bridgehead on the west bank to prevent any further Allied troops being released to 
defend the Ardennes. The 2°d Battalion therefore had to ensure that no large-scale 
crossing took place in their area. Lt Col Renison wrote that it was during their stay in 
Maashees, that the troops of `D' Company were once again forged into a team `after 
their period of disappointment and partial disbandment at Overloon'. "5 The casualties 
had been very heavy in this Company, but it had taken only two months to re-build the 
men's `team spirit', thus showing that even with the addition of substantial numbers of 
reinforcements, a sense of loyalty can develop. 
The New Year brought welcome news for some, the chance of a week's leave at home. 
Doug Parker was one of the fortunate ones: 
Somebody said to me "You lucky so and so", and I was one 
of the first out. I came home in January. It was for seven 
days. If you come out and then you have to go back in the 
line you're that bit more frightened. You get used to the 
shelling and mortaring when you're in the line. I was 
fortunate going back on the Maas. 116 
The first fourteen `other ranks' and Major Rutherford left for England on the 2nd 
January, followed by fifteen on the 7"', fifteen on the 10th, and finally fifteen on the 140'. 
The fact that this was new, and a welcome, if overdue change, was indicated by Lt 
Little's addition of an exclamation mark after his entry in the War Diary for the 7ý' - 
`Capt RT Brown (Adjutant) and 14 ORs proceeded on leave to England! ' On his arrival 
at the battalion that same day, Lt Little took over as Intelligence Officer and prepared 
the War Diary, although it is interesting that he also signed the Diary's entries for the 
previous week, before his arrival, and seems, in addition, to have typed those entries. 
The War Diary therefore, is not only a sparse document, it cannot be confirmed who 
ils Ibid., p. 200. 
116 Extract from interview with Doug Parker 17th July 1999. 
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compiled the entries or how the decision was made as to what information would be 
included. 
On the 6th January, `D' Company carried out a deception plan on the river bank by using 
smoke and a motorcycle to deceive the Germans into thinking a crossing was being 
implemented. This was intended to protect an attack by the 1" South Lancashire 
Regiment on the Wanssum bridgehead. The Germans had already been spotted wiring 
the river bank and this activity continued during the battalion's stay in the area. Later in 
the month `A' Company tried a similar exercise by using a tannoy to amplify supposed 
noises of a wiring party. Two of the interviewees recall tannoys being used during this 
period. However, both referred to them as being utilised by the Germans rather than the 
British! 17 
Being in a static position, it was ideal for sniper work and sniping was specifically 
mentioned in the War Diary between the 13`h and 17th of January with some measure of 
success. The War Diary for the 13th January displayed Lt Little's sense of humour: 
`enemy who used to saunter around Aaien sniped at by battalion snipers throughout the 
day. By evening they were reported to be moving at the double'. Sniper work was 
intended to affect morale by putting the enemy into a state of constant alert, as well as to 
kill or wound officers and thereby affect efficiency. However, within the German army 
it was a feature of training that all troops should be capable of displaying initiative and 
therefore the sniping of officers would theoretically have less impact militarily. "8 
On the 18th January the battalion began further river crossing training, with the 
assistance of Lt Laming DSC RNVR, in order to take patrols across the River Maas. 
Unimpressed with the battalion's assault boats, he acquired three naval dories, `naval 
types complete with white ensigns'. 119 Just over a week later, a patrol of Lt T Russell 
"' During interviews with Wilf Todd and John Gardner. 
18 For example, Popular Guide to the German Army No 2. The Infantry Division. War Office May 1941. 
In papers of T. Hare SWWEC (2002-1821). 
119 2" Battalion War Diary 18`h January 1945. 
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and eleven `other ranks' took a done across the Maas, with a reserve done and two 
assault boats as back-up. As the reserve crew saw men in snowsuits approaching, they 
thought it was the patrol returning and went to meet them, but IJCpI Higton was killed 
when the men were discovered to be German. 
Towards the end of January the battalion pulled back to Venraij to go into reserve. 
During the beginning and middle of February more officers and `other ranks' enjoyed a 
week on leave in England, while short day-passes were issued to Belgium. The battalion 
moved back to the Louvain area on the 7", and the War Diary characterises this period 
as quiet, `general routine'. Whilst Lt Col Renison was in the UK on leave, he noted that 
Operation Veritable had commenced on the 8th February, but the only mention in the 
press was of the Canadian Army. 120 He discovered that the 15`h, 43rd, 51St and 53rd 
Divisions were fighting with the Canadians, but he considered that the 2nd Battalion 
must be being held for an assault crossing of the Rhine, due to the river crossing 
training the troops had been given. 
Into Germany. 
Operation Veritable was intended to advance 21 S` Army Group up to the Rhine through 
the Reichswald Forest, which was four miles deep. 121 Initial moves went well, but the 
weather conditions, mud, and a build-up of traffic hampered the troops. The 3`d Division 
had not been called on to participate in the first phase of clearing the Reichswald Forest 
or taking Cleve and Goch. During these intense battles, involving the SS, Panzers and 
German paratroopers, the 2nd Battalion had, according to the Regimental historian 
`spent a quiet time in the back areas'. 122 
'20 Lt Col Renison's memoir, pp. 222-223. In So Few Got Through, Martin Lindsay wrote that he found it 
frustrating that British units were not mentioned, due to the Army Public Relations Dept. `How much 
morale in the Army would go up if they would release unit names and how bucked our Jocks would be to 
see "1" Gordon" in print once a month or so', p. 220. 121 Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, p. 385. 122 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 246. 
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The way the battalion was now ordered to move, illustrates the rapidly changing nature 
of the front line after the static period on the Maas. During the morning of the 23' 
February, the Brigadier informed Lt Col Renison that it was likely he could expect the 
battalion to be based in its current area for around two weeks, yet that same day Lt Col 
Renison was advised the battalion would be moving the next morning to relieve the 15th 
Division, and `we were going into the battle before the Rhine was reached after all'. 123 
The battalion moved firstly to Tilburg on the 24th then on to Goch the following day, 
going into the trenches held by 46`x' Brigade, who had been in action since the beginning 
of Operation Veritable and whose casualties had mounted. 
From Goch, the 3`d Division's overall objective was to cut the line of the Udem-Weeze 
road and capture Kervenheim, using all three Brigades. Within this plan, known as 
Operation Heather, the main action of the 2nd Battalion was to capture intact the bridge 
over the Mühlen-Fleuth, on the road to Weeze. This operation formed part of the British 
and Canadian efforts to clear the final positions of the Germans west of the Rhine. 
David Fraser argued that Operation Veritable `was a killing match; slow, deadly and 
predictable', 124 as the Germans defended tenaciously and inflicted high casualties on the 
Allies throughout this operation, having committed three Infantry, four Parachute 
Regiments, one Panzer Grenadier and two Panzer Divisions against the British and 
Canadians. 125 In light of how much depended on good defence by the Germans and how 
hard they fought, it is clear that for the 2°d Battalion, other than the D-Day landings, this 
is the one battle of the battalion that can be described as spectacular. There were other 
battles in which the battalion performed very well overall, including the Chateau de la 
Londe in June and at Overloon and Venraij in October. However this is the action in 
which infantry of the battalion worked alone in their area, supported by the artillery, 
achieving initial success in the advance and then holding on through determined 
123 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 229. '24 Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, p. 390. 125 Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 205. 
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Schaddenhof Farm 
The Battle of the Bridge 27th-28th Feb 1945 
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`A' Company captured a further fifteen enemy soldiers and had reached objective 
Geurtzhof, codenamed `Duck', by midday, although the company was reduced to 
around thirty men for the onward assault on Kampshof. Due to the mounting casualties, 
`C' Company, commanded by Major Reg Rutherford, was ordered to secure the bridge, 
and moved at such speed that it was taken by 2pm with the loss of just three men. The 
swift advance, `faster than anything I have ever seen in battle before or since', 127 
ensured that the bridge was not blown and one platoon waded through the Mühlen- 
Fleuth to capture the garrison at Schaddenhof. The Germans counter-attacked, with 
tanks and infantry, repeatedly during the course of the rest of the day and night; 
reaching and even entering, the Schaddenhof farm buildings, desperately defended by 
the battalion but with ammunition running out. The only armoured support was 
provided by the tank of the artillery forward observation officer. 128 The Germans 
attempted to cut off `C' and `B' Companies by infiltrating the woods between the farm 
buildings and the bridge and the dwindling ammunition made the situation desperate for 
the forward companies. The forward platoon of Lt Glew had to withdraw to the 
farmhouse after being attacked by paratroopers. According to Peter Brown, the 
paratroopers `all looked to be about 7 feet tall. Whether they were drunk or drugged I 
don't know but they appeared to just keep coming forward without trying to take 
cover'. 129 
The isolation of the two forward companies was compounded when the Germans 
attacked the Middlesex heavy machine-gunners in the copse near the bridge and drove 
them out. The efforts of the entire Corps artillery was called for, and by shelling right 
up to the farmhouse walls, they managed to hold off the German attacks. The role of the 
artillery proved pivotal in the Schaddenhof defence, permitting the infantry to defend 
the farmhouse while the Germans surrounding the perimeter suffered high casualties. 
127 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 244. 128 John Ford, FOO of B Troop, 76th Field Regiment, Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 211. 129 Peter Brown privately held memoir. 
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The German counter-attacks finally subsided at 4 o'clock in the morning, leading Lt Col 
Renison to conclude that the battle had been `a close-run thing'. 130 Subsequently, 83 
German dead were recorded in the area in front of `B' and `C' Company positions and 
around 150 POWs were taken. By the following morning nine officers of the battalion 
and 147 soldiers had been killed or wounded. 
This battle, described by Scarfe as `epic', 131 deserves to be considered spectacular 
because the two forward companies held out for nine hours against superior numbers of 
German paratroopers, despite low ammunition and heavy casualties. There was no 
armoured support of any significance on their side of the bridge, yet the men faced tanks 
and panzerfausts which fired directly at the farmhouse walls. The Germans entered the 
outbuildings and called on the battalion to surrender, and at times the situation inside 
the farmhouse appeared, to the defenders, to be untenable. There were also concerns for 
the large numbers of casualties sheltering in the cellar, who were unable to be evacuated 
for treatment, some of whom were German. However the companies continued to put 
up opposition and the strong counter-attacks ultimately failed. The Divisional 
Commander named the bridge `Yorkshire Bridge' in honour of this battle. This was an 
important accolade and the interviewees taking part in this action remain proud that it 
was awarded. 132 
Not only was the bridge renamed, General Whistler also sent a message to the 2 °a 
Battalion Commander saying: `how very proud I am of the magnificent fight you made 
last night. Will you let all ranks know that I shall come and tell them, as soon as I 
possibly can, how moved I have been by their very gallant actions'. 133 At the close of 
Operation Veritable, General Whistler judged that 9"' Brigade, followed by 185t' 
130 Quoted in McNish, Iron Division, p. 126. 
131 Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 2 10. 
132 The maps in the memoirs of Robin Dunn and R. F. Fendick show few details other than place names, 
yet both have marked the location of the `Yorkshire Bridge'. Fendick included a tribute to the actions of 
Major `Banger' King during the battle, p. 171. 133 Copy letter in War Diary dated 28`' February 1945. 
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Brigade had performed best during recent weeks, with 8`h Brigade not proving as 
successful, although `E Yorks had a terrific night holding a bridgehead against repeated 
counter-attacks', and he also wrote that the Lincolnshire and Suffolk battalions were the 
best in the Division. 134 The ferocity of the battle and the ability of the battalion 
infantrymen to hold off the counter-attacks despite the lack of ammunition, has resulted 
in a concentration on this action within Divisional secondary literature. The only option 
available to the infantrymen at Schaddenhof was to continue to resist and in so doing, 
face a very real risk of death, or they could surrender, as their only route of withdrawal 
had been cut-off. It is to their credit that they continued to resist when outnumbered and 
out-gunned. This was a valiant action by the 2°d Battalion and although it formed just a 
minor part of the overall operation, together, the jigsaw of small advances by all the 
Allied units ensured ultimate success, albeit a costly one. During the subsequent days, it 
fell to the other Brigades of the Division to capture Kervenheim, Winnekendonk and 
Kapellen, while 8t' Brigade rested. 
On the 2 °d and 3rd March, a draft of 172 reinforcements and two new officers arrived at 
the battalion. Many came from other regiments and, until their arrival, were unaware of 
their final destination, or to which regiment they would be attached. 
The 2nd Battalion then moved on towards the Rhine, in preparation for the final push. 
For a short time, while the Allies built up supplies ready for the crossing, the battalion 
experienced a lull in the action and saw for themselves that the civilians had enjoyed 
better living conditions than those in France and Holland. From Calcar, the battalion 
moved to Honnepel on the 140` March, where the War Diary recorded `we are told that 
our chief role while sitting on the banks of the Rhine is to obtain all possible 
information of the enemy on the East bank'. The Rhine crossing commenced on the 23`a 
March yet the battalion was not directly involved. The initial assault was made by 1St 
134 McNish, Iron Division, p128, Sir John Smyth, Bolo Whistler, pp. 145-146. 
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Commando Brigade at Wesel, 15`h Division north of Xanten and 51St Division at Rees; 
the same divisions as were involved in the opening days of Operation Veritable. The 
crossing was accompanied by a large airborne drop and by 27th March the bridgehead 
was ten miles deep. The Regimental historian recorded that the 3`d Division wished it 
could have taken part in the initial crossing. 135 Yet none of the interviewees expressed 
this opinion. Instead their memories of this period invariably focused on the better 
living conditions and ample provision of food, which included some of the livestock left 
by the German farmers. There again appears to be a divergence between what views the 
battalion espoused in public and the reality as experienced by the infantryman. 
During this period, Nightingale assessed the role of the battalion to be one of acting in 
support of the initial assault divisions, 136 however this support extended only to 
observation of German activity across the river. 137 Scarfe termed this `an unspectacular, 
fundamental part', whereby the Division formed a `springboard off which two Divisions 
dived into mid-Germany'. 138 
The crossing of the Rhine was a vast undertaking, with 30,000 engineers and pioneers 
to do the bridging work, 1300 artillery guns in support and the involvement of a 
complete Airborne Army Corps, both parachutist and glider-borne. 139 . gis Was 
therefore an important operation and to be follow-up troops meant that there would be 
little opportunity to perform outstandingly if the initial crossings were a success. In the 
event the 2 °d Battalion guarded the gaps blown in the dykes and waited for the first 
prisoners of war to arrive. Although the Rifle Companies were not involved in the 
assault, 8t' Brigade provided medical services for those of other units who were 
wounded in it. 
135 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 258. Also Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 220. 
'36 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 258. 
137 This was also the Divisional role. McNish, Iron Division, p. 129. 
138 Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 220. 
139 McNish, Iron Division, p. 260. 
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The War Diary included a detailed breakdown of the different units involved, with the 
thought that `3 Div will probably follow up with the Guards Armoured Div sometime 
after the 20h March'. This did not happen and the War Diary noted `movement in the 
Bn area decreases' before the 2nd Battalion made their own crossing over a bridge at 
Rees on the 29"'. Other units of the 3`d Division had become involved the day before. 
The beginning of April saw the battalion just over the border in Holland at Enschede, 
after an attack on the town was called off when the Germans were found to have 
withdrawn. Having hoped that their stay in `this large friendly town with its comfortable 
billets' would be a long one, the War Diary reflected the battalion's `regret' that the 
troops were ordered to leave for Nordhorn in Germany on the 3`d April, where a large 
camp for displaced people, principally Russians and Poles, was discovered. This phase 
was the start of the civilian affairs problems that plagued the battalion until some 
months after the cessation of the war. The following day the Carrier Platoon liberated 
the Dutch village of Ootmarsum, where `they were greeted with great warmth. This 
little village had been asking for our aid when underground troops of the hamlet clashed 
with the enemy'. 140 The battalion was presented with a scroll of thanks by the village, 
commemorating the liberation, which was not recorded in the War Diary, but is clearly 
a unique document and is held at the Regimental Museum in York. 
On the 10th April, the battalion moved to Harpstedt, and as they travelled, large groups 
of displaced people lined the route `some saluting, some waving. They seemed happy 
despite the long march, the dust and probable shortage of food'. '4' The Suffolks held 
Bassurn and the South Lancashires Wildeshausen, with these two towns and that of 
Harpstedt each controlling a road leading north-west into Bremen. 142 On the 13th, 8th 
Brigade was directed to the Brinkum area, with the 2"d Battalion based at Fahrenhorst. 
On the 16`", the 2"d Battalion was ordered to take Heiligenrode and Great Mackenstedt. 
140 2°d Battalion War Diary 4'h April 1945. 
141 Ibid., 10th April 1945. 
142 Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 244. 
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The fighting here is recorded in great detail in the War Diary, yet it differed in intensity 
from the battles of the previous year. As an illustration, UK leave continued throughout 
and was not curtailed, which would have happened had the progress of the war been in 
jeopardy. 
It was during this period that the Reverend George Fox, of the 3rd Reconnaissance 
Regiment, 3`d Division, recorded in his diary, `3`d Division seems to have lost some of 
its old drive, it is certainly not considered the first class division as when in the 
Normandy bridgehead. There are many reasons, but I am not fully in the picture. I am 
not in a position to judge'. 143 Reverend Fox was not the only one to consider the Yd 
Division had faltered. Lt Col Martin Lindsay DSO rated the infantry divisions at 1" 
August 1944 and on 1'` April 1945. The 3`d Division was rated top for efficiency and 
effectiveness in August but was 3`d on the list by the following April. 144 This may 
perhaps be explained by David Fraser's summing up of the final battles in Germany as 
`seldom easy, but to fight them was to engage in a race where the result was already 
known. The necessity was clear but the stimulus flagged'. '45 Thus, small and costly 
battles continued to be fought, while the units concerned proceeded cautiously. As Wilf 
Todd explained: `For an infantryman every little battle was serious, because it didn't 
matter whether it was a major battle or a skirmish, a bullet could kill you. 146 It is this 
knowledge that colours the War Diary through the remaining days of the war. There is 
clearly frustration towards the German forces who inflicted casualties when continued 
resistance seemed futile. The advance of the 2nd Battalion in this area, and to Great 
Mackenstedt, formed part of a larger attack involving 9t' Brigade and the 51St Highland 
Division. The rapid progress saw the 2°d Battalion capturing two 88mm guns with their 
143 The Reverend Colin Fox ed. Diary orthe Reverend George Fox MC June 16`x' 1944-June 6`h 1945 
(York, 1998) Diary entry for 17th April 1945. 
144 Martin Lindsay, So Few Got Through, p. 254. Of course it might not be purely accidental that 
Lindsay's own division, the Si", topped the second list. 
'43 Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, p. 393. 
146 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 4'" April 1999. 
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crews and numerous prisoners. However, both villages were defended and house-to- 
house fighting took place. By the 20`h April, the road and rail links had been cut 
between Delmenhorst and Bremen, and the 2nd Battalion had cut the road link by taking 
two vital crossroads. 
The last major battle that involved the 2 °d Battalion, the taking of Bremen, saw the 3ta 
Division making an attack from the south of the city, with 52 °d Lowland Division and 
43rd (Wessex) Division entering the city from the east. Thus, for the 24th April the Diary 
recorded `the Battalion has little to do but watch preparations for the attack upon 
Bremen' and the next day `in the morning we hear that the attack went well'. 
Nightingale reasoned: `as at Honnopel, the East Yorkshires were just spectators of the 
first phase'. 147 The two other Brigades, 9th and 185`h, began their attack on the night of 
the 24t'/25t', and much of the opposition in Bremen had been cleared before 8th Brigade 
became involved on the 26t' April, with the 2°d Battalion entering the housing estate of 
Rablingshauser, supported by tanks of the 417th Dragoon Guards. 148 8th Brigade's 
objective was to clear the area of Bremen south of the Weser. '49 There was a constant 
danger from SS troops and `B' Company `chased eight of these contemptible tykes 
along the road killing two, taking four PW, (while) two escaped' . 
150 `C' Company took 
almost two hundred prisoners and discovered an enemy AA control post, then captured 
another hundred soldiers near the village of Strom. Lt Col Renison went to investigate 
for himself the reports of so many prisoners and met `a long column of Boche marching 
down the road towards us shepherded by a few jubilant members of "C" Company'. 15, 
The AA control post had been expecting the advance to come from the Delmenhorst 
area, by 51st Division, and not from behind them. The following day, `A' Company 
troops were fired on from houses, which killed one and injured another, then `seventeen 
'47 Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 272. 
148 Scarfe, Assault Division, pp. 266-7. 
lag McNish, Iron Division, p. 132. 
1502 d Battalion War Diary 26th April 1945. 
151 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 361. 
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despicable SS youths gave themselves up'. 152 More trouble was experienced further on, 
and `it was with mixed feelings of regret and rage that we learned that Major 
Pemberton, "A" Coy Comdr had been wounded'. 153 
On May 5th official hostilities ceased, however for some of the interviewees, 
interestingly the longer-serving ones, the news was an anti-climax. 154 Jim Fetterly 
recalled `there was no celebration except a few handshakes. We were dirty and tired and 
grateful'. '55 The Regimental History recorded: `It was difficult for us to appreciate that 
hostilities were virtually at an end'. 156 The Colonel of the 2 °d Battalion addressed all the 
troops and told them of messages of appreciation from Field Marshal Montgomery and 
a message from the Commander of 30 Corps, Lt General B. G. Horrocks CB DSO MC, 
received on ls` May 1945, stating `it seems to me that the Division has gone from 
strength to strength in the recent fighting and I am certain that there is no better 
Division than the 3`d British in the British Liberation Army today'. 157 On the 8th May, 
V. E. Day, the War Diary recorded `today is V. E. Day but there is nothing in the nature 
of boisterous flag waving hilarity'. lsa 
From Normandy to Bremen the 2 °a Battalion suffered 1072 dead, wounded or missing, a 
complete turnover of the rifle companies by two and a half times. This is clearly a high 
rate of loss, although not an exceptional figure for an infantry battalion of this period. '59 
It is significant that the total number of missing was comparatively small, just two 
officers and fifty `other ranks', which was an indication of how well the men of the 
152 2nd Battalion War Diary 27th April 1945. 
153 Ibid. 
154 This sense of anti-climax was not restricted to the long-serving 2°d Bn soldiers. Major General P. 
Martin remembered `weeping quietly to myself. . . it was a grand anti-climax as far as I was concerned' SWWEC Tape 2106. 
155 In a letter from Jim Fetterly to the author dated 9m January 2000. 
'56 Regimental History p. 24. 
157 Ibid., pp. 24-5. 
158 This feeling was replicated elsewhere. In A Canloan Officer, R. F. Fendick related how `there were 
few signs of emotion among the group I was with there, just quiet acceptance' p. 222. In 18 Platoon, 
Sydney Jary wrote `we had learned too much to indulge in shallow demonstrations', p. 122. 
159 The 4th Bn The Somerset Light Infantry lost more - 1313 killed or wounded since July 1944. Sydney Jary 18 Platoon p. 122. 
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battalion fought. 160 Some of those missing had been captured - Capt G. W. Smith met a 
Sergeant and four privates of the 2 °d Battalion in his prison camp. 161 
An examination of the secondary literature reveals a concentration on the role of 
armour, particularly during the Normandy Campaign, due to the nature of the planned 
operations. The pressure on manpower dictated a reliance on armoured brigades and 
divisions, to make territorial gains and tie up the armour of the enemy. The role of the 
infantry was thereby relegated to a concentration on protection of the flanks and 
consolidation of the territory secured by Allied armoured formations. In the event, some 
of these operations, for example Goodwood, were not successful due to the difficult 
terrain and the strength of the opposition. The infantry divisions thereby, were limited in 
their own achievements and generally, few divisions merit more than a brief reference. 
The performance of the 2°d Battalion during this period could quite legitimately be 
dubbed `unspectacular' overall. Its story is the story of many of the battalions of the 
north-west Europe campaign. It formed part of a solid, county regiment and did no more 
than many other similar regiments of the line. However this is not to denigrate its 
achievements, in particular the battalion, unlike other units, 162 was never forced to give 
up territory or objectives it had taken. 163 A careful study of the War Diary has revealed 
that at no point were the troops forced to retreat; the story is overwhelmingly one of 
advance followed by consolidation. The men, in some encounters, notably at the 
Chateau de la Londe and the Schaddenhof farm, fought extremely well, despite taking 
heavy casualties. Of course, other battalions in other Divisions, could be argued to have 
160 Lt Col R. H. W. S. Hastings used this argument in support of his own battalion, the 6th Battalion Green 
Howards, p. 7. 
161 In the Bag! by Capt G. W. Smith - memoir IWM (95/30/1). '62 There are innumerable instances of retreats during this period. The 6th Battalion Green Howards had 
been forced to retreat following heavy casualties at a farm called Les Hauts Vents, the 81 Battalion DLI 
was driven out of Tilly. 
163 In The Snapper Vol XL June, 1945, Lt Col Renison wrote in `Banger' King's Obituary `it was his 
proud boast that this Battalion had never failed to take its objective and to hold it'. 
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performed equally well at various stages and in different locations, 164 although McNish 
concluded that the role of the 3`d Division as a whole was unique, in that its infantrymen 
had fought in all three campaigns noted as decisive by General Eisenhower; the battle of 
the Normandy beaches, the battle of the Falaise pocket and the battles west of the 
Rhine. 165 It should be noted however, that the 3`d Division was not at the forefront of the 
culminating battle to close the Falaise Gap, but rather was involved in the lead-up. The 
2"a Battalion was not alone in enduring hard battles; other units of the Division had their 
own actions in which prolonged and arduous fighting took place, resulting in a high 
turnover of men. 
The interviews have been used in this chapter both to confirm the areas in which the 
battalion served and describe more fully the conditions the infantry discovered therein. 
The historic value of the interviews, in this assessment of the battalion's performance, 
lies in their providing the personal aspects missing from the War Diary. The individual 
infantryman, unable to influence strategy, was most concerned with survival, whether 
involved in a small or large battle, or sitting under shellfire. It was not of immediate 
concern whether the battle was newsworthy or how history would judge the battalion. 
This would be a matter for post-war reflection. For the infantryman, his wish was to live 
long enough to see the end of the war and return home. It was not of relevance that post- 
war, secondary literature would depict his contribution as less `glamorous' than that of 
the special forces. 
The individual infantryman of the battalion would never describe himself as spectacular. 
Neither would the infantry of other similar regiments. Yet the majority did enough to 
secure eventual victory, despite the lack of rest, the horrendous physical conditions, the 
fear and the instinct for self-preservation. An understanding of the extent of the 
difficulties facing the infantryman, examined in the following chapter, leads to the 
164 Martin Lindsay, So Few Got Through; p. 244. His troops had to endure street-fighting for 48 hours at 
one stretch when clearing Rees and were `overloaded with congratulations'. 165 McNish, Iron Division, p. 133. 
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conclusion that this was a remarkable feat. Hastings rightly argued that it was the 
overall quality of the British Army that decided the outcome of the north-west Europe 
campaign, rather than the superior fighting qualities of single units. 166 The fighting 
quality of the 2°d Battalion, as for so many other battalions, was sufficient to assist in 
securing the unconditional surrender of the German Army, which was the ultimate goal 
of the campaign. 
166 Hastings, Overlord, p. 150. 
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Chapter 4- Leadership, Comradeship and Endurance - conditions of service for 
the 2 °d Battalion infantrymen 
This chapter concentrates on the conditions endured by the infantrymen of the 2 °a 
Battalion during the north-west Europe campaign. During the course of the campaign, 
the infantry battled through mud, snow and rain, using whatever was around them to 
alleviate the conditions, while under constant threat from bombardments and small-arms 
fire, all without any idea of how long the war would last. The physical and mental 
difficulties are measured against an examination of those aspects which went some way 
to alleviating the hardships, such as small-unit loyalty, comradeship, good leadership 
and comforts, in order to understand why the infantry continued to fight, despite the 
ever-present risk of injury or death. ' 
The Battalion War Diary does not provide a detailed insight into the conditions under 
which the infantry operated as this was not within its remit. It is primarily a military 
document outlining the progress of the actions in which the battalion took part. The 
interviews are therefore valuable historically in that they reveal the life of the individual 
infantryman during the campaign. In many cases, the interviews reinforced the available 
secondary literature on life in the infantry. However they additionally, and again, more 
importantly, provide an insight into the memories that remain particularly vivid for the 
individual 2nd Battalion infantrymen, such as experiences of near-misses and injuries. 
They also reflect the strong link between physical conditions and the places in which 
the interviewees served, and reveal how the sixty years since the conflict ended have 
shaped the memories of those involved. The length of time that has elapsed, has often 
eroded memories of place names and dates, which is to be expected. However the 
memories of the physical hardships and their specifics, are richly detailed and evocative. 
1 For an examination of the issues of discipline and morale, see David French, Raising Churchill's Army, 
Chapter 4. 
2 For example John Ellis, The Sharp End of War. The Fighting Man in World War II (London, 1980), 
Richard Holmes, Acts of War. The Behaviour of Men in Battle (London, 2004) and Sean Longden, To the 
Victor the Spoils. D-Day to V. E. Day, the Reality behind the Heroism (Gloucs, 2004). 
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Each interviewee remembered experiences which were intensely personal, for example, 
Arthur Lumb witnessed a doctor cut off what remained of a man's leg using a pair of 
scissors3 and Peter Brown threw a potato at a German soldier, fooling him into thinking 
it was a grenade, at the height of the battle for Schaddenhof farm. These are small, 
individual details that remain vivid for the interviewees and taken altogether, the 
personal evolves into the group record of the battalion. These overlapping `layers' of 
memory reveal a great deal of the group experience, and allow useful generalisations to 
be made. Within secondary literature, representations of life in the infantry are based on 
memoirs and interviews from regiments across the Army. Here, memories have been 
solicited from one battalion, so the degree of overlap is greater and the reliability of the 
evidence is consequently higher. 
Physical Conditions and Comforts. 
During the north-west Europe campaign, the soldiers faced severe physical conditions, 
including extremes of weather, long periods in action, and a lack of basic facilities 
including food, shelter and warmth. They spent long periods in trenches, trying to make 
them as safe and comfortable as possible. Events such as the arrival of the Mobile Bath 
Unit or finding additional food were therefore seen as a notable exception to their 
normal existence and interviewees often recalled specific instances. As one Regimental 
History concludes, `there is no greater mistake than to believe the more spartan a life the 
soldier lives, the better soldier he must be'. 5 
During the interview process, examples of the physical conditions were given in 
response to questions about specific regions in which they served. Hence the town of 
Troarn is associated with problems of mosquitoes, Venraij and Overloon are defined by 
3 From interview with Arthur Lumb 1" May 1999. 
4 From interview with Peter Brown 19th September 1999. 
S Nicholson, The History of the Suffolk Regiment 1928-1946, p. 138. 
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rain and mud, 6 while the Maas area is linked to snow and intense cold over a prolonged 
period. For the infantryman, the physical conditions are of paramount importance, 
because for long periods he is fully exposed to the natural environment. Hence his 
sensory memories remain vivid. It is apparent that much time was expended in attempts 
to maximise personal comfort by whatever means were available. Often this was as 
basic as putting doors or branches across the top of a trench, or securing shelter in a 
cellar.? 
There was often a shortage of food, or a lack of opportunity to eat the food the troops 
did have access to: at breakfast men could make porridge from blocks in their ration 
packs or have soya-link sausages but `sometimes you just had tea and the whistle would 
be blowing to get going. Then you'd probably just have a piece of chocolate from your 
emergency rations or some hard tack biscuits'. 8 Many of the interviewees recalled the 
ration packs, the monotony of the food available, and the shortages, hence packages 
from home proved a highlight. 9 Equally, if a parcel did not include food, the 
disappointment could be extreme. 1° To supplement the rations, soldiers bartered 
cigarettes and tins from their own supplies, for eggs and fresh foodstuff. Determined 
efforts were made to deliver hot food to those in the front line, however the War Diary 
makes several references to the difficulties this entailed. On one occasion, Wilf Todd 
volunteered to drive a Bren carrier through the shelling to deliver food to his company, 
even recalling that the sweet was Yorkshire Pudding fritters with syrup. 
6 Capt P. E. G. Balfour wrote about Holland to Anne, `This is a bloody country. It rains all day, it is 
extremely cold and is rapidly becoming one large bog', 13th November 1944 (SWWEC 99.90). 
7 This was a widespread practice. R. F. Fendick wrote of providing overhead cover for the slit trenches, of 
logs, building wood or sheet metal, covered with spoil, in A Canloan Officer, p. 61. 
8 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 1' May 1999. 
9 Alf Ackroyd recalled receiving a bacon and egg pie from his mother, which arrived with mildew on, yet 
was still eaten, during an interview 25h February 2002. 
10 In his recollections, John Scruton wrote of the fury of a new reinforcement in his section who received 
Brylcreem instead of the expected honey or jam. 
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As well as the lack of food, the constant tiredness was a feature both of the interviews 
and in personal accounts from other units involved in this campaign. " As an officer, 
Clive Crauford emphasised how important it was for the maintenance of morale for him 
to visit the slit trenches of those on guard duty at night, but ` when you're dog-tired, you 
haven't had a decent night's sleep since God knows when, ... the willpower required to 
make yourself wake up and get moving and go and see the outposts (laughing) is 
incredibly difficult'. 12 This lack of proper rest took its toll on strained nerves. One 
interviewee remembered, `you didn't get any proper sleep. You were in a slit trench 
with another chap and you'd grab an hour or two and then he would. There was 
nowhere to sit. You just got your head down as best you could'. 13 The ability to dig a 
slit trench quickly was essential. Often the interviewees would dig more than one trench 
a day - as soon as the soldiers stopped, it was the first duty that was performed. This 
was a normal feature of life for the infantry. la 
The other problem was a lack of opportunity to wash. Daily shaving, even if it was 
using tea, was deemed essential, yet bathing was infrequent and relied on the `mobile 
bath units' or the soldiers' ingenuity. The lack of privacy was patently difficult for some 
of those serving in the campaign. Doug Parker remembered an experience at the mobile 
bath unit, when `no sooner had we got naked than they started mortaring it. I had to dive 
in a trench. I was really embarrassed about that'. 15 John Scruton recalled French women 
laughing at their nakedness and one man of his section confided `not even my wife has 
seen me like this'. 16 
To supplement the rare visits of the mobile bath unit, some interviewees remembered 
unorthodox methods of washing in the field, such as a rudimentary shower made from a 
11 Lt Col R. H. W. S. Hastings of 6'h Battalion Green Howards wrote, `the predominant feeling was of 
fatigue. Officers and men were very tired indeed', p. 6 of A Short Account of the Operations of 6`h Bn 
Green Howards, held at the archive of the Green Howards Regimental Museum. 
12 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5th November 2000. 
13 Extract from interview with Doug Parker 17th July 1999. 
14 Capt Michael Bendix recalled `digging four, in a four hour period' SWWEC (2000-356). 
's Extract from interview with Doug Parker 17th July 1999. 
16 John Scruton privately held recollections. 
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tin with holes punched in it' 17 and a bath with water heated in 40 gallon oil drums. `We 
all took turns to go in. It was alright if you were first in but not so good for the last'. 
18 
When the battalion was in trenches near Troarn, shellfire'9 and wet weather affected 
morale. The interviewees recalled a further factor which added to the discomfort, a high 
concentration of mosquitoes. Of course, for the infantry, living in trenches deep in water 
made life far from comfortable and for some, the mosquitoes were the last straw. 
20 `The 
net result of this was a very serious outbreak of so called "battle exhaustion" which took 
the very harshest treatment and a good deal of plain speaking by the Doctor to quell'). 
' 
None of the interviewees remembered the conditions causing anyone to report sick, but 
some did recall the ointment supplied for mosquito bites, including Bill Turner: `Oh 
honestly they bit me to death the sods did. All over my face. They used to call me "the 
man with the blue beard"', 122 as the ointment was coloured. 
During the freezing winter of 1944-45, the troops had to become acclimatised to the 
sub-zero temperatures and resorted to improvisation to keep themselves warm. They put 
sacking over their boots and packed them with straw, 3 and when they went to the top of 
the orchard for a standing patrol there was a hen run, in which they would take turns to 
lay, to shelter from the wind and snow. 24 The intense cold affected the performance of 
the troops and their weapons, and was a feature of life for many units in Holland during 
this period ?5 
17 From interview with Clive Crauford S's November 2000. 
" Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 25th March 1999. 
19 Sydney Jary wrote in 18 Platoon `Morale was always higher during an attack. Sitting around being 
shelled is not an occupation to be recommended', p. 49. On p. 110, one of Jary's Lance-Corporals `went to 
pieces' due to the intense noise of the accurate shelling. 
In A Canloan ricer, R. F. Fendick reinforced how great a problem the mosquitoes in this area were: 
`my platoon had more casualties, sent back for treatment of infected mosquito bites in a two or three week 
period, than we had from enemy action' p. 87. 
Lt Col Renison's memoir, p30. 
22 Extract from interview with Bill Turner 2d January 2003. 
b From interview with Horace Pinfold 2d December 2000. 
24 From interview with Wilf Todd 1' May 1999. Also recalled by Harry Smithson in his recollections. u Sydney Jary, 18 Platoon, p. 93 `the oil in our automatic weapons froze and, until anti-freeze lubricants 
were issued, our Brens were useless'. 
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Although the months of December and January were quiet militarily, the harsh physical 
conditions took their toll, and unusually, the War Diary makes specific reference to this 
in a section at the end of January, prepared by Lt Little, entitled `General Notes on the 
Month': `The biggest enemy during the month was the cold. It was overcome by the 
issue of a weird collection of clothing, including locally made fur coats, ear muffs, gum 
boot stockings, and sand-bags for the feet. Rum was issued on a generous scale 
throughout the month'. 6 Although none of the interviewees mentioned unusual 
clothing, many did recall the sand-bags, the snowsuits and the unrelenting cold. Horace 
Pinfold also recalled the rum issue, considered essential by many soldiers: 
Being the youngest, I was told to carry the rum up to this 
trench up by the Maas, a big bottle of rum, and of course... 
they kept looking at me, I thought `they are looking after 
me'. . and anyway I disappeared 
down a hole, and I 
remember this very plainly, and this one chap said "is he 
alright? ", and somebody said "never mind if so and so over 
there is alright. Is the rum alright"? That is a further thing 
that stands out in my mind. 7 
This is a typical anecdote illustrating Army humour, 28 but it also reflects just how 
important the rum became at times, for morale purposes as well as to combat the cold. 
Although `this rum was so strong a lot of the boys could not drink it', 29 it proved a 
method of making the harsh physical conditions bearable. 0 Rum was not distributed 
daily, but depended on the prevailing circumstances. In Smithson's account of fetching 
the rum for his depleted section, the qualification was that it had been raining for more 
than ten minutes. 
The harsh physical conditions were alleviated during periods in reserve or while on 
leave, when efforts were made to supply the soldiers with beer and recreation, while 
26 god Battalion War Diary 3V January 1945. 
27 Extract from interview with Horace Pinfold 2°d December 2000. 
28 The importance of humour as a stress diffuser should not be overlooked. Many of the interviewees 
quoted examples of laughter despite the grimmest of situations, including Peter Brown and Wilf Todd. 
Harry Smithson's recollections. 
30 For the function of alcohol on the frontline see Richard Holmes, Acts of War. The Behaviour of Men in 
Battle, pp. 247-250. 
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continuing to adhere to army rules and standards. Lt Col Renison's memoir makes 
reference to football matches, ENSA shows, dances and film showings, yet rest periods 
were, of necessity, short and infrequent. More regularly, the battalion was removed 
from the front line in order to re-equip and receive reinforcements. However these 
periods were not wholly restful as the areas were usually close enough to the front line 
to be within German artillery range 31 
Endurance and Exhaustion. 
For many infantrymen, after a long spell in action, watching comrades becoming 
casualties and perhaps their replacements also being killed or wounded, they would 
begin to feel `an increasing weariness of the spirit, a slowly dawning and dreadful 
realisation that there was no way out, that the odds were stacked against the front-line 
soldier' 32 For officers, the risks were even greater. 
To many involved in this campaign, it appeared that more concerted action could be 
expected from the inexperienced soldier, with the longer-serving troops becoming 
increasingly cautious. 3 Lt Col Richardson considered that `the old war horse needs far 
more careful handling and bandaging up in cotton wool than the youngster, who is 
prepared to rush his fences because he has never had a bad fall' . 
34 One battalion in 3`h 
Division was quoted as having failed to advance during an attack because the 
experienced soldiers, hearing a Spandau machine gun, had gone to ground, encouraging 
the reinforcements to follow suit, `such is the state to which too much hard fighting and 
mental exhaustion can reduce a fine formation'. 5 In fact, no matter how good the 
training in helping the infantryman acclimatise to the battlefield, he would still have a 
31 This was usual practice for the infantry and also for armoured regiments. Brig M. J. P. O'Cock recalled 
incurring casualties out of the front line `in spite of all our precautions' SWWEC (2003-2287) p. 5. 
12 John Ellis, The Sharp End of War. The fighting man in World War 11, p239. 33 Major General P. Martin - after a period in action `we certainly didn't take the sort of wild risks which 
one would have expected the newly arrived troops from England to take' SWWEC Tape 2106. Also 
Belfield and Essame, The Battlefor Normandy, p. 116. 
34 Lt Col P. 1-1. Richardson DSO OBE, Commanding Officer of 7'h Battalion The Green Howards, p. 3 
from his account held at The Green Howards Regimental Museum, Richmond. 
35 Belfield and Essame, The Battle for Normandy, p. 169. The battalion was not named. 
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`breaking point'. 36 John Folley wrote honestly of the mental pressure, which resulted in 
thoughts of suicide, 37 and which impacted on the rest of his life. As has already been 
outlined, cases of men refusing to advance on the enemy are well-documented, both on 
occasion within the 2°d Battalion and in many instances elsewhere within infantry 
regiments serving in north-west Europe 38 An infantryman's `breaking point' was 
considered to be after four hundred days of exposure to action, even with proper rest out 
of the line 39 
During the north-west Europe campaign, Major-General Gilbert of the 2"d Battalion 
Lincolnshire Regiment found that as a Company Commander he was initially 
unprepared for cases of battle exhaustion. He quickly had to learn to spot a man under 
strain and send him back down the line for a short rest. 40 Gilbert highlighted the most 
stressful situations as being periods of intensive shelling and also accurate aimed rifle 
fire. 4' Sir Robin Dunn reiterated that it was difficult to persuade soldiers to do their duty 
when they were `frightened, tired, cold, wet and hungry', 42 yet in his experience at least 
90 per cent of his men continued to perform effectively. Some men remained effective 
in action longer than others, yet all would succumb to exhaustion eventually. 43 
Symptoms of exhaustion included `shaking hands, stammering, tears and untypical 
behaviour' and it could prove unsettling for the other men in the unit. 
36 Discipline and the Death Penalty in the British Army in the War against Germany during the Second 
World War, David French. Journal of Contemporary History 33.4. 
37 Article by John Folley, `Every Man has a Breaking Point', Special Collections, University of Leeds, 
ARMY 069. 
3= A Diary entry on 10th August 1944, by Reverend George Fox MC of the 3M Reconnaissance Regt 
stated: `encouraged one man to get out of his trench and join the rest, I told him that I would stand by him 
at his post, but of no avail. Impossible to reason with such a case in such surroundings, they must be got 
away from the line', cd. The Reverend Colin Fox. 
39 Gwynne Dyer, in War, wrote that during the Second World War, the US Army said men would break 
down after 200-240 days and both US and British Armies agreed that breakdown was inevitable. See also 
Richard Holmes, Acts of War, p. 215. 
40 John P. Waterfield remembered the Padre alerting him if an individual was displaying signs of battle 
fatigue, whereupon he would be sent for a short rest. Interview SWWEC (2002-1672). 
41 Major General G. C. A. Gilbert MC. Interview by SWWEC Tape 1424. 
42 Sir Robin Dunn of the Royal Artillery. Interview by SWWEC Tape 1500. 
43 Major General P. Martin recalled one of his Corporals in the DLI breaking down in Normandy, after 
serving gallantly in the desert. Interview SWWEC Tape 2106. 
44 Lt Eric Chamberlain SWWEC (2003-2067), Brig M. J. P. O'Cock SWWEC (2003-2287). 
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Inevitably there was a conflict of interest between the military, who needed the maximum 
number of men available for active service, and those operating in the field of psychiatry 
who wanted to treat those displaying symptoms of strain. By initially treating cases close 
to the front line, as many men as possible could be returned to their unit instead of 
evacuating them to the rear. 
For the 2°d Battalion, the strain that resulted from being in action became apparent by the 
end of June. Straight after the Chateau de la Londe battle, the battalion moved back to 
Mathieu. The rest was certainly needed. On Lt Col Renison's arrival at the battalion he 
noted that `I was horrified to find how pale and tired, almost listless everyone 
seemed' 45 This situation was replicated within other battalions serving in Normandy 
during the period 46 The Chateau de la Londe action was arduous and had taken its toll 
mentally. Capt Ogden recorded in his memoir that he felt it would be a useful exercise 
for `B' Company to go back over the battle for training purposes, yet `before we started, 
normally cheerful red faced soldiers were going grey and ashen in colour. I felt it a little 
in the pit of my stomach. We were slipping back in time to the battle itself. We were in 
an actual time warp or a psychological one'. 7 He swiftly cancelled the exercise and 
returned the men to their usual duties. Capt Ogden remembered the large number of 
unburied dead from both sides, as the action had taken three weeks in all, and the 
interviewees too, recalled these sights and the attendant smell. For Peter Brown, the 
battle `was certainly the worst experience we'd had to date', particularly as he had had 
to share his dug-out with a dead German for some hours and `although by this time we 
were used to the smell of death, it was a long time before we recovered from this 
experience' 48 
" Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 11. 
4' Lt Col Martin Lindsay, So Few Got Through, p. 13. Lindsay's CO said as early as July 15`h 1944 that 
his battalion was tired as a result of too much use being made of the Division, accounting for a number of 
men becoming `bomb-happy'. 
47 Captain J. H. Ogden, Ogden's Force IWM (67/267/1). 
48 Peter Brown privately held memoir. 
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Neither the War Diary nor Lt Col Renison wrote of deserters, yet desertion was a 
common problem among infantry divisions in north-west Europe. During the First 
World War, the ultimate punishment for desertion had been the death penalty, but this 
ultimate deterrent was no longer in force during the 1939-45 conflict. The usual 
sentence for desertion in the north-west European campaign, was three years' penal 
servitude. 49 As a result of a survey of 2,000 deserters, a close link was established 
between desertion and low morale, so that if unit morale faltered, a soldier could resort 
to desertion or become a casualty of battle exhaustion S0 The survey also linked 
desertion to men who had served in previous campaigns and a higher rate among the 
infantry, who comprised 89 per cent of the total. In one of Major King's letters to his 
batman he referred to the problem of desertion, when the German troops counter- 
attacked and `some of our bomb happy crowd beat it' S1 He is obviously not writing of 
just one or two men who could not, or would not, face battle, yet the north-west Europe 
campaign, at this point, was only three months old. 
The interviewees spoke of men who had become `bomb-happy' but did not mention 
many incidences of desertion, as it was considered a source of shame for the battalion 
52 
Cpl John Scruton remembered men leaving the front line when they had had enough, 
and once or twice he helped them with a little money, in the knowledge that if they 
stayed, their behaviour could endanger others. He also revealed, `I had one bloke who 
shot his forger off not long after D-Day' to effect a return to the UK. Scruton argued 
that this behaviour was in the minority, as `most stuck it out, often month after month, 
with a dogged, stubborn (sometimes sullen) spirit of determination' S3 Other than this 
one mention of a self-inflicted wound, none of the other interviewees spoke of such 
" Robert H. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War (London, 1958) p. 118. 
S0 bid. pp. 122-123. 
51 Letter from Major King to Blenkhorn dated 29th August 1944. 
52 Lt Col Martin Lindsay wrote that six deserters from P Division had surrendered to his battalion, 
although no unit name was given, in So Few Got Through p. 24. Lindsay also recorded deserters from his 
own battalion p. 64. 
53 Interview with John Scruton 3 1" May 1999. 
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incidences, although John Folley wrote of limbs held above the trenches during shell- 
fire `sprouting up like weeds' in the hope of achieving a `Blighty' wound. M 
The P Infantry Division's monthly medical bulletins analysed the numbers of 
casualties and their causes. The bulletin for October 1944 showed that battle exhaustion 
cases were high in proportion to wounded during the battle for Venraij55 and pointed out 
the reason for the preponderance of such cases was due to the battle conditions of `cold 
and wet weather, inability to dig proper slit trenches due to the waterlogged ground; a 
prolonged battle with not very much progress and the continual fear of mines'. The ratio 
for the 2 °d Battalion was 1: 2, meaning that for every two men injured in battle, one 
became a casualty of exhaustion. Fortunately around three-quarters of the exhaustion 
cases were `returned to unit' following proper cam, 56 although it is not clear how many 
men may have later suffered a relapse. This is a higher percentage than that achieved by 
the 53`" Welsh Division, which managed to return only 52.4 per cent of soldiers 
suffering from exhaustion to their units during Operation Veritable in the period 
February to March 1945 57 
The report concluded that in respect of the Venraij battle, the majority of cases were of 
physical exhaustion rather than mental. It also linked the higher incidence of exhaustion 
to the days when more than ten men had to be evacuated with wounds, inferring that the 
resulting blow to morale predisposed the troops to becoming exhaustion cases. To speed 
up the treatment of exhaustion cases, a system was implemented for November whereby 
an officer assessed all new cases at the Advanced Dressing Station and divided them 
into physical exhaustion cases exhibiting slight nervous symptoms who could be treated 
on site, and those who were `nervous wrecks' who were evacuated direct to the Field 
"4 `A Blighty', from the papers of John Folley, University of Leeds. 
53 In A Canloan Officer, R. F. Fendick ascribed this figure as being due to `the very severe nature of the 
fighting and the appalling conditions', p. 135. 
56 3" British Infantry Division monthly medical bulletins, prepared by the ADMS of Td Div, Colonel RD 
Cameron. From the papers of Lt Col D. Paton of the RAMC, 223 Field Ambulance. SWWEC (2001- 
1354). 
57 A. D. Bolland, Team Spirit. The Administration of the 53'd Welsh Division during Operation Overlord 
June 1944-Atay 1945. SWWEC (2003-2140). 
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Dressing Station. The November report considered the issue of `the Exhaustion 
Casualty' in greater depth, being defined as `the soldier who, not being wounded or 
suffering from a particular disease, finds himself incapable of carrying on during the 
battle'. The causes included poor physical conditions, a long period at the front under 
shellfire, the loss of Company Commanders with no real leaders to take their place, and 
a lack of `esprit de corps' within the troops, particularly relating to the arrival of new 
reinforcements who may feel inferior due to their dearth of battle experience. The report 
stressed the vital role played by officers in keeping the cases of exhaustion to a 
minimum, including regular visits around the platoon by its officer, putting new 
reinforcements with an experienced soldier acting as a `battle father' and keeping troops 
active during rest periods, with parades, training and marches. In the case of the 2nd 
Battalion, it is apparent from the War Diary and interviews that these recommendations 
were rigorously followed. The only recommendation which does not feature in the 
interviews is that of giving lectures to the troops on the progress of the war between 
battles; rather it was noted by two interviewees that more information would have been 
useful. 
In assessing the incidence of battle exhaustion it is clear that particular elements of 
active service produced increased strain for the infantrymen. These elements include 
continual bombardments, the period immediately before going into action, the battle 
itself, and patrolling. Maintaining a constant high level of patrolling is a feature of Lt 
Col Renison's memoir and was regularly referred to in interviews. Patrols varied 
according to their purpose, whether for reconnaissance, or to protect the position (a 
`standing' patrol) or to demoralise the enemy by engaging them, and in doing so, 
perhaps capture a prisoner for intelligence (a `fighting' patrol). Their different purpose 
would determine how many men went, and what weapons would be carried. Infantry 
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battalions carried out all three types depending on their location, for example proximity 
to the enemy, and whether `friendly forces' covered the flanks. 58 
Patrolling could be a dangerous activity, 59 although one interviewee, Alf Ackroyd, 
opted to take out patrols as `it meant that next day you could get your head down 
without being disturbed for five or six hours' 60 As a lack of sleep was an ever-present 
problem, for Alf Ackroyd, the benefits of being able to sleep for a longer stretch 
outweighed the risks of being out on patrol. However, Doug Parker recalled his first 
patrol as an unnerving experience: `The first patrol I went on there was a Spandau firing 
down on us from a tree when we were walking across a field. All these tracer bullets 
were coming. I heard this lad shout, "mother, mother". Well we all did a runner, we 
were that frightened'. He added: `It was no wonder your nerves were terrible. Every 
time you went out you'd wonder if you were coming back' 6' Coping with such fear, 
and continuing to serve in the front line in spite of it, is considered by some to be a true 
measure of bravery. 62 
For some of those who became casualties, depending on the nature of their injury, it could 
be seen as a positive experience, in that it gave them time away from the front line. Of 
course, some of the injuries were life-changing in that their effects have continued to the 
present day. All those who became casualties remembered the details of the incident, their 
route back for treatment and the care they received, in great detail and with clarity, even in 
cases where the remainder of the interview was devoid of hard facts. For all those 
wounded, the names of hospitals, the number of weeks hospitalised and what they did 
during the subsequent leave, are all brought easily to mind 63 
ss In 18 Platoon, Sydney Jary argued that reconnaissance and standing patrols were useful for information 
purposes, but fighting patrols were a `contentious proposition', p. 72- 
59 Capt Michael Bendix described fighting patrols as `hateful' and standing patrols as `physically 
exhausting' SWWEC (2000-356). 
60 Extract from interview with Alf Ackroyd 251h February 2002. 
61 Extract from interview with Doug Parker 17'h July 1999. 
62 R. F. Fendick, A Canloan Officer, p. 83. In 18 Platoon Sydney Jary cited the example of Pte Charles 
Raven. 
63 For example, interviews with Jack Reid, George Burnham and Peter Brown. 
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Similarly, incidences of `near misses' were recalled in detail . 
64 Harry Smithson and two 
comrades ran for the same trench when shellfire started. Smithson was second into the 
trench and the last man, who landed on the top of the others, was killed. 65 On D-Day, 
Arthur Lumb was leaving the beach when the men in front of and behind him were 
killed, while Lumb was unscathed. 66 Such incidences reminded the interviewees of their 
mortality, and their good fortune in escaping unhurt when others around them were 
becoming casualties. Yet, for the longer-serving interviewees, it became increasingly 
clear that the only acceptable way to escape active service was to be injured or killed. 
Wilf Todd summed up this awareness: 
I always thought I would come through the Normandy 
landings. Later on in the war, and especially at night when 
you've been through a big attack and you're laying in your 
trench, you used to think about all your mates who had 
died. You knew that most of the faces you saw now hadn't 
come with you on the landings. You'd think surely my time 
must be coming now and you didn't give much for your 
chances of coming through the war. 67 
During the north-west Europe campaign, the infantry came under enormous strain and 
cases of battle fatigue were widespread. 8 There was a fine line between endurance and 
breakdown and it was only a matter of time before any infantryman would fall victim to 
collapse. It was the high turnover of soldiers that ensured large numbers did not suffer 
from breakdown simultaneously. 
Ki11ina and the Treatment of Prisoners. 
The issues of killing, and prisoner mistreatment, remain sensitive ones, which is 
reflected in the fact that few interviewees volunteered details of particular instances. Of 
those that did, it appears that being close enough to the enemy to see his face as you 
64 Martin Lindsay, in So Few Got Through, wrote that initially, near misses were `slightly exhilarating', 
but after a while the law of averages became apparent and they wore you down, p216. 
63 Harry Smithson's recollections. 
" From interview with Arthur Lumb 1" Mal 1999. 
67 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 4 April 1999. 
" See Ben Shephard, A War ofNerves. Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994 (London, 2002) pp. 250-255. 
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killed him had a significant impact on the survivor. 69 It is also quite rare to find 
particular instances of killing among infantry memoirs of the period. I did not pose a 
particular question relating to either prisoner abuse or killing generally, as I decided it 
was too intrusive to raise this subject in the short interview time available. However, a 
small number of interviewees did speak of these issues voluntarily, and from listening 
to the testimony and watching the reaction of the interviewee as he recalled the event, it 
is clear how affecting these issues were, both at the time and during the subsequent 
years. 
Despite Joanna Bourke's argument that some men during this period gained pleasure 
from killing, there were no feelings of pleasure associated with these instances of 
prisoner abuse or killing of Germans generally. Bourke wrote, `fear, anxiety, pain; these 
are only too familiar in combat. But excitement, joy and satisfaction were equally 
fundamental emotions, inspired by imagining that they had scored a good, clean 
"kill"' 70 None of my interviewees viewed the killing of German troops as in any way 
pleasurable, and instead gave examples of killing to protect their comrades or for self- 
preservation. 
It was in the battle for the bridge near Schaddenhof farm, that Dennis Bowen used his 
bayonet in action to kill a German soldier, which was not a regular occurrence during 
this campaign. Dennis Bowen shuddered, and his voice faltered, while describing his 
bayonet attack. 7' In another interview Wilf Todd calmly described one of the incidents 
which deeply affected him both at the time and post-war. After crossing the Escaut 
canal, he killed one of a small party of Germans while they were surrendering, as he 
mistakenly thought the German, who had a revolver in his hand, had just shot his friend. 
69 This extends beyond the 2' Bn. Norman Ford wrote of shooting a young 17 year old German who 
'suddenly became a fellow human being'. It is 'still painful to recall', SWWEC (99.40). 70 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing. Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare, 
43. 
71 From interview with Dennis Bowen 23rd January 2000. 
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This soldier closely resembled his father, with whom he had a troubled relationship, and 
this had a profound effect on Wi1f Todd. n 
Killing close-up was a very different proposition to the long-range killing of the aerial 
bombing campaign, or the shelling from a distance undertaken by the artillery. Only a 
small proportion of the armed forces killed at close range; the infantry of the rifle 
companies, and machine-gunners in the tanks, on the occasions when they had enemy 
infantry in range. It was common not to see enemy soldiers on the battlefield, as 
German forces usually remained hidden from view. 
In terms of treatment of prisoners, it appears that instances of mistreatment often 
occurred shortly after a battle, in retaliation for the loss of comrades and while the 
captor was angry and distressed. Certainly the most dangerous period for any new 
captives was in the first few moments of surrender. 73 Having lost almost all of the men 
from his section during the battle for Touffreville, Alf Ackroyd remembered: `two 
Germans surrendered, and I was so full of emotion that for the first time I turned the 
rifle and pulled the trigger. Fortunately it didn't fire, a typical misfire, for which 
afterwards I was very thankful' 74 This was the only personal involvement recalled 
during the interviews. The other incidents recorded during the interviews and battalion 
memoirs, entail acting as witnesses to prisoner abuse by other battalion members. 75 This 
reflects the findings of Stephen Ambrose, who interviewed over one thousand combat 
veterans. While only one admitted killing a prisoner himself, nearly a third recalled 
n From interview with Wilf Todd 4ih April 1999. 
n From Peter 11. Liddle and S. P. MacKenzie, 'The experience of captivity: British and Commonwealth 
prisoners in Germany', eds. P. Liddle, J. Bourne, I. Whitehead, The Great World War 1914-45 Vol. 1 
Lightning Strikes Twice. 
74 Extract from interview with Alf Ackroyd 25th February 2002. 
73 For example Melville Ilardiment, a sergeant in the god Battalion, recalled a private called Willy killing 
three Germans trying to surrender on D-Day: `I felt so bloody angry. All around us there were men, my 
friends, dying bravely'. Hardiment considered that the private `had obviously felt the same way as I had. 
Only more so'. From The Daily Star, 6th June 1984. Other incidents were recalled by Alf Harrison and 
John Folley. 
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other GIs shooting unarmed POWs. 76 Certainly Alf Ackroyd was unable to recall any 
specific guidance from officers as to how prisoners were to be taken, and treated 
thereafter, n although this would have been their responsibility. 
Jim Fetterly, at the time a junior officer, wrote that before the battle for the Chateau de 
la Londe, he was specifically ordered by a superior officer not to take any prisoners 
during the forthcoming action. This shows that the killing of prisoners, while officially 
against the Geneva Convention, was, on occasion, unofficially sanctioned during the 
campaign. Fetterly queried the orders as he refused to countenance the shooting of 
Germans who wished to surrender, and was saved from a charge of insubordination by 
his superior being wounded during the battle. 78 Fetterly's example is corroborated in 
Stephen Ambrose's work, when he related the experience of Pvt Phillip Stark, who was 
ordered not to take prisoners as there were too few soldiers available to take care of 
them. 
It is unsurprising that the interviewees did not discuss many examples of prisoner 
mistreatment, as pride in membership of the 2nd Battalion remains strong. There is also, 
naturally, the concept of morality, with most infantrymen believing in fair treatment for 
prisoners, aware that they too could be captured. As a Regimental Policeman, Arthur 
Lumb handled many of the prisoners. During his interview he remained angry about one 
particular incidence of prisoner mistreatment: `This German had tried to escape near the 
Escaut canal. If he'd have got over, he'd have had a decent run into Germany. He was 
captured and this sergeant kicked him really hard. I didn't like it at all'. 80 
Some prisoners did not expect to be treated fairly. Tommy Hall considered that snipers 
generally recognised that surrender would be futile, since their methods of operating 
M Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers. The US Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Surrender of 
Germany (London, 2002) pp. 352-353. See also Ambrose's Band of Brothers (London, 2001) p. 206. 77 During visit to Alf Ackroyd 41h June 2007. 
n Letter from Jim Fetterly to author dated 10'k March 2000. 
79 Stephen E. Ambrose, The Victors. The Men of World War II (London, 2004) p288. 
s0 Extract from interview with Arthur Lumb 1" May 1999. 
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were not `honourable' and they were therefore not often taken prisoner: `The laws of 
fighting say that a sniper has to be shot because he shoots people who don't stand a 
chance. As a sniper you know what's going to happen to you'. 1 
It is clear that in most instances, prisoners were treated fairly and cases of mistreatment 
are in the minority. There are also examples where killing of soldiers on both sides 
could have taken place but were avoided. John Folley wrote of being observed by a 
German soldier while he carried an injured infantryman to safety, yet was not fired at, 
and John Scruton's patrol watched a lone German soldier fishing but did not take the 
opportunity to shoot him. British infantrymen differentiated between soldiers of the 
Wehrmacht and the SS Divisions. However the concept of pleasure in killing is 
certainly not generally recognised by the infantry of the 2"d Battalion. 
Loyalty and Comradeship. 
The strongest ties among infantrymen have historically been with their immediate 
friends within a small unit, usually their section, or more widely, the platoon. It is this 
loyalty that binds soldiers together and keeps them fighting together despite the 
conditions under which they operate, so that `the group, family, is the psychological 
protection for individuals. The power of the group cannot be overstressed'. 82 Lt Col 
Renison commented on small unit loyalty at the end of January 1945 when the freezing 
conditions in the Maas area had necessitated calling a temporary halt to offensive 
action. The men had time to live together in their sections without the relentless 
turnover from casualties and had therefore formed closer bonds, so that `each section 
had got its team spirit'. 83 
a' Extract from interview with Tommy Hall 17th July 1999. Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon, considered sniping 
to be `sordid' and `more often than not, it was a cold and calculated way of killing which achieved no 
military advantage', pp. 60-61. 
82 Lt Col Ian Palmer, senior lecturer in military psychology, quoted in Wendy Holden's Shell Shock 
(London, 2001) p. 168. 
93 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 216. 
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These friendships could prove life-saving while in action. Tom Penrice saved the life of 
Wilf Todd, Arthur Jessop provided similar protection for Horace Pinfold, and Bill 
Yoxall defied an officer's orders to drag his injured friend, John Scruton, to safety, 
while all were serving in north-west Europe. In attaching familial roles to their friends it 
was clear that for many, the section, rather than the company or battalion, was 
considered in the same light as a family. Each man had at least one `mucker' that he 
would dig-in with and with whom he would share a trench. 
Mindful that the reinforcements had had less time for training, and were being 
assimilated into a regiment usually not their own, it was usual for longer-serving 
soldiers to help acclimatise them to front line duties. This practice was not confined to 
the 2 °d Battalion and is referred to in memoirs and interviews. 84 Denis Bowen recalled, 
`I could see how one of the D-Day veterans would literally take one or two of the new 
reinforcements under his wing and would coax them along and reassure them when the 
going was tough'85 and John Gardner remembered two ex-Chindits in his section 
reassuring him with the words, `if there is any trouble you stop there and we will see to 
it'. 86 By easing the path of the reinforcements, the veterans allowed them time to 
become used to active service, which was gratefully acknowledged by the reinforcement 
interviewees. 
The strong tie of comradeship was evident in the case of minor injuries, whereby the man 
injured would refuse to report sick, for fear of being permanently separated from his 
section. Going on guard duty while in Maashees, Norman Lucas fell while going upstairs 
from the basement and set fire to his hand, when the lit paraffin in his lamp spilled, yet 
treated the bum himself in preference to seeking medical assistance. 87 This reaction was 
not confined to the `other ranks'. Lt Jim Fetterly suffered a head wound earlier in the 
" Ray Fort -interview SWWEC Tape 1257. 85 Extract from interview with Dennis Bowen 23`d January 2000. 
86 Extract from interview with John Gardner 2°d December 2000. 
87 From interview with Norman Lucas 96' October 1999. 
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campaign, and despite being unable to wear a helmet, was allowed to set up a sniper 
school rather than be evacuated to the UK, until after three weeks, `I asked to be 
returned to my battalion' 88 This shows how quickly the bonds of loyalty and 
comradeship developed. Fetterly, a Canadian officer on loan to the British Army, had 
only joined the battalion just before D-Day. 89 
Some of the interviewees refused the opportunity for promotion in order to stay with 
their friends, and in so doing, forewent the extra pay. This desire to be with friends 
proved difficult when an infantryman was deemed `LOB', Left out of Battle. Both Wilf 
Todd and Alf Ackroyd, although safe while LOB, hated the experience and would not 
repeat it. Alf Ackroyd returned to discover the last of his original section had been 
wounded and was demoralised as a result, recalling `I was real down in the dumps that 
night, 90 
The death of friends and the circumstances surrounding the loss were vivid memories 
for the interviewees. Such recollections were often accompanied by strong emotion. 
Horace Pinfold recalled the death of Arthur Jessop, the friend who had saved his life, `a 
shell landed and I was thrown into the air. I may have knocked myself out, came round 
and looked at Arthur and half his head had gone, and that really got me and it does now 
doesn't it? ' (addressing his wife). Horace had not told his wife about this event, which 
affected him greatly, for many years, and she asked him to share his experience, in order 
to assist my understanding of how traumatic wartime service could be for these young 
infantrymen. 
Officers and Men. 
During the interview process a question was posed about general officer and men 
relationships and in so doing, it became apparent that all relationships with officers 
88 Both quotes from Jim Fetterly's letter to author 31s' October 1999. 
89 In An Ordinary Person, Hugh Bone did not want to leave the 2' Battalion when he injured his knee, 
and arranged to stay at `B' echelon with the stores until fit, unpublished memoir, p. 37. 
90 Extract from interview with Alf Aclaoyd 11th March 2002. 
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were eclipsed by the general regard for one officer. This officer, Major `Banger' King, 
will be considered in depth as a hero figure to the men of the battalion in the next 
section. Other officers mentioned, include Majors Rutherford and Crauford and also the 
Canadian officers on loan, such as Lieutenants Fetterly and Robertson, who were 
particularly remembered for their informal relationship with the `other ranks'. 
Individual interviewees remember instances of bravery demonstrated by these officers, 
including Lt Fetterly's actions at the Chateau de la Londe, resulting in the award of his 
Military Cross, and Major Rutherford's similar award following action in Holland. 
Majors Rutherford and Crauford were both also noted for their leadership qualities, and 
stories have been recounted of Major Crauford walking up and down a railway 
embankment near Venraij, while under fire, in full view of the enemy and shouting at 
the men to advance `because they hadn't even started firing at us yet'. The interviewee 
remembered `Albert Bean saying "If they weren't firing, what the bloody hell was that 
stuff trying to take the top off his steel helmet? " The Germans could have chopped 
Major Crauford in two with their machine gun bullets' 91 
None of the interviewees had anecdotes regarding the Commanding Officer of the 
battalion, Lt Col Renison. Although held in high regard for his abilities as CO, the only 
reference to him was in relation to King, when he was complimented for giving 
"`Banger" his head' and allowing `him to do whatever he wanted' 92 Similarly, the 
interviewees made few references to Company Commanders other than Majors 
Cranford and Rutherford, although this is probably due to the high turnover of officers 
at this level within the battalion. 
The junior leaders in the 2 °d Battalion, the young Lieutenants, or subalterns, mentioned 
by the interviewees, were all held in high regard, particularly the Canloan officers. The 
casualty rate among the young Canloan officers was very high. Leonard Robertson 
91 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
92 Ibid. 
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provided figures illustrating that of the original 673 Canadians involved in the scheme, 
20 per cent were killed and a further 50 per cent wounded, principally in Normandy; 
junior officers in particular, faced the attendant risks of `leading from the front' 
93 
Certainly not all the officers were valued by the interviewees, but very little criticism 
was openly offered, perhaps to protect their reputations and that of the regiment. John 
Folley and Jim Fetterly both wrote of officers who succumbed to battle fatigue and who 
either `disappeared' from the battlefield or threatened suicide 
94 Yet such cases usually 
met with some degree of understanding, especially if the sufferer had served for a 
lengthy period in the front line 95 
Early in the north-west Europe campaign, the problems of leadership under extreme 
conditions became apparent. Whether a man should be ordered to play his full role in an 
action, or whether he should report for treatment if his panic was in danger of infecting 
the rest of the soldiers around him, was a split-second decision which often devolved on 
to the junior officers in the first instance. In the battle of the Chateau de la Londe, Lt 
Fetterly sent back a former wrestler who `kept at me to turn back before we all got 
killed. As he was useless, I told him to take back the two wounded. He took one under 
each arm and actually ran carrying the two'. 6 Just days previously, Clive Crauford had 
acted differently, when stragglers from another battalion which was taking heavy 
casualties, attempted to retreat through 2°d Battalion lines. After Crauford ordered the 
men to return to their unit, a nearby soldier remarked to Crauford: "`they didn't get 
away with it with you Sir", and it occurred to me then I had been dead right. The good 
soldier doesn't want to see the scroungers get away with it' 97 Yet, examples of 
93 Letter from Len Robertson 27`' March 2000. Martin Lindsay, in So Few Got Through wrote the average 
life expectancy of a platoon commander was one month, p. 126. 
94 `They Gave Their All', John Folley, University of Leeds, and letter to author from Jim Fetterly 10th 
March 2000. 
95 This understanding was not extended to those who succumbed without having `proved' themselves. For 
example Sir Robin Dunn MC in Sword and Wig - memories of a Lord Justice, was angry that a new 
Captain, in refusing to go into the line, had got away with a `soft option' p. 74. 
'6 Extract from letter from Jim Fetterly to author 10th March 2000. 
97 Extracts from interview with Clive Crauford 5th November 2000. 
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`scroungers' were differentiated by Crauford from those of young men experiencing 
real and natural fear, as demonstrated in the Introduction. Here, a young, nervous 
soldier was encouraged to deal with his fear and remain in the front line. Young officers 
were faced with such situations increasingly, as the campaign continued, and were in 
the difficult position of having to decide for themselves how to react and how to impose 
discipline, particularly in light of the number of reinforcements joining the battalion. 
Officers became aware that there was often a fine line between carrying on the fight or 
reporting sick, perhaps even deserting. 98 
During front line duties, the barriers between officers and their men became `blurred' 
due to the intense experiences they shared. One interviewee recalled `when we were in 
action we were all the same, the officers and us, but it was in peacetime that they were 
more selective' 99 This peacetime division became apparent post-war: `in Egypt we 
started getting these young officers out of OCTU who'd never seen action and they 
started trying to lay the law down', 10° which proved unpopular with those who had 
served in the front line. While in action of course, the other ranks looked to their 
officers to provide strong leadership and in this it appears that the officers mentioned 
with such respect by the interviewees, did not disappoint. In return, Clive Crauford 
considered that a bond developed between his men and himself. The men under his 
command were: 
typical of the wartime army as a whole, very ordinary sort 
of fellows, they played the game according to the rules. 
They knew that the officer had to give instructions, they 
recognised that sometimes you would say something 
awkward, difficult, and tell them things they didn't want 
to do, but they recognised also that he was doing his job 
and they knew they wanted to do their job, most of them 
did, there was always the odd one who was a perfect 
damned nuisance, but that's not typical. The majority of 
98 Martin Lindsay, So Few Got Through, p. 132. 
9' Extract from interview with Jack Reid 4t° July 1999. 
100 Extract from interview with Denis Cade 4th July 1999. 
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them were willing to do their job if they could, willing to 
help. '°' 
If the officers looked after their men then the relationship could prove mutually 
beneficial. Major Crauford recalled the care his men displayed towards him when he 
was very tired and starting to dig a slit trench. His batman told him to go to sleep, but 
Crauford demurred, feeling that if his men had to dig he should follow suit, at which 
point `they all turned round to me at once and they said "you go to sleep Sir, you could 
do with it, we'll do the digging". So I gratefully recognised I was among friends. 102 In 
this reminiscence, Crauford's men still referred to him as `Sir', in deference to his rank, 
yet the relationship clearly tends towards the informal. A key factor in this process was 
the recognition by the other ranks that their officers shared the same physical conditions 
and dangers they did while in action. Certainly the respect of the interviewees appears 
to be reserved for those officers that fought alongside them, rather than those, at any 
level, who were less visible. 
During the war, there was also less emphasis on the `spit and polish' aspects of service. 
Some standards of cleanliness, for example with regard to foot care and maintenance of 
weapons, were essential, yet the `other ranks' had a particular antipathy for officers they 
saw as making unrealistic demands, given the prevailing physical conditions. 
During an interview, Alf Ackroyd remembered an officer of one of the Guards 
regiments being attached to the battalion for a short period. Having called an `0' group, 
he sent the attendees back to their trenches because `we wasn't smart enough. We 
hadn't shaved and we hadn't got our boots clean, and how he expected us to clean us 
boots I don't know.. . and he is there with his flat cap and shiny badge and, you know, 
nice and comfortable in his trench. No sense'. Some officers became known by the 
`other ranks' for their `chickenshit' which refers `to behaviour that makes military life 
101 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5th November 2000. 
102 Ibid. 
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worse than it need be'. 103 An officer therefore quickly became unpopular if he was not 
perceived to share the same conditions as his men, nor to hold their needs as important. 
From the interviews conducted it was apparent that officer and men relationships within 
the 2 °d Battalion were generally very good, and an affection and respect for their 
officers has continued to the present day. The experiences of the interviewees with 
regard to their officers reflect the argument put forward by French that `effective 
leadership was the key to success and regimental officers did not fail to provide it. They 
shared the hardships of their men, led from the front, and suffered correspondingly 
higher casualties'. 
104 
A Study in Leadership. 
The north-west European campaign would not have been successfully prosecuted by the 
Allies without strong and effective leadership by many officers of all ranks, both 
commissioned and non-commissioned. Such leadership is essential for the welfare of 
the men being led, and to ensure they operate at their peak, particularly `during 
moments of great danger' when `the grip of the leader on the led is paramount'. '°5 Of 
course, leadership was not restricted to the officers, but in the case of the 2nd Battalion, 
there was one man, above all others, who demonstrated the difference that effective 
leadership could directly make to morale and unit cohesion. 
Major Charles King, known throughout the battalion as `Banger', inspired men within 
the battalion, and also the 3id Division, with his bravery, energy and inspirational 
leadership. All the interviewees remembered King and related examples of his heroism, 
his lack of fear, his sense of humour despite the hardships, and his care in ensuring their 
needs were met. This study in leadership focuses on three aspects of King, to 
demonstrate his leadership style and why it proved so successful. Firstly it considers 
what King was like as a man and as an officer, secondly, what exactly he provided for 
103 Paul Fussell, Wartime - Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War. 104 French, Raising Churchill's Army, p. 76. 
105 Sydney Jary, Eighteen Platoon, p. 7. 
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his men to elicit such loyalty and feelings of respect and affection, and finally, what it 
was about him that made him `different' from other leaders. 
For this study the interviews `fleshed out' the one-dimensional heroic version of King, 
presented within the Divisional secondary literature. 106 Different anecdotes are 
remembered, particularly by those who served with him the longest, and stress his 
humour, generosity and care towards them, as well as the feats he carried out while in 
action. 
To the young recruits Major King seemed different from other officers from the 
moment of his arrival in the battalion. A regular officer, as opposed to the `civilian 
officers' brought in for the duration of hostilities only, King had the additional aura that 
familiarity with the army brought. This, together with the relative gap in their ages, 
fostered the element of hero-worship in the young soldiers from the first, so that: 
When he came to our battalion some of the longer serving 
soldiers were really excited. We couldn't understand why, 
until we first glimpsed Banger on the parade ground. His 
hair was down onto his collar and he had a proper round 
service hat on with a peak, a cheese cutter, pushed slightly 
towards the back. '07 
Here then was an officer who was clearly less concerned with the `spit and polish' 
element of service life, who wore his hair overlong and his hat off the regulation line. 
For the strictly regimented recruits it is easy to understand why initial impressions of 
Major King remain strong in the memories of veterans so many years on. As an able 
and witty raconteur, King also told stories about himself and his previous army career, 
particularly while serving in India and Africa. Such stories would have produced an 
aura of glamour and mystery around King, and the younger element particularly, would 
have been impressed with these tales of romantic adventure. They also reinforced 
King's status as a regular officer of many years standing. 
106 These sources are the divisional histories of Scarfe and Delaforce, and Ryan's book The Longest Day. 107 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
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Although the stories portray King's bravery and sincerity, none mark him out as 
especially remarkable in his appearance, stature or voice. He was of average height, 
wore standard British army uniform and was seldom seen without his pipe. In 
comparison, it is easy to see why T. E. Lawrence's wearing of white robes with a gold 
curved sword caught the public imagination, transforming him into `an imperial 
adventure hero'. 108 Growing up during a period of imperial adventure stories and heroic 
lives biographies it would be remarkable if King had not been infected with ideas of 
proper behaviour along heroic lines and was attracted by the opportunity for adventures 
of his own in India and Africa. 109 
King's leadership style on active service became apparent to the men of the 2nd 
Battalion during the D-Day landings. As previously noted, having `gone to the trouble 
of writing down the lines he wanted', 110 King read extracts from Shakespeare's Henry 
V, to his men on board the landing craft, in recognition of the historic day and to stir his 
men into action. News of the reading spread round the battalion, so that one 
interviewee, recalling the incident, maintained, `When you get somebody like him, 
reading stuff like that, you'd follow him to hell. Especially when you knew that once 
the ramp went down he'd be right out at the front and you'd have a hell of a job to keep 
up with him' " 
Together with the stories related by the interviewees, an idea of King's character is most 
evident today in the small collection of letters to his batman and batman's mother. Prior 
to D-Day, King had written to his batman's mother to reassure her as to her son's 
chances: 
los Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes. British adventure, empire and the imagining of masculinities 
(London and New York, 1994) p. 169. 
109 Hugh Bone's poem `A Man is Gone', written shortly after King's death, referred to his experiences of 
`strange adventures, witchcraft, native wars. Of wandering in the East in Lashiv, Tibet, Penang, a 
soldier's outpost life. In Rasmack and Peshewar, the vast Sudan; a Lord of life in Bongo Bongo land'. 
"o Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day, p. 148. 
11 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
206 
I hope you are not worrying too much about him. As a 
bachelor I haven't any (family) worries, but I feel that it's 
up to me to get as many of my company through this 
business as I can. The men take the place of a family in my 
estimation... and you can be sure that I won't lead your 
son or any of my company into any damn suicide act. ' 1 
After his batman had been injured and on discovering his whereabouts, King wrote to 
return the money he had removed from his batman's wallet for safekeeping, `plus 
something to have a drink with me when you get out of hospital'. ' 13 
These letters are not perfunctory messages of goodwill but detailed and familiar. King 
clearly likes his batman. This is not King displaying `kindly and humane paternalism' 114 
or behaving towards Blenkhorn as though he were a `cherished pet'. There is no 
apparent social gulf between the two men. King is happy to refer to his own character 
faults, in revealing that his new batman is `almost (but not quite, as that would be 
impossible) as forgetful' as him. This correspondence is all the more remarkable as 
Major King's daily responsibilities, even during `rest periods' were extremely onerous 
and illustrates the depth of the care King felt towards his men, even when they had 
returned to the UK. 
Major King was always keen to be where the action was, and frequently went so far 
forward that he was way in advance of front lines. One incident which was mentioned 
in a letter to his batman, was reiterated by one of the interviewees. After crossing the 
Escaut canal, `King had gone across and taken the battalion objective. He'd gone miles 
ahead and was holed up in a farmhouse'. 115 The `other ranks' favoured his boldness, 
appreciating that he would not order them to go where he was unwilling to go himself, 
and thereby validating the argument that `a man who is prepared to take risks makes a 
more popular leader than one not so inclined'. '16 As well as being a regular officer and 
1 12 Letter from Major King to Blenkhorn's mother 24d' April 1944. 
113 Letter from Major King to Blenkhorn 29th August 1944. 
114 Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London, 1994) p. 217. 115 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
... Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, p. 217. 
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highly recognisable to all in the battalion, King did indeed treat his men as members of 
his family, leading one interviewee to comment that "`Banger" was a father, mother, big 
brother, you name it, all rolled into one'. "7 This aptitude of effective leaders, to 
demonstrate fatherly qualities, was also reinforced by Lionel Roebuck who told his 
platoon commander Dennis Hallam, `you were like a father to us', despite Hallam's age 
being almost the same as the young soldiers he was commanding. 118 
Major King was also willing to stand up against instances he perceived as unjust to his 
men, or that might cause unnecessary casualties. Hugh Bone, the 2°d Battalion Signals 
Officer knew `Banger' well and stressed this aspect of his character: `The troops loved 
him because he always thought of them and stood up for them, even on an occasion in 
Normandy risking court martial for them by telling the Brigadier what he thought of 
him in a particular action'! 19 
An additional facet of King's character was seen as important by a further three 
interviewees, who stressed that for King, rank didn't appear to matter, that `it was the 
guts that counted' 120 and that `he used to mix with us a lot. He was an officer you could 
talk to and he'd have a laugh and a joke with you'. 121 It was the junior officers who 
lived alongside their men on a daily basis during wartime. The further up the 
promotional ladder the officers rose, the further removed they became, particularly in 
peacetime conditions. However the ranks did not detect this `divide' with Major King; 
he was relaxed and familiar with them. King also ordered his young Lieutenants to go 
on guard duty, to subject them to the same conditions under which their men operated 
and thereby promote their 122 
"7 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
118 Recounted in conversation with author. 
119 Hugh Bone's memoir, An Ordinary Person. Jack Reid singled out this attribute specifically, as he had 
personally benefited from it, in his interview 4th July 1999 
20 Extract from interview with Tommy Hall 17th July 1999. 
12' Extract from interview with Jack Reid 4th July 1999. 
122 Letter from John Folley to the author dated 26th March 2004, dictated to his wife due to illness. 
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As an officer, King could also show understanding towards those who were badly in 
need of rest. Lt Fetterly complained to `Banger' that he had taken patrols out four nights 
in a row in Holland. The Major asked Fetterly to take that night's patrol as `you 
Canadians have that Indian blood in you' 123 and then gave him time off. King was 
complimentary as he knew Fetterly was reliable and there was no doubting Fetterly's 
bravery, which had been proven, yet King also appreciated that rest was essential to 
maintain morale. 
Major King proved an invaluable Second-in-Command to Lt Col Renison, when 
Renison took over command of the battalion in October 1944, and he wrote of King that 
he was `a tower of strength and a source of encouragement. To say that at times he 
almost nursed me might sound sentimental, but so it seemed to me'. 124 By introducing 
the word `nursing', Renison credits King with a more gentle, even feminine, quality 
than is usually considered when hearing stories of King's exploits. The interviewees, in 
contrast, have focused on King as `a man's man', happiest in action, while the 
newspaper articles about him stress his masculine qualities. This explains the general 
amusement at the sight of King driving away a group of nuns in his jeep in Holland. 125 
Of course, Renison's memories of King will be tinged with an element of gratitude that 
his Second-in-Command bore him no professional jealousy and instead devoted his 
energies towards assisting Renison in a successful prosecution of the battalion's war 
efforts. Renison was shrewd in taking full advantage of King's eighteen years' 
experience. Interestingly, King revealed that he had not been keen to accept the role of 
Second-in-Command, preferring instead to remain as company commander. Yet, as 
King confided to his batman: `I would like to command the battalion one day, and 
although that is not very probable it is a step on the road'. 126 
123 Letter from Jim Fetterly to author 9`h January 2000. 
'24 Letter from Lt Col Renison published in The Snapper 1945. 
'u Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regiment, p. 231. 
126 Letter from Major King to Blenkhom 21" November 1944. 
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King was also well regarded by Major Crauford, who understood, and agreed with, 
King's views on waging war. During his interview, Crauford said `I knew "Banger" 
very well, and I liked and respected `Bangere". 127 He chose the word respected, rather 
than admired, because he saw King as a fellow officer, an equal. Cranford recalled King 
`making an example' of one soldier returning from a patrol, who had let down the 
others and endangered their lives. King threatened the soldier that he would shoot him if 
he behaved in the same way again. He then told him that he would receive the backing 
of the other men in the patrol to do so: `if you let them down they won't object to you 
being shot'. Crauford added: `He wouldn't have shot him of course, but it taught him a 
lesson anyway'. Like Crauford, Major King fully appreciated the situation faced by the 
battalion, which required that everyone play their allotted role to avoid additional or 
unnecessary casualties. Crauford was concerned about telling me this story of King's 
actions, in that it might not reflect well on King, yet his reason for telling this story was 
to illustrate proper fighting conditions; `people don't realise the urgency of the situation. 
You have got to win. There is no other thing. If you are in a battle there are only two 
things. You may be massacred or you may win. It's better not to be massacred'. 128 He 
also credited King for being `a hands-on type of Infantry officer', and again this is the 
same attribute with which interviewees have credited Crauford. 
Having considered King's qualities as a man, and as an officer, it is important to 
examine what he provided for the men, in order to maintain their morale and mould 
them into an effective fighting force. Chiefly, Major King provided care for his men, he 
championed and inspired them. The stories related by the interviewees, invariably 
involve humour, either in how King reacted to the situation at the time or as a personal 
response to recounting the story to an audience. Occasionally the interviewees appear 
surprised at how they were inspired to acts of bravery by King in extreme situations, for 
127 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5t` November 2000. 
128 Ibid. 
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example one recalled the officer ordering him to drive his Bren carrier through 
unexploded shells, in order to deliver rations to the front lines, where the men were 
resting having completed a full day's fighting. The driver did as he was ordered, and 
was rewarded by being given some whisky by King after the rations had been delivered. 
Recalling these events sixty years on, the interviewee still seemed surprised on 
reflecting that he had actually accomplished the drive unharmed. 129 
Of course, demonstrating care for his men made military sense. Ensuring the men had 
their rations, particularly hot food after a day in action, and had sufficient ammunition 
to meet any counter-attacks, would assist in maintaining morale within the battalion. 
What came as second nature to King, due to his military training and care for his men, 
did not come naturally to all officers. At the cessation of hostilities, the 3rd Division's 
monthly medical bulletin130 carried an article on `Promotion of the Health of the 
Soldier', including instructions on personal hygiene, clothing and food. To avoid 
causing offence, the author wrote that these elements would not be `new to 
Commanding Officers, but it is hoped that the notes will be helpful to all who are 
concerned with the health of the soldier'. The recommendations were commonsense and 
clearly the fact that they needed to be made at all, showed deficiencies in discipline and 
leadership. The care that King displayed helped to ensure that the sick rate among the 
troops was kept as low as possible. During the cold month of December 1944, the 
monthly medical bulletin recorded a drop in the number of sick cases in the 3`a 
Division, which was attributed to good hygiene, good food, hot meals, reasonable billets 
and satisfactory bath arrangements. 131 King's care therefore made good military sense, 
by helping to ensure the numbers of men fit to fight were as high as possible. 
129 From interview with Bill Turner 2d January 2003. 
130 3`d British Infantry Division monthly medical bulletin prepared by Col W. A. Robinson ADMS. From 
the papers of Lt Col D. Paton of the RAMC, 223 Field Ambulance. SWWEC. 
131 Ibid. 
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As well as encouraging his men to feats they found very unnerving, some memories 
focus on King's source of inspiration to them as individuals, making them feel `I wish I 
were like him'. 132 This wish comes through most strongly in the writings of John 
Folley, who acted as Major King's driver on many occasions during the north-west 
European campaign. In a collection of sixteen pieces regarding his personal 
experiences, four directly relate to the activities of the Major. 133 They directly contrast 
his own actions with those of King; depicting himself as fearful and with an 
overwhelming drive for self-preservation, while his officer is portrayed as courageous 
and oblivious to his own safety. In one piece entitled `Thanks for the Memory', Folley's 
jeep was involved in an accident with a tank. As the tank began to crush the jeep, 
endangering its occupants, Folley jumped on to a wall, yet `the Major still puffing on 
his pipe, made no effort whatsoever to move'. 
In two further accounts by Folley, entitled `Flirting with Death' and `Put that light out! ' 
he recounted the Major going out alone at night to capture two German prisoners, one 
of whom carried a Spandau machine gun, and later, deliberately attempting to attract the 
attentions of a sniper by lighting a fist full of matches to reveal his position. The 
numerous accounts of the Major's bravery and ability to instil confidence in others are 
recounted to demonstrate how important he was to the maintenance of morale in the 
battalion, to the extent that, `he only had to ask for a volunteer and his whole company 
would rally around him, in fact they so loved him, they'd die for him, even a timid 
fellow like myself, the Major's charisma championed me, for he was invulnerable'. 134 
This differs from Joanna Bourke's assertion that soldiers often viewed heroes with 
suspicion because they might endanger their lives, and thereby considered them ruthless 
and fanatical. 135King's bravery was viewed as inspirational rather than ruthless and it 
132 Extract from interview with Doug Parker 17`h July 1999. 
133 Folley, Special Collections, University of Leeds. 
'34 Ibid. 
135 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing. Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare. 
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was stressed by the interviewees that he would not ask anything of them that he was 
unwilling to do himself. Keegan argued that this heroism was essential in the leadership 
of armies, as without it, `victories are bought with the blood of disillusioned men'. 136 
It should not be forgotten too, that the interviewees were infantrymen, men `at the sharp 
end'. To these men, an officer who is willing to put their needs before his own, to 
always lead by example and to show no fear, is deserving of great respect. As one NCO 
explained; 
If `Banger' came to see you and you were under fire, he 
would never get down. He'd get down on one knee but 
never lie down. He used to give us confidence. I don't 
think he knew he was doing it, it came automatically. 
`Banger' was a great bloke. . . He had the ability to act 
under fire... He was an inspiration. 137 
The word `inspiration' is repeated frequently in interviews. For young, frightened 
soldiers, under shellfire and suffering continual casualties, inspiration was vital. 
Brigadier S. J. Hill used this same word in his description of how a commander can 
influence a battle, and concluded `example, example, example wins battles'. 138 The fact 
that Major King would appear relaxed and calm under fire was a boost to morale and 
`his presence was an indication to those around him that things were not as bad as they 
seemed'. 139 Major King understood fear; before sending out a patrol he would brief the 
NCO and `as soon as you went in he'd have the rum bottle out and he'd put you in the 
picture'. 14° King therefore favoured the use of rum to ward off the cold and act as 
`Dutch courage', but from the story of his threatening to shoot the errant soldier, it is 
clear that he would not tolerate those who were unable to `manage' the fear. 
For soldiers living and fighting under the harsh conditions, while tired, - cold, dirty and 
sometimes hungry, men who appeared invulnerable were highly regarded. Examples of 
136 John Keegan and Joseph Darracott, in The Nature of War (New York, 1981) p. 69. 
"' Extract from interview with Tommy Hall 17th July 1999. 
138 Brigadier S. J. Hill's interview SWWEC Tape 964. 
139 Lt Col Renison's tribute to Major King in The Snapper. 
'40 Extract from interview with Tommy Hall 17'h July 1999. 
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officers willing to place themselves at great personal risk to encourage their troops are 
certainly not rare and were frequently necessary. One instance is that of Lt J. A. Clark 
of the Green Howards who also served in Normandy. The Green Howards' Regimental 
History cites Clark's actions during one day's fighting as typifying `coolness and 
gallantry', in that: 
When his company was held up in front of a gap in a high 
wall, with a Tiger tank firing at close range from a flank, 
the men were temporarily disorganised, and inclined to 
waver. Lt Clark, with great calmness, lit a cigarette, and 
walked slowly up to the gap in front of the whole 
company. His courageous example pulled the company 
together, and the leading troops followed him 
immediately. 141 
However, those willing to display such selfless bravery often became casualties. Not 
only did officers suffer a disproportionate number of casualties, compared to their men, 
but `the most dangerous job in the army was commanding a rifle platoon or rifle 
company'. 142 King, of course, had been Company Commander of `A' Company until 
his promotion to Second-in-Command. King regularly carried out acts similar to that of 
Lt Clark, yet appeared to live a `charmed life', adding to his aura of invulnerability. 
It is therefore King's courage and his care that elevates him to the status of a hero and it 
is the reason why he is remembered as such in the stories told. It is not that other 
officers did not possess such qualities; King just possessed all the qualities cherished by 
the `other ranks', in abundance. 
King's own morale was deeply affected by the high casualty rate and at the battle of the 
Chateau de la Londe: 
Our last regular CQMS, a good Runner, and a Cook 
Corporal, all three received a direct hit in their trench, 
killing them and burying them in one short second. 
Banger, whose company they were in, was very upset. 
Already his Sergeant-Major had been killed and Clerk 
141 Capt W. A. T. Synge, The Story of the Green Howards 1939-45 (Richmond, 1952) p. 317. 142 David French, Raising Churchill's Army, p. 77. 
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wounded. His familiar HQ was looking familiar no 
longer. '43 
For King, the casualties did not just mean losing `faces' he had served with over a long 
period, they were his friends. He would also have appreciated that the high turnover of 
personnel greatly affected unit cohesion, which was essential to the successful 
prosecution of the war. Yet the veterans clearly feel that King did not just see them as 
`anonymous men', but as individuals, with their own feelings and needs. 
It is important to emphasise that Major King's dedication to his men should not be 
viewed as a sign of weakness or evidence that he was regarded as either soft or a 
pushover. One method of `encouragement' was to watch men going to ground under 
shelling, while he did not, and then saying `What a bunch of women I have'. 
144 King 
would also quote the saying, `A coward dies a thousand deaths, but a brave man dies 
only one'. '45 He was especially intolerant of men he deemed `malingerers' or, as I have 
already shown, those whose behaviour endangered others. Renison explains this critical 
side of the Major's character by arguing that, `if he was intolerant of the "hanger-back" 
it was because he was such an ardent champion of the Infantry soldier who had 
followed him in so many actions and whose value he knew as few other men can have 
known it'. 146 As an infantry officer, King saw at first hand that `the task of the infantry 
was by far the most onerous and dangerous of any arm of the service, and the rifle 
companies suffered the highest casualties in the army'. 147 The wonder was not that so 
many suffered from battle exhaustion, but that so many infantrymen stuck it out without 
succumbing. 
143 An extract from a letter written by Lt Hugh Bone to his mother dated 23rd July 1944, IWM. 
'44 Letter from John Folley to the author dated 26th March 2004, dictated to his wife due to illness. 
las From discussion with an interviewee, Wilf Todd. Proverb traced back to Mortimeriados (1596) and 
quoted in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar II, `Cowards die many times before their deaths, The valiant never 
taste of death but once'. King was obviously fond of Shakespeare's plays, having quoted from Henry V 
on D-Day. 
146 Letter to The Snapper from Lt Col Renison, 1945. 
147 Sir Robin Dunn, Sword and Wig - memories of a Lord Justice, p. 75. 
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King may have been an heroic figure, but he was not infallible. His flexibility with 
military regulations meant that he instructed his jeep should not be immobilised when 
left outside Battalion HQ in Gemert in December 1944. Consequently the jeep was 
stolen, a common problem. King had to attend a Court of Enquiry where he admitted 
being at fault. It was a mistake he would not repeat. In January 1945 King's trailer was 
stolen from his parked jeep. A Dutch boy helped him identify the unit of the troops who 
had stolen it and King discovered them about to paint out the Divisional sign and unit 
serial number. `Needless to say he soon had his trailer back'. '48 
It seems no coincidence that other examples of hero-worship I can trace mainly involve 
other Infantry Regiments. Colonel John Hope of 1KRRC was shot by a sniper in Italy in 
April 1945. One of his officers, John Waterfield, wrote of Hope that: `he was a 
continuing influence and inspiration to me, far and away the most outstanding 
personality of my war-time experience'. The difference here, is that Waterfield was a 
young officer at the time of meeting Hope, who was his superior in rank, and despite the 
two men both being fellow officers there is an element of hero-worship in Waterfield's 
memories. This is due both to the difference in ages and Hope's offering `idiosyncratic 
but wise' advice and guidance to the younger man. Hope had demonstrated the same 
care for his men that Major King did, to the extent that, `when he went on `Python' 
leave from Boufarik, after four years overseas, John Hope typically took a lot of time to 
visit families of riflemen and officers who had been killed'. 149 Rather than the element 
of hero-worship, Martin Lindsay of the 1St Gordon Highlanders, wrote of his CO in 
terms of love: `Harry is a unique character. I have never met a CO who is less feared yet 
so much respected and adored, nor one for whom people would go to such pains to 
148 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 234. 
'49 John P. Waterfield, in his memoir North Italy and Schloss Thalenstein, Carinthia 1945 - Remembered 
in June 1999, p. 2, SWWEC (2002-1672). Julian Wathan also recorded his own view of the shooting of 
`our much loved Colonel', describing it as `a ghastly day'. Memoir SWWEC (2002-1670). 
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produce good results'. '5° It is rarer to find such glowing references to officers in the 
memoirs of the `other ranks' of the Second World War, as in most instances, senior 
officers were more removed from the day-to-day activities of their men; it is in action 
that the boundaries become blurred. 
It is apparent that both Colonel Hope and Major King, demonstrated good qualities of 
leadership, which is `synonymous with inspiring confidence in those who follow'. '5' 
Such qualities come from a `proper understanding of the needs and opinions of those 
one hopes to lead'. 152 This was far more important than other factors such as `voice, 
stature and appearance, an impression of omniscience, trustworthiness, sincerity and 
bravery'. '53 
Finally, a consideration of what made King different from other officers, will illustrate 
why he was an important figure within the battalion. It is clear from the interviews, that 
many officers displayed both great bravery and good leadership qualities. What set King 
apart was his position under Lt Col Renison as Second-in-Command of the battalion, a 
role in which he excelled. King was regularly in charge of ensuring rations and supplies 
of ammunition reached the front lines. He was therefore a highly `visible' officer and 
this facet had continued from his initial D-Day role as `A' Company Commanding 
Officer. This visibility, although putting King at personal risk, was in line with the ideas 
put forward in military manuals, which argue that to maintain high morale, the leader 
must `set himself the deliberate task of inspiring his men' so that an infantryman will be 
`infected by the energy, vitality and enthusiasm of his officer'. '54 As Company 
Commander; King carried out his role along the exact lines recommended by Major 
General V. H. J. Carpenter, in that `it's good man management. It's being approachable, 
150 In So Few Got Through, Lt Col Martin Lindsay DSO wrote of Major Harry Cumming-Bruce, pp. 96-7. 
See also The Recollections ofR jeman Bowlby, Alex Bowlby's impression of Capt Kendall. 151 Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, p. 212. 152 Ibid., p. 215. 
153 Ibid., p. 215. 
154 The Instructors' Handbook on Fieldcraf and Battle Drill 1942 edition p. 46. 
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being able to discuss problems. You have got to make sure that the troops are looked 
after properly. Even if the conditions are tough, they don't mind having conditions 
tough as long as they know that you are doing your best for them'. King continued to 
display care towards the troops, even after his promotion to Second-in-Command of the 
battalion. Carpenter, as a young officer during the war, `learnt to appreciate the 
importance of the individual soldier'. lss King, as a regular officer with many years' 
experience, had had the time to acquire this appreciation pre-war. Of course, not all 
regular officers held the `other ranks' in the same regard, but this is one of the main 
reasons why King was so popular with the men who served with him. 
Major King was referred to as `Banger' throughout the battalion and indeed the 3`a 
Division, showing he was popular with the troops and considered one of them. The 
clearest illustration of the use of Major King's nickname was during the battle at 
Schaddenhof farm in February 1945, when King's timely arrival in a Bren carrier was 
confirmed by wireless and `it is significant of all that "Banger" meant to the Battalion 
that the only message that came back over the air was "Banger's here"'. 156 During this 
action, King managed to get ammunition through to the beleaguered men of `C' 
Company, having driven through a German-held area. Two of the most seriously 
wounded men were then evacuated in the carrier on the return journey. Veteran Lionel 
Roebuck had more reason than most to be grateful to the Major. He was one of the two 
evacuated men, and described King's action as `my salvation', being aware that `many 
others died that night who could have lived if they had been got out earlier for the 
urgent medical attention which they badly needed'. 157 The outcome of the battle would 
have been very different without King's intervention. The men were surrounded by 
enemy troops at the farm and it was the arrival of fresh supplies of ammunition that 
iss Interview with Major General V. H. J. Carpenter, SWWEC Tape 1500, at the time a subaltern with the 
RASC. 
'56 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 249. 
157 Lionel Roebuck, memoir The Five Yorkshire Tykes, p. 82, privately published. 
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enabled them to carry on the fight. For his actions, King was awarded the bar to his 
DSO. 158 His concern for the stranded men, without ammunition and suffering heavy 
casualties, outweighed thoughts of personal risk and King had been determined to try 
and reach them. His bravery was later immortalised on the front cover of an edition of 
The Victor comic, an historically inaccurate but inspiring account of derring-do. '59 
In distinguishing what makes a good military commander, Dixon differentiates between 
`task' and `social' specialists. In the military a task specialist's role is to defeat the 
enemy, while as a social specialist he must maintain good relations between the group 
in order to maintain high morale, so that `the ideal military leader is, of course, one who 
manages to combine excellence as a task-specialist with an equal flair for the social or 
heroic aspects of leadership'. 160 In both King's wartime roles as Company Commander 
and Second-in-Command, he enjoyed considerable success as a task-specialist and he 
earned the affection and respect of his men. Whether he would have displayed similar 
success if he had continued to be promoted is impossible to assess. His determination to 
be highly visible would always have put him at greater risk of becoming a casualty and 
his willingness to challenge orders he thought wrong, would not have endeared him to 
his superiors. What he was not willing to do was to `stick to the rule book, do nothing 
without explicit approval from the next higher up, always conform, never offend your 
superiors' 161 to ensure his promotion. Plus the Second World War was nearing an end 
and he would not have thrived as a peacetime soldier, waiting to fill `dead men's shoes' 
on the slow promotional ladder of the reduced peacetime officer corps. 
To the men, King appeared invulnerable and 'lucky, 162 which were useful attributes for 
a successful leader. While other officers were wounded, often more than once, Hugh 
iss An award of the bar to the DSO was rare. King received a congratulatory phonogram on 15th March 
1945 from Lt Gen Horrocks CB DSO MC, Commander of 30 Corps. 159 The Victor, No 275,28th May 1966. 
'60 Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, p. 219. 161 Ibid. p. 244. 
162 Lord Harewood referred to luck as `a major part of a successful soldier's character.. . everybody believes in you and it is wonderful', interview SWWEC Tape 1044. Also Sydney Jary, 18 Platoon, p. 7. 
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Bone wrote that King `had led a charmed life disdaining all enemy fire, walking about 
smoking his pipe and carrying, and firing, his rifle as if out shooting birds on a Scottish 
estate'. 163 This added to the sense of shock when King was killed towards the end of the 
war in Europe, the news of which produced an outpouring of emotion, so that `there 
wasn't a man in the battalion who wasn't shedding tears. For an officer to command 
such love and respect was incredible'. 1" 
A number of the interviewees have different views as to how it happened, where King 
was when it occurred and at what time of the day, although there is general agreement 
that it was caused by driving over a mine. Only one interviewee, Ken Boulding, was in 
the jeep with Major King. As Boulding took the wheel to return in the dark, "`Banger" 
says "I will drive us back", so I said "fair enough", because you couldn't say no, you 
can't to a bloke like that'. 165 As an eyewitness, Ken Boulding felt that while driving, 
Major King had cut the white tape left by the engineers to indicate a safe passage clear 
of mines, yet others gave different versions of events. What is important regarding the 
interviews in this respect, is that many can remember where they were, or what they 
were doing, at the time of Major King's death. 
John Folley claimed a special place in the funeral arrangements of the Major: `another 
soldier and myself dug the grave and attended the funeral ceremony and incidentally Major 
"Banger" King, to my knowledge, was the only Officer, of many who were killed, whose 
body was draped with the Union flag, prior to interment'. It was prophetic that Lt Col 
Renison wrote: `It is tragic that we lost so great a friend when final Victory is so near; but 
wherever men meet in the future, there will be tales and memories of "Banger". 166 
Renison had realised the enormity of this loss when he wrote `no words can really express 
what this means to the morale of the battalion, and as the days and hours passed by, I 
163 Hugh Bone's unpublished memoir An Ordinary Person. 
164 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
165 Extract from interview with Ken Boulding 8t' January 2000. 
166 Lt Col Renison's letter in The Snapper 1945. 
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realised more and more how much I had depended on him in so many things'. 167 Not only 
was King's death a blow for the battalion, it was remembered more widely through the 
Division too and was mentioned by the Divisional Commander in his personal diary. 168 
In Lt Col R. F. Fendick's typescript memoir `A Canloan Officer' he clearly remembered 
receiving the news: 
I remember very vividly standing and leaning on the CO's 
jeep when someone brought the word that Maj Banger King 
had just been killed. Banger was 2ic of the East Yorks and 
was a famous character throughout the Div. He'd landed on 
D-Day and almost made it to the end. 169 
The manner in which King died deprived the Major of a hero's death. Driving over a 
mine so close to the end of the war was more tragic to his men because it was not fitting 
for `Banger' to become a casualty in this random way. If he had been hit while crossing 
the bridge to the farm when he was under a hail of gunfire, or while crossing the D-Day 
beach, that might almost have been expected. He was not the only heroic figure to have 
met death in an inglorious way. Sir Henry Havelock, a national hero following the 
Indian Rebellion of 1857-8, died of dysentery. 170 
Although The Times obituary, placed by King's family, was sparse and offered no clue 
as to his military achievements, the obituary in The Snapper, the Regimental newsletter, 
was effusive. Written by journalist Hugh Gunning and issued by the Ministry of 
Information, it said of King: `Between 6th June 1944 and 15th April 1945 he packed into 
his soldiering enough excitement to fill a book of personal adventure.. . If only half the 
stories told about "Banger" were true, he would still qualify as one of the greatest 
characters of this campaign'. 171 Clearly then, stories about King were well-known 
167 Lt Col Renison's memoir, p. 338. 168 Sir John Smyth VC, Bolo Whistler. The Life of General Sir Lashmer Whistler. 169 Fendick served with 2°d Bn The Middlesex Regt, a Divisional Support Battalion in the 3'd British 
Infantry Division. Memoir p. 205. 
170 Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes. 
171 When Gunning, was asked to name a composite D-Day man by The Hull Daily Mail, during the 20th 
anniversary of the landings, he opted for `Banger' King, calling him `the happy English warrior'. He had 
selected King as a man `big enough to be representative of the men and women, civilians and serving 
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throughout the battalion and beyond, and were liable to refinement and exaggeration in 
their re-telling. The obituary stresses his role as an officer in the infantry, in that `he was 
a born leader of Infantry. He understood Infantry. He championed Infantry at every 
opportunity. He prayed that England would never forget her debt to Infantry'. In 
emphasising King's affinity with the infantrymen under his command, Gunning reminds 
the reader of the importance of the foot soldier `at the sharp end'. 
The Snapper also featured tributes by two senior officers who had commanded King, Lt 
Col Renison and Lt Col Hardy Spicer. Renison's tribute to King differed from that of 
Gunning, who had described the Major as having `a thirst for danger'. Renison argued 
instead, `it would be unfair to "Banger" to say that he deliberately courted danger; he 
knew too much about fighting for that and it was just this knowledge and a complete 
fearlessness that enabled him to succeed where others, without his leadership, would not 
have dared to start'. Here we can see the difference between a war correspondent 
wishing to attach more drama to the Major's character, as opposed to the more 
measured view of a man who knew King well and understood him. Lt Col Hardy Spicer 
was more lyrical: 
How can one think of `Banger' as dead? It is impossible. 
He is not, and never will be, to not only officers and men 
of the East Yorkshire Regiment and countless children 
who loved him, but also to his Sudanese troops who loved 
him too. You cannot kill a spirit like that, for by so doing 
you would kill all that his beloved Regiment stands for 
and, indeed, England herself. 
Hardy Spicer had not always displayed such understanding towards King's character. 
Prior to D-Day, when Hardy Spicer was the Commanding Officer of the battalion, Jack 
Reid recalled being sent out by King to perform a task. When Hardy Spicer heard of the 
order, he told Reid to go back to the Major and `tell him I'm running this outfit, not 
men, who made D-Day, June 6,1944, the crowning day of the British war effort'. The Hull Daily Mail, 
6th June 1964. 
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him'. 172 Major King, although understanding the strict chain of command, was 
altogether more flexible in his approach and therefore more suited to the ever-changing 
requirements of the battlefield. He flourished in an environment that demanded 
initiative. 
I have examined memoirs and interviewed veterans to find out why the Major was so 
popular with his men that to them he remains a hero. Since `heroes are made, not by 
their deeds, but by the stories that are told about them', 173 1 have looked at the stories 
told of his exploits and it is clear that `Banger' was a superlative Infantry officer with a 
clear understanding of how to get the best from his men, while ensuring unnecessary 
casualties were kept to a minimum. In turn, the `other ranks' appreciated his care and 
leadership which helped them endure the harsh conditions of battle. Life in the infantry 
was, and is, tough, and infantrymen need support of friends and their leaders to endure 
battle conditions. King's bravery and charisma, his care for the men and pride in the 
battalion, have led to the stories told about him forming a personal and group living 
memorial to this officer. In the following chapter, I will consider how King has been 
remembered after his death in more detail, how the stories of his exploits are retold as 
veterans of the battalion meet for the first time, and how these stories act as a group 
unifier. 
Conclusion. 
One member of the 2nd Battalion wrote of his best times in north-west Europe, as 
hearing shouts that the mail had arrived, that food or the rum issue was ready, the 
showers were coming up or that they were due to be relieved. Other than the physical 
necessities, his morale was boosted by seeing planes going over to attack Germany, or 
seeing German positions coming under heavy fire. Naturally his worst occasions were 
172 Extract from interview with Jack Reid 4'h July 1999. 
173 Dawson, Soldier Heroes, p. 188. 
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the opposite - times of being soaked to the skin, or hungry, or in physical danger, or 
particularly when resting after a battle, `only to hear the order "push on, we have them 
on the run"'. 174 This soldier's feelings were replicated by many others within the 2 °d 
Battalion during the campaign, and also in the infantry generally. The interviews have 
highlighted the poor physical conditions and the difficulties of prolonged service, and 
this element of the interviewees' experience has been reconstructed within the chapter. 
Hearing of the stresses first-hand, and thereby acquiring an understanding of the nature 
of comradeship, is a reminder that the interviewees of the 2 °d Battalion were actually 
participants in the war and the making of history, which makes it more personal than the 
reading of a globalised account of the period. The infantryman's constant exposure to 
the elements means he will be reliant on a regular supply of food, good clothing, 
washing facilities and opportunities for rest. He will be sustained by his comrades and 
requires good leadership in order to perform his role. Where these are lacking, morale 
becomes affected, and it becomes more likely that the soldier will succumb to battle 
exhaustion. Although it is clear that members of the 2°d Battalion did succumb, and 
some deserted, the numbers were never so high that the fighting performance of the 
battalion was seriously affected. Instead, the battalion maintained a creditable 
performance despite the physical conditions, due primarily to overall good leadership 
and small-group loyalty. 
Within the wealth of secondary literature pertaining to the Second World War, little has 
been made of the achievement of the line regiments in this campaign in remaining 
largely steadfast, despite the physical and mental hardships. On the contrary, as has 
already been noted in Chapter One, the British Army has been considered second-rate 
compared to the Germans, and a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the Allies' 
material superiority as an explanation for their eventual success. Such arguments do a 
174 Harry Smithson's recollections. 
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great disservice to individual infantrymen, most of whom served for many months 
under increasing strain. The long-term repercussions of this strain, as recorded in the 
following chapter, were borne by the men and their families during the subsequent 
years. 
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Afterword - Post-War Life 
As the war in Europe came to a close, the men of the 2 °d Battalion and their families 
could at last begin to look towards their futures. In this section I consider what post-war 
Britain had to offer the men of the 2 °d Battalion as they returned home, how they coped 
with civilian life and the longer-term effects of service in the north-west Europe 
campaign. The reason for an exploration of post-war life, is that for many, the Second 
World War did not end at the cessation of hostilities, and its repercussions remain. On 
mainland Europe, the ramifications of large numbers of displaced persons, refugees, the 
destruction of property and transport, called for Allied efforts for several years. ' 
However even in the UK, with its avoidance of occupation, there were years of 
shortages in all areas to come. In this `total war' the civilians of the UK had been 
involved on an unprecedented scale. Consequently, soldiers were expected to return 
home, find jobs, build new families and to settle down to civilian life, without a fanfare. 
However, some returned home with physical injuries whose effects lasted a life-time, 
and others suffered mental difficulties that were `hidden' within the family. As the 
veterans aged, they had more time to reflect on their war service and wonder what had 
happened to their comrades, resulting in the formation of the 2nd Battalion Veterans' 
Group in the 1990s. 
For many of the younger men of the battalion, the end of the war in Europe did not 
signal the end of their service. Infantrymen of the 2 °d Battalion, in line with those in 
other regiments, were not demobbed automatically, as the war in the Far East continued 
and there were a range of duties still to be performed in Europe. It was announced that 
the 2 °d Battalion would form part of the expected invasion force on the coast of Japan 
and the soldiers were assessed for fitness. The news was greeted with dismay; some 
infantrymen had been in the frontline since D-Day and few anticipated they would make 
1 See Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945 (London, 2007) and Gregor Dallas, Poisoned 
Peace. 1945 - The War that never ended (St Ives, 2005) whose title acknowledges that the ramifications 
of the war continue. 
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it home alive from an assault on Japan. The only positive aspect was that the battalion 
would be sent to the US initially, for further training, delaying their involvement in any 
invasion. In the event, the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki resulted in Japan's 
unconditional surrender; to the relief of the interviewees who were due to be deployed 
there. 
In the short-term, members of the battalion assisted with repatriation of refugees and 
forced labourers, with some interviewees being sent to Brussels to guard prisoners, and 
others being sent to train the Belgian Army. It soon became clear that the battalion 
would be sent to Egypt and Palestine instead, for peace-keeping duties, as part of the 
`Imperial Strategic Reserve' and the news came as a blow to some of the interviewees' 
wives, who had thought their husbands would be returning home. 3 
The 2 °d Battalion arrived in the Canal Zone of Egypt in October 1945, and moved to 
Haifa in Palestine in December of that year, before returning to Moascar in Egypt in 
1946. This period witnessed terrorist activities by the Stem Gang and Irgun Z'vai 
Leumi who sought to establish an independent Jewish state. 4 During 1946 and 1947 the 
interviewees were gradually demobbed and the battalion returned to the UK in 1948 for 
amalgamation with the 1St Battalion. In respect of the interviews covering this period, 
details of life in Egypt and Palestine are invariably richly detailed and include 
recollections of the different climate, the food and leisure activities. What was apparent 
in a few of the interviews, but by no means all, was the difficulty some had in 
reconciling their views on the Jewish situation in Europe, with their orders to stop 
Jewish refugees entering Palestine in their unauthorised vessels. They expressed 
2 This relief is not confined to the 2d Battalion. Dr D. Paton of the RAMC described hearing the news: `I 
am not going to Japan now. Oh lovely bomb'. SWWEC (2001-1354). Also General Sir R. Ford was 
earmarked for the invasion: `Thank God that never came off SWWEC Tape 1496. 3 Harold Isherwood wrote to reassure his young wife: `Well Darling I guess you will know by now that I 
am on my way to Palestine. I guess it came as a shock to you Sweetheart, but never mind it will soon pass 
on when I will be home with you for good'. Letter undated - supplied by Mrs Isherwood. 4 Alex Danchev, The Army and the Home Front 1939-45 in The Oxford History of the British Army, ed. 
David Chandler (Oxford, 1994). 
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surprise that the Jews were now regarded as the `enemy' and they, in return, were 
considered a target for terrorists. One of those targeted was Wilf Todd, who recalled, `I 
was out in Haifa, and Slim and I had just come out of an Arab shop, when a taxi came 
up the pavement and tried to knock us down'. 5 In this instance, the interviewee 
considered he had been recognised because he was in command of the prisoners' cage. 
The confusion as to the purpose of their service in Palestine was in direct contrast to the 
feelings the interviewees expressed about active duty in north-west Europe, which was 
regarded as being totally justified. 
Mainly however, the interviewees held no firm political opinions about their situation, 
rather they spoke of interminable guard duties, and being called on to suppress a 
`mutiny' by other battalions over delayed demobilisation dates. Information concerning 
this mutiny proved interesting as it was not mentioned in the Regimental history. Some 
interviewees also viewed this period as a useful one for coming to terms with their 
service in north-west Europe, although it did not alleviate their nightmares and 
flashbacks after the interviewees returned to the UK. 
For married couples the separation often proved difficult as some wives had had to live 
with their parents or in-laws during the war, due to the low pay earned by infantrymen. 
By the end of the war, one-third of the male working population, one-half of them 
married, were in uniform and serving away from home, leaving two and a half million 
women at home, enduring the separation and often living in poverty. 6 Of the small 
sample of wives interviewed, all but one had worked during the war, and as their 
husbands returned, they followed the Government's preferred route, which was to return 
to the home instead of remaining in the workplace.? Elsie Hall had moved in with her 
s Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 10 May 1999. 
6 Robert Mackay, The Test of War. Inside Britain 1939-45 (London, 1998). 7 See Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives (Boston, Mass, 
1983) on the role of women during the war. 
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sister, as she received one pound 12 shillings a week for herself and her son. 8 Elsie's 
husband, Tommy, was in the building trade before he was called up, and consequently 
he was able to come home quickly under the `B' release scheme. Other than early 
release for essential industries, demobilisation for those categorised Category A, was 
decided by age and length of service. 
When Arthur Lumb was demobbed in January 1946, his son had been so pleased to see 
his father that he would not leave his side, greeting his father with the words `Is this my 
daddy? ' This reaction was not always typical; in many instances, children experienced 
problems in bonding with fathers who were often strangers to them. On being taken ill 
with tuberculosis, contracted while in Belgium guarding prisoners, Arthur's family 
discovered the cost of health care prior to the formation of the NHS in 1948. Edna 
Lumb explained, `my dad said we'd all club together and get a specialist which would 
cost five pounds. The doctor and specialist came and he wouldn't come in the house 
until we'd given him the money'. 1° Following treatment, it took a year before Arthur 
was fit enough to return to work. The couple considered themselves extremely fortunate 
to qualify for a prefab house post-war. Few houses were built during the war, so there 
was a pressure on housing in the early post-war years, alleviated only slightly by the 
construction of 125,000 prefabs by 1948.11 The wives interviewed, recalled that 
wartime austerity and rationing remained until the early 1950s, and particularly 
remembered the harsh winter of 1947, when the British Isles `was blotted out by a 
blanket of white' 12 and there were difficulties in obtaining coal due to the fuel crisis. 
8 From interview with Elsie Hall 13th June 1999. 
9 Angus Calder and Dorothy Sheridan, eds. Speak for Yourself. A Mass-Observation Anthology 1937-49 
(London, 1984). 
'o Extract from interview with Edna Lumb 1' May 1999. 
11 Paul Addison, Now the War is over. A social history of Britain 1945-51 (London, 1985) Chapter 3. 12 Peter Hennessy, Never Again, Britain 1945-51 (London, 2006) p. 282. 
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The husbands, fathers, and sons, who returned to their families, were not the same men 
who had left. 13 Physical changes were apparent; often the men had grown taller, had 
changed weight, or had suffered injuries which altered their appearance permanently. In 
one instance, the interviewee had not returned to his wife at all; she had left him during 
the war and he had instigated divorce proceedings. 14 Although reluctant to discuss the 
circumstances, it was clear that this had deeply affected him during his service and 
afterwards. Despite a significant rise in the number of divorces during the war years, '5 
this situation was not typical for the interviewees; instead it is a testament to attitudes of 
sixty years ago, that so many marriages have lasted. Indeed, some of the wives have had 
to care for husbands who have suffered greatly as a result of their wartime experiences. 
It is still not widely recognised that many of the returning infantrymen of the Second 
World War suffered mental health problems post-war. For the interviewees the effects 
varied; some were open to discussion about the problems they faced, however others 
denied any difficulties and in one instance it was a wife who interjected to talk of her 
husband's nightmares: `Well, he didn't know about it but he used to be shouting and of 
course, moaning. He was always shouting .. you could tell he was upset you 
know '. 16 
It must be taken into account that this is a generation not encouraged to discuss such 
matters, which are deemed `private' and, as men, they can fmd it difficult to talk about 
mental health issues openly. Taking this into account, the admissions of difficulties I 
have recorded are frank and illuminating for the listener. One interviewee spoke of the 
aftermath to his injury: `If I got agitated about anything I used to start to tremble, and it 
probably lasted a quarter of an hour, twenty minutes... "7 He was destined to suffer this 
13 See Richard Holmes, Acts of War. The Behaviour of Men in Battle, Chapter 10, for a discussion of post- 
service effects. Also Sean Longden, To the Victor the Spoils. D-Day to VE Day, the Reality behind the 
Heroism, Chapter 18. 
la This interviewee wished the details to remain anonymous. 15 Divorce numbers increased from 9970 in England and Wales in 1938, to 47,041 in 1947. From 
Addison, Now the War is over. 
16 Extract from interview with Ken and Joyce Boulding 8th January 2000. 17 Extract from interview with George Burnham 26th February 2000. 
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reaction for the next couple of years, before it finally started to subside. For another 
interviewee, his experiences have affected him throughout his post-war life: 
I felt the effects straightaway afterwards. I couldn't relax. 
If I went to the pictures I had to come out in the middle of 
the picture. I just couldn't stand it. When I was at home I 
couldn't sit down. I used to pace about all the time. All the 
time I've been married I've always been on a short fuse. I 
dream every night and at times I have panic attacks. The 
whole thing changed me. My wife ... has had a 
lot to put 
up with for 47 years. '8 
Despite many visits to his doctor in the early years, medical and practical help was not 
forthcoming, until in more recent times the Combat Stress organisation offered 
assistance. This same interviewee was told by his doctor that he was a time-waster, so `I 
used to take Sanatogen powder. Well it was 1947. It was stress you see, but it wasn't 
recognised. Now you see all these people wanting counselling when something 
happens'. 19 He was angry at the lack of help on offer in the immediate post-war years, 
when his doctor failed to understand the effects that serving in the infantry had had on 
him psychologically. Similarly, Jim Fetterly returned home to Canada in September 
1945 and experienced dreams, finding that he `kept fighting the war at night'. 
Hospitalised for five weeks, Jim received `excellent care' which `put 35 pounds back on 
my carcass'. 20 
For another interviewee, the symptoms did not become openly apparent for many years 
afterwards, but his breakdown was precipitated by witnessing an horrific car accident: 
`the thing I remembered most was the smell of the blood at this accident. When you 
were in action you had the smell of the blood mixed with the smell of cordite from the 
explosions. You couldn't get rid of it. I think that awoke latent memories'. ' Winter and 
Sivan attributed this traumatic recall as being triggered by extrinsic contexts, such as a 
similarity of noise or smell and, as Wilf Todd discovered, at this point the memories can 
18 Extract from interview with Doug Parker 17t' July 1999. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Extracts from letter to author dated 31' October 1999. 
21 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 4t' April 1999. 
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be paralytic 22 The interviewee credited his return to full mental health as being due to 
help from his family and friends, who gave `sympathy and understanding', as well as a 
good medical practitioner. 
From my small sample of interviewees of the 2 "d Battalion, 10 per cent have described 
moderate to severe mental health issues which required medical treatment. A 
significantly higher number have described milder symptoms, which include bad 
dreams and an inability to settle down to civilian life, typified by a move from job to 
job. If this percentage were transposed to the wider British Army it is obvious that many 
thousands of servicemen have suffered problems since the end of the Second World 
War, and will have received a variable quality of assistance. Since this generation is of 
the `suffer in silence' school, then much of the strain will have been borne by the 
families of those afflicted. One returning serviceman, suffering nightmares, found that it 
helped to talk about his experiences with his father, who had served in the First World 
War23 
The partners of the returning servicemen bore the brunt of the problems faced by their 
husbands during this difficult period of re-adjustment. John Folley paid tribute to his 
wife's forbearance: `I wish to put on record, my wife deserves recognition for her 
loyalty, affection and patience in counselling me through my horrific nights of terror' 24 
During his final years, John spoke `for hours of his experiences - almost an obsession' 
and these experiences were `very vivid, he talked as if it was yesterday'. 5 He felt 
compelled to re-live his experiences, re-visiting them by day and night, waking `scared, 
sweating and shaking'. In John Folley's case his experiences appear to follow Jo Stanley's 
argument that not all remembrance is welcomed by servicemen, indeed a number of them 
suffer from `involuntary commemoration'; re-living traumatic events from their service 
22 Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, p. 15. 23 From interview with Horace Pinfold 2°d December 2000. 
24 John Folley Recollections - Special Collections, University of Leeds. 25 Letter from Janet Folley held with John Folley's papers. Dated 22nd July 1996. 
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repeatedly26 and becoming `involuntary walking memorials' to their experiences. Jo 
Stanley ascribed this process as being caused by traumatic events in wartime, however 
other aspects of military service, such as peace-keeping tours, can result in similar mental 
health issues. 
Even today, some veterans find it difficult to fully come to terms with their war 
experiences and their daily lives are dominated by them. Not all the symptoms were 
mental. Another interviewee attributed his years of suffering from stomach ulcers as 
initially due to the army food, but admitted that the sights and sounds of war were 
probably more of a factor in his ill-health. Certainly his daughter felt that her father's 
experiences had adversely affected him. 7 Patently, none of these mental health issues 
pertain only to the Second World War. A recent report from the New England Journal 
of Medicine shows more than a quarter of US soldiers seeking hospital treatment after 
service in Afghanistan and Iraq, are suffering from mental disorders. 28 
Although it is impossible to establish how many ex-servicemen from the Second World 
War suffered such disorders, it is important to note that at that time, treatment for 
mental health problems carried a stigma which discouraged men from seeking help. In 
an effort to come to terms with their experiences, some veterans have written memoirs 
or short recollections for their families and organisations including the IWM. One 2nd 
Battalion veteran, Melville Hardiment, produced a collection of stark poems29 and 
described his memories of the wounded and dying in an article in The Daily Star30: `In 
my dreams, I not only see their agony. I hear it. Every scream, every whimper, every 
last word'. The writing of poetry and memoirs is one way of processing traumatic or 
26 Jo Stanley, `Involuntary Commemorations. Post-traumatic stress disorder and its relationship to war 
commemoration', eds. T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper, The Politics of War Memory 
and Commemoration. 
27 From interview with Crowther Goldie 19th December 1999. 
28 Article in The Daily Mail, 1' April 2005 
29 Melville Hardiment, Remembering the Huns (Cambridge, 1993). 
30 The Daily Star 6th June 1984. 
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overpowering memories, in order to come to terms with them. 1 Of course, not all 
veterans experienced problems on returning home; one veteran, a reinforcement, said he 
`slept like a log' and was proud of his war service, `it's an achievement in one way that 
you did do your part'. 2 Whether the 2"d Battalion veterans suffered mental or physical 
health problems or not, neither circumstance is unusual, and instances of both are 
recorded in memoirs and oral recordings. However it was the scale of the mental health 
issues, ranging from the mild to the severe, that was surprising, as no long-term studies 
on numbers affected by their service in the infantry during the Second World War, have 
been carried out. 
British post-war policy towards ex-servicemen was `very low-key and, by modem 
standards, tough'33 and was very different to that adopted by the US. For those returning 
home, there would be a lump sum payment and accrued leave, during which time the 
demobilised would need to search for future employment. For the interviewees, jobs 
seemed not too hard to come by generally, although it became harder for those 
demobbed later, after they had completed service in Egypt and Palestine. This reinforces 
Addison's assertion that, post-war, finding a job was not too arduous M The problem lay 
in finding a job that paid well and constituted regular employment. 5 Many of the 
interviewees returned to their pre-war jobs, `held open' for them under the provisions of 
the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act of 1944, which specified returning 
servicemen should be employed on the same terms and conditions that would have 
applied had the war not removed these men from their jobs. Of course, while the 
servicemen had been in the forces, those remaining in civilian life had had further 
training opportunities and possibilities of promotion. Some interviewees returned to 
31 Social support is one coping strategy; others are avoidance of the memories, or processing them by 
developing narratives about them. See Nigel Hunt and Ian Robbins, `Telling Stories of the War: Ageing 
Veterans Coping With Their Memories Through Narrative', Oral History Journal Vol. 26 Autumn 1998. 
32 Extract from interview with Norman Lucas 96' October 1999. 
33 Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves, p. 328. 
34 Paul Addison, Now the War is over. A social history of Britain 1945-51. 35 E. Cox recalled `Going to the labour exchange and being told there were no vacancies for ex tank 
drivers was no help'. Memoir SWWEC (2003-2325). 
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their original employment but could not settle. One discovered that following his 
service he felt happier being outdoors, so re-trained firstly as a joiner and then later as 
an electrician, when he married and needed a higher wage. 6 Others moved from job to 
job, trying to secure higher wages. 
While Dewey argues that the war was the catalyst which led to a greater equality of 
income, 37 the interviewees did not benefit from this change in the early post-war years. 
None of those interviewed had held down high income jobs prior to the war; they were 
primarily young men on their first or second jobs at the time of call-up and this was 
reflected in the types of employment they initially found when they returned home, with 
a high proportion becoming labourers, drivers, railway workers, textile workers and 
storesmen. Albert Eccles was determined that he would not become a miner, which was 
the job of his father and two brothers. However he eventually relented, after years of 
working seven days a week on low pay. As working in the mines remained dangerous, 
with harsh conditions, the general trend was a move away from mining by the 
workforce, and higher wages had to be offered to stem the tide 38 
For Wilf Todd, who had risen to the rank of Company Sergeant Major by the time of his 
demobilisation, his new job in the transport department was not personally satisfying: 
`It was a thankless job - you took all the abuse from the travelling public. .. It was 
hard 
to acclimatise, but you have to change and accept things as they are'. 9 For Wilf, his 
previous position of authority counted for nought in the civilian world. 40 Prior to his 
demobilisation, he had applied to join the Fire Service: `A sergeant from the Army Fire 
Service asked me all sorts of questions and I had to pick a ladder up and run with it. It 
caused quite a bit of amusement from the lads seeing their sergeant major running with 
36 From interview with Horace Pinfold 2d December 2000. 
37 Peter Dewey, War and Progress, Britain 1914-1945 (London and New York, 1997) p. 321. 
38 Addison, Now the War is over Chapter 7. 
39 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 0 April 1999. 
ao See Philip Ziegler, Soldiers. Fighting Men's Lives, 1901-2001 (London, 2001) in which he focuses on 
the lives of nine Chelsea Pensioners. He argues that the Army sent soldiers into civilian life unprepared; 
their skills were often irrelevant, and the authority they had enjoyed was denied them. 
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a ladder and being interviewed by this sergeant'. 1 On returning home, Wilf had to take 
other jobs while waiting for a place in the Fire Service to become available. 
Clive Crauford, having reached the rank of Major, summed up the difficulties in re- 
adjustment. When asked if he had returned to University to finish his Degree course, he 
replied: 
No, it wasn't on... it was necessary to start earning some 
money, apart from the usual army pay, and I joined a firm 
of stockbrokers and worked my way up through the 
normal routine. I had no knowledge of finance, I knew 
how to strip a Bren gun, (laughing) it wasn't very 
helpfu142 
One of the sample, unable to find steady employment, re-enlisted for the £100 pay-out 
on offer, and served during the Korean War with the Duke of Wellington's Regiment 43 
Others considered re-enlistment, but the 2 °d Battalion had changed; their friends had 
returned to civilian life and the Army had returned to its peace-time role with guard 
duties and emphasis on `spit and polish'. This indicates the difficulties of acclimatising 
to a former way of life that seemed almost alien to the young soldiers, and a wish to 
return to a military system that seemed familiar and thus reassuring. 
When asked how their war service had changed them long-term, if at all, interviewees 
spoke in vague terms of self-discipline, growing up overnight, and learning to take care 
of themselves. Clive Crauford felt that `nothing has ever seemed quite so important. I I. 
don't think the ups and downs of life have been so difficult to cope with.. I think it 
made me more likely to shrug my shoulders and say "oh what the hell"' 45 Denis Cade 
raised the more profound point: `We went in the army to learn to kill. When we came 
out we were never untrained, if you know what I mean. You had to live with it. We 
41 Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 4t' April 1999. 
42 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5th November 2000. 
a3 From interview with Alf Harrison 5th November 2000. 
44 Re-enlistment was not a rare occurrence, nor restricted to the other ranks. Lt General Sir D. House 
recalled of his battalion, `I missed them like fury and I was unhappy and I couldn't wait to get back in 
gain', during interview with SWWEC (2002-1779). 
4 Extract from interview with Clive Crauford 5'h November 2000. 
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went out to do a very hard job' 46 Until the men came home, the skill that had been most 
highly prized by High Command was the ability to kill the enemy. This `skill' had to be 
forgotten or suppressed in order to adjust to civilian life. 
Most of the interviewees came home wanting to put their experiences behind them and 
re-build their lives, particularly towards finding a partner and starting, or enlarging, 
families. In the first three years post-war, marriages rose by 13 per cent and births by 33 
per cent compared to the years 1936-1939.47 None of the interviewees mentioned the 
wider welfare changes post-war, such as the National Health Service, education 
changes, state pensions, family allowances and unemployment insurance. 48 The 
interviewees appeared apolitical when reflecting on the immediate post-war period, 
which does not tally with secondary literature that focuses on the strong political move 
towards Labour. 49 For them, the pressure was personal, not societal; the need was to 
find employment and settle back into civilian life. 50 There was often little time or 
Consequently few joined inclination to become involved in regimental reunions. 1 
groups in the early years. As Albert Eccles argued, `I wouldn't even join a Christmas 
club'. 2 Later, more recognised the potential benefits of joining the Regimental 
Association, going to the local British Legion or becoming a member of the Normandy 
Veterans' Association. 
46 Extract from interview with Denis Cade 0 July 1999. 
47 Peter Hennessy, Never Again, Britain 1945-1951 p. 169. 
48 As John Stevenson summarised, in British Society 1914-45 (London, 1984), Angus Calder and Henry 
Pelling argue that the welfare changes were merely a hastening along old lines of provision, however Paul 
Addison and Arthur Marwick argue that a degree of change must be attributed to the war. Tony Judt, in 
Postwar, argues that across Europe, the `change was most marked in Britain', p. 73. 49 Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and Social Change, 1900-1967 
(Harmondsworth, 1970). Also see S. P. Mackenzie, Politics and Military Morale. Current Affairs and 
Citizenship Education in the British Army 1914-1950, pp. 186-187. Mackenzie asserts that this trend was 
due to the experience of war and the attendant changes in people's lives. 50 The interviews reflect Alison Rowetz's assertion that `the main goal of this peace was self- 
containedness and the chance to re-build family relationships in private' p. 147, in Housing the People, 
from Labour's Promised Land? Culture and Society in Labour Britain 1945-51 (London, 1995) ed. Jim 
Fyrth. See also J. A. Crang, `The British Soldier on the Home Front: Army Morale Reports, 1940-45', 
eds. Addison and Calder, Time to Kill, p. 71. 
51 This tallies with Jo Stanley's assertion that in the 1950s the aim was to put the war behind them. It was 
easier and deemed more `manly' to forget. From `Involuntary Commemorations. Post-traumatic stress 
disorder and its relationship to war commemoration', eds. T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael 
Roper, The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, p. 252. 
52 Extract from interview with Albert Eccles I Id' September 1999. 
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Few kept in contact with other East Yorkshire servicemen when they first came home, 
except in cases where those veterans lived locally. For some interviewees this became a 
source of regret in later years and attempts were made to trace friends through electoral 
rolls, telephone directories and appeals on the Service Pals page on Teletext. I was also 
regularly asked if I had knowledge of old friends through my network of interviewees, 
some of whom did not belong to the 2nd Battalion Veterans' Group. This demonstrates 
how important their war service was to so many of the interviewees, who spoke of the 
extraordinary comradeship discovered through the sharing of adversity, and feel that 
civilians cannot appreciate how strong these bonds remain. 
The 2nd Battalion Veterans' Group was for some, the first and only group they had joined. 
Its disbandment at Christmas 2003 was a disappointment for the members, although the 
annual reunion remained, albeit with fewer attendees, until April 2006. This is a similar 
situation for many Second World War veterans groups, including the Dunkirk Veterans 
Association, and is due to the ageing membership. One interviewee felt that membership 
had not always been beneficial for him, as it reminded him of his experiences, particularly 
on receipt of the newsletters, rather than allowing him to suppress his memories. 3 Copies 
of the quarterly newsletters have been sent to the IWM by the Secretary in an effort to 
preserve the experiences of the 2°d Battalion and gain a measure of public recognition. The 
group founder, Norman Lucas, felt that until starting the group `there had always been 
that gap' and it was satisfying through the newsletters and reunions to `put together 
many of the pieces of the jigsaw that you would never have done without coming 
together in a group'. 54 
Personal memories have been either altered or reinforced by membership of the 2d 
Battalion Veterans' Group and the Regimental Association. Until its disbandment, the 
veterans' group newsletters included pieces written by members of the group about their 
53 From interview with Wilf Todd 4`h April 1999. 
54 Extract from interview with Norman Lucas 91 October 1999. 
238 
experiences of life with the battalion, including humorous incidents, memories of training 
and extracts from memoirs. Although these newsletters often acted as a unifier, with group 
and individual acceptance of the experiences contained therein; certain aspects, such as 
names and dates, were sometimes questioned. The newsletters also featured requests for 
information, and veterans would respond to `fill-in' gaps in others' memories. It became 
apparent that some veterans would submit several articles for inclusion, while others did 
not wish to take part. A request for specific information, such as an appeal for stories about 
training at Inverary, received a good response, with the information being sent to the local 
museum. However, general appeals for reminiscences were less successful. 
For the 2°d Battalion Veterans Group, the short annual service held at Beverley Minster 
each April was a suitable and welcome setting for commemoration. " The service of 
prayer was held in the Regimental Chapel, where the `Colours' hang overhead, the 
Regimental silver is displayed and the Kneelers, embroidered by local women, have 
been partly funded by the Veterans' Group and partly by private donation. It was a 
solemn event, offering time for private thought, and prayers were said for those killed 
during the war, their families and for those serving in the armed forces today. The 
veterans identified with these prayers and with infantrymen serving in today's army, as 
despite progress in transport and technology, they appreciated that active service in the 
infantry still comprises digging-in, patrolling, exposure to the elements and close- 
quarter fighting. For the veterans, this service in Beverley Minster was deemed 
important, as it recognised those killed from their battalion. It was a formal event during 
an otherwise informal reunion. 
For the remainder of the reunion, commemoration took the form of a `Do you 
remember...? ' exchange of reminiscences. During the reunions, talk would often be 
political, focusing on national issues highlighted in the press. Despite the expression of 
ss Winter and Sivan, eds. War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, argue that individuals 
reinforce their recall of memories through rituals such as saluting the flag, moments of silence etc. p. 14. 
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national pride and homage towards those lost during the war, many veterans feel that 
they are marginalised in society. Denis Cade argues, `we as the military went to war to 
fight for our country for everyone's freedom. We gave our todays at our young age for 
your tomorrows. We fought for the country we loved. Now we wish that our country 
would love us as much now we are old and frail',. 6 There is a dissatisfaction that war 
pensions can be difficult to achieve and that pension levels are low, while other sections 
of society are seen as `milking' the benefits system or being granted benefits 
undeservedly. For some veterans therefore, their feelings of marginalisation range from 
being overlooked as a battalion, as a regiment, and as a branch of the Army deemed 
`inferior', to being excluded as pensioners and feeling that they are undervalued 
members of society. The reunions were first and foremost an opportunity to reinforce 
friendships and sometimes to air grievances about the country they live in today. 
The focus during the reunions was on comradeship, the type of deep-rooted friendship 
that evolves from shared experiences and dangers. This is evident both during 2°a 
Battalion reunions and those of other organisations, such as Regimental Associations, 
the Normandy Veterans Association and the British Legion clubs. 7 During the 
exchanges it was apparent that the men of the group had developed shared memories, in 
particular concerning the battle at Schaddenhof farm, and also between those veterans 
who had served in the same companies. As many of the veterans were reinforcements 
who joined the battalion during the winter of 1944-45, this was the main battle in which 
they were all involved and common memories were therefore easier to establish. If any 
group member `doubted' his own memory, he would use the group setting, to approach 
other group members for clarification about that event. 58 In such instances, group 
memories tended to take precedence over individual memories and the veteran would 
56 Extract from interview with Denis Cade 4`h July 1999. 
57 E. Cox described this as `a common bond that can only come from what we all went through' in his 
memoir SWWEC (2003-2325). 
58 For example, I was able to settle a long-standing, but amiable, dispute about the situation of different 
companies at Schaddenhof, by taking documents to a reunion for all to consult. 
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`alter' his memory to fit. For most of the group, this was the only occasion on which 
they would meet each year and it was important to reinforce the group memories, as 
these encouraged a sense of inclusion and membership of a tight-knit fraternity. Within 
the group, the D-Day veterans were held in high regard, as having experienced more 
action than the later reinforcements and their memories held more weight. 59 
It has already been noted in the previous chapter that Major `Banger' King, DSO and 
Bar, was a central figure in the 2°d Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment during the war. 
However he also remains so, to the veterans of the 2nd Battalion, today. By the time of 
his death, in April 1945, the infantrymen of the 2 °d Battalion had amassed a wealth of 
stories about his personality and exploits which continue to be retold and which have 
now become a `living memorial' to the officer who became Second-in-Command of the 
battalion. This collective remembrance acts as a `group unifier' with which everyone 
can identify, and Major King has come to symbolise to the veterans, all that was `right' 
about the war. Many of the interviewees had their own anecdotes about him, forming 
both an individual as well as a group memory, once the stories have been shared with 
other veterans, and the Major continues to be spoken of with great respect and affection. 
To all veterans in the group the Major was, without doubt, a hero; a man distinguished 
by exceptional courage, and a man who is idealised for possessing superior qualities in 
any field. 
The stories, elevated to the level of myths, are not a matter of historical record, but are a 
group record, and a reinforcement of group and battalion solidarity, and are extremely 
important to the individual veteran and the group as a whole. There is clearly a 
difference between an anecdote, or story told about King, and its change to the status of 
a myth. A `myth' is used here in the sense that it is `the construction in narrative, or 
story, of a collective memory. That memory involves acts of forgetting and fantasy as 
59 See eds. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, p. 27, who 
quoted Roger Bastide as likening this position to elders of a tribe. 
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much as of preserving'. 60 It is not to argue that the stories told about Major King are 
`fantasy', more that in their re-telling the stories are enhanced and refined to highlight 
the `glamorous' aspects of this officer and reinforce the acts of bravery for which he 
was renowned. The purpose is to encourage the listener to gain an appreciation of 
King's importance to the story-teller. Certainly, in telling the stories, the interviewees 
became animated and were happy to express their opinions; `he should have had a 
VC', 61 `he was a great bloke''62 `he was a man's man', 63 `he was a gentleman in every 
respect'. TM This level of animation and obvious pleasure in talking about King was not 
apparent in any other area of the interview and was my first indicator that the Major was 
held in high regard by the veterans. Such positive stories also act `as a counter-weight 
against darker images' 65 
As King is a pivotal figure to the Veterans' Group, the remembered and shared stories 
of the officer are an important feature of reunions and are used as `conversation 
openers', since they reinforce a common bond between those who served in the 
battalion. The stories thereby act as a group, as well as individual memorial to King, a 
`living' and continually evolving memorial, as opposed to the fixed obituaries in The 
Snapper and The Times. Of course, these group memories have a `shelf-life', limited to 
the existence of the group and the individuals therein and, unless they are recorded, the 
stories of Major King will be forgotten. During the sea crossing for the 60th 
commemorations of D-Day, two veterans met for the first time. "Do you remember 
`Banger' King? " was the first question which Daniel Keenan asked Wilf Todd. It was 
the opening to a conversation of exchanging personal memories, which reflected the 
Major's importance to the `other ranks'. Wilf remembered the Major's pipe giving off 
60 John Hellmann, `The Vietnam Film and American Memory', eds. Martin Evans and Ken Lunn, War 
and Memory in the Twentieth Century. 
61 From interview with Tommy Hall 171 July 1999. 
62 Ibid. 
63 From interview with Jack Reid 9`h May 1999. 
64 From interview with Denis Cade 4`h July 1999. 
65 Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, p. 36. 
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sparks in the dark, while Daniel spoke of his giving out chocolate and cigarettes and 
playing his banjo while singing `dirty' songs (although his instrument was in reality a 
mandolin). Certainly, in group situations some veterans find it easier to speak of the 
deeds of others rather than their own experiences, fearful that in putting forward their 
own memories it may seem immodest. Since the Major was also so well-known in the 
battalion, stories about him are `safe ground' for two ex-battalion members meeting for 
the first time. 
For the unfortunate few, commemoration is `involuntary' as has been outlined in this 
Afterword, and is interwoven with traumatic memories that dominate their post-war 
lives. However for many ex-servicemen, although not all, membership of the different 
veterans' groups has reinforced their feelings of comradeship towards their fellow ex- 
infantrymen, particularly in their later years. Certainly the members of the 2"d Battalion 
Veterans' Group found mutual support and friendship within the group, which was 
clearly demonstrated at the reunions. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis set out to re-construct the history of, and examine the performance of, the 2"d 
Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment during the north-west Europe campaign. 
Marginalised and criticised, the members of the battalion had had few opportunities to 
record their own experiences of the period. The written sources are scarce and scanty, 
comprising a small number of memoirs of varying lengths and detail, as well as the War 
Diary and Regimental newsletter. Taken separately, the existing sources offer only one 
view of the battalion, be it strictly military, or the view of one particular infantryman, 
which is the reason for the thesis' title. To gain an in-depth knowledge of the 
performance of the battalion and in order to re-construct the history of the battalion 
using all the available source material, the best course of action was to approach 
battalion members directly. In so doing, the interviews revealed much about the 
battalion and provided a unique view of the D-Day landings on Sword Beach and the 
life of the average infantryman. Many others have written about these areas but to find a 
good number of sources from just one unit is rare. The interviews produced countless 
examples of evocative and expressive language, as well as rich and dramatic detail, 
particularly during the D-Day operation, for example, Wilf Todd recalled: 
The next thing, the ramp dropped, the steel doors were 
opened and a machine gun fired up the middle of our 
landing craft, hitting a lot of the chaps. We were up and 
out. Capt. McGregor was shouting everyone out and we 
were all slipping on the vomit and the blood. ' 
The interviewees displayed conviction and compelling authenticity, and both attributes 
were enhanced by the opportunity to question the sources. The only drawback has been 
the restriction on space within the confines of the thesis to include more than a few 
limited extracts. 
' Extract from interview with Wilf Todd 20th March 1999. 
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The narrative of the battalion, despite encompassing the military sphere, has proved to 
be a social history. The interviews have provided the history of a small unit with its 
members experiencing the same events, albeit while joining and leaving the battalion at 
different times. There have been several interesting outcomes to this research. The most 
positive outcome is that the veterans interviewed have realised that their battalion, and 
their own actions during the period, have a place in history. Overwhelmingly, the 
interviewees wanted to record their own memories of service in a regiment of which 
they remain proud. More than sixty years on, it continues to be a source of 
bewilderment to the veterans, as to why their part in the D-Day landings has been 
marginalised and receives so little press coverage during anniversaries. The 
interviewees therefore had their own goals within the process and the interviews acted 
as a validation of their personal experiences. The image that is portrayed in secondary 
literature is that put forward by Commando sources, who claim that a lack of training 
and good leadership resulted in a poor performance by the 2nd Battalion during the 
operation. Although many 2 °d Battalion veterans remain ignorant of the scale of the 
criticism, their own accounts reveal a very different picture to that portrayed to date. 
The level of training received by those serving on D-Day was high, due primarily to the 
length of time available in which to cover both the specific duties of an amphibious 
landing, and those skills which would be in greater demand subsequently. It was the 
increasingly urgent need for infantry recruits that necessitated a short training period for 
reinforcements and hence a more superficial range of skills, which needed to be 
intensified on arrival at the battalion. Naturally, without a point of comparison, the 
interviewees who had joined the battalion as reinforcements, considered their own 
training to be adequate. Yet it was clearly deemed essential that reinforcements be 
helped to acclimatise to the stresses of the battlefield by use of a `buddy' system. It was 
2 The importance of `reminiscence' work with elderly people is assessed by Joanna Bornat in `Oral 
History as a Social Movement: Reminiscence and Older People', Oral History Journal Vol. 17 Autumn 
1989. 
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the individual memories of the interviewees, when assessed as a group, which revealed 
the clear differences in the quality of the available training. 
Interviewees who joined the battalion after D-Day also held the longer-serving veterans 
in high regard and classed them as `superior' soldiers because of their involvement in 
the Normandy landings. The major factor in eroding the British Army's performance 
was the high casualty rate, particularly for junior officers, which meant that they often 
had very little time available to settle into their roles. It was the sheer number of 
casualties that led the battalion to become increasingly reliant on inexperienced 
reinforcements, yet despite the high turnover of soldiers, the battalion still put in a solid . 
performance. With regard to the campaign from D+1 onwards, the interviews confirmed 
the official version of events, however their historical value lay in the rich, dense detail 
which overlaid the War Diary records. 
With the exception of the `Life in the Infantry' chapter, the interviews have been used 
firstly to counter criticisms, or to confirm or refute existing written sources, thus 
illustrating that oral history can be valuable in different ways. However in all chapters 
the strength of the oral evidence has been the rich detail that has revealed previously 
unknown facts about active service in the battalion, those elements of the battalion 
history that cannot be read about in the Battalion War Diary or Commanding Officer's 
memoir. It is the battalion history from the point of view of the ordinary soldier, his 
training, his actions on D-Day, how he fought despite the conditions and how he shaped 
his life post-war. 
The interviews were used differently for the `Life in the Infantry' chapter as there, they 
were the main source, and revealed the strong link between the physical circumstances 
and the place in which the battalion was serving, for example Troarn being remembered 
for problems with mosquitoes. For some of the interviewees, place names were 
impossible to recall, and the questions were tailored to suit these difficulties, for 
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example, I would ask if the interviewee remembered the swarms of mosquitoes, rather 
than asking if they recalled serving in Troarn. This became possible once the strong link 
between the natural environment and memory had been established. This was especially 
pertinent to infantrymen as they spent long periods outdoors and exposed to the 
elements, and their sensory memories remain richly detailed. 
Within secondary literature, judgements on how the soldiers coped with combat and 
what their lives were like during this period, are usually based on various regiments and 
different areas of service. However the oral accounts of the 2 °d Battalion provided a 
large degree of congruence which permitted valid conclusions to be drawn. In some 
instances I was able to interview several witnesses to the same event, for example, 
Arthur Smith spoke of being buried, when a wall fell on him after a shell was dropped 
at the Chateau de la Londe, and I traced the two men who saw the incident and dug him 
out. 1 also interviewed two men in the same platoon, who were out in front of 
Schaddenhof farm. Both remembered the German Paratroopers attacking them frontally, 
and who appeared to them to be giants. Their descriptions of hurriedly pulling back to 
the perimeter of the farmhouse are very similar. 4 These are seemingly small details, 
however their degree of overlap and congruence are replicated in many of the areas of 
active service undertaken by the battalion. 
One of the central concepts throughout the thesis has been memory, both individual and 
group, and at the 2 °d Battalion reunion events it has been possible to view the inter-play 
of both elements and how one is influenced by the other. Taken together, the interviews 
form an overlapping `jigsaw' of memories which provide an in-depth view of what it 
was like to serve in this battalion during the north-west Europe campaign. Individually, 
with two notable exceptions, they allow a more superficial `snapshot' of life in the 
3 Arthur Smith bemoaned the loss of his Treacle Pudding in the incident and complained that the other 
man buried with him made a lot of fuss, when he was in reality unharmed. Hugh Bone and Jack Reid dug 
them out. Interviews 27th September 1999,15`h July 2004 and 4"' July 1999 respectively. 4 Wilf Todd's interview 4th April 1999 and Peter Brown 19th September 1999. 
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battalion. It is therefore as a group record that the interviews are more unusual, and 
useful, historically. They have also revealed that there exists a distinct `group memory' 
beyond that of the individual, most evidenced in the reminiscences about Major 
`Banger' King. The interviews proved vital in establishing the character and actions of 
Major `Banger' King, when assessing what it was about this officer that made him an 
inspirational leader. Despite effusive obituaries, there is only a small collection of letters 
to give clues to his personality. The interviews produced numerous stories, descriptions 
of his leadership style and a reinforcement of the distress resulting from his death. 
In addressing the issue of post-war life, the oral accounts clearly showed the difficulties 
encountered by the interviewees on returning to civilian life, and coming to terms with 
wartime experiences. Post-war, the veterans received no assistance in finding jobs and 
any mental health issues were met with a varied response. It was the level of trauma, 
and how widespread it appeared, that was the most interesting aspect of this area of the 
interviews. Although the existence of trauma is recorded elsewhere, from my small 
sample it could be said to be more pervasive than so far acknowledged. 
The only negative aspects to the research relate to the effects of the interview process on 
a small number of the interviewees. One interviewee remarked that I now reminded him 
of the war whenever I saw him, whether or not the subject was raised during my visit. 
This often resulted in bad dreams afterwards. He was not the only interviewee for whom 
the interview process `re-awakened', or reinforced, the traumatic aspects of his service. 
This finding has also been an outcome of further interviewing since conducted on behalf 
of another regiment. 5 This is a reminder of the responsibility of the interviewer and 
researcher towards the interviewees. However most interviewees welcomed the 
opportunity to share their memories of the period, and found the experience rewarding 
5 Nigel Hunt and Ian Robbins argue however, that veterans should be encouraged to talk about their 
experiences, to enable them to `take control' of their memories. `Telling Stories of the War: Ageing 
Veterans Coping With Their Memories Through Narrative'. Oral History Journal Vol. 26 Autumn 1998. 
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and enriching. For all, the interview process was an affirmation that their life 
experiences are important and historically significant 6 
It appears that the interview process can have various outcomes, both in the nature of 
the testimony supplied, and the effect on the respondent of supplying it. Certainly the 
frank nature of some of the material has ethical implications for the future use, or 
archival storage, of the interviews and it is clear that, on occasion, the recall of 
distressing memories strayed into the realm of therapy, an area in which I am not 
qualified to assist the interviewee. 7 In order to transfer the recordings to the public 
domain, probably the archive of the Prince of Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire in 
York, each interview will require an examination of the contents to ensure that those 
elements conveyed in confidence, are edited out of the final version. 
It was beyond the remit of the thesis to interview wives and family members of the 
veterans in any great numbers, although the limited interviewing conducted provided a 
good insight into conditions on the Home Front during the period, and the strain 
imposed on wives while their husbands served abroad. Most of the veterans interviewed 
were unmarried during their service years, because they were largely of a young age. 
However of the small number who were married, four of the wives were interviewed 
separately and their testimonies were rich with anecdotes and observations. It would 
have been rewarding personally to expand this field of enquiry. 
On a personal level, the most rewarding aspect to the research was the opportunity to 
gain a deeper understanding of the nature of comradeship among ex-service personnel, 
an appreciation of the feelings of pride associated with their service in the armed forces, 
and a look into the way infantrymen cope with the pressures of front-line duties. In 
today's challenging environment for the infantry it is evident that while spheres of 
operations are different, the scale of the stresses involved are similar. What is most 
6 Stephen Caunce, Oral History and the Local Historian (London and New York, 1994). 7 This area is discussed by David W. Jones in `Distressing Histories and Unhappy Interviewing'. Oral 
History Journal Vol. 26 Autumn 1998. 
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apparent is the long-term impact the experience of shared danger has for those serving 
through it, so that the bonds of friendship and regimental loyalty remain for life. It is 
true that `war is a source of pain and grief and sometimes of shame; yet it may also offer 
satisfactions - excitement, comradeship, pride, such as peacetime cannot equal'. 
8 
Interviewees often asked if I had come across friends they had served with, and gave me 
their names. On one occasion I was able to reunite an officer with his batman. 
Veterans referred both to fellow servicemen and their regiment in terms of `family'. 
Many spoke nostalgically of their service years for primarily this reason, despite 
instances of traumatic events, the discomforts and hardships, and long spells away from 
their biological families. Many also stressed that friendships forged under such 
circumstances are intense and cannot be replicated in civilian life. This explains why so 
many join Regimental Associations and attend social events held by the regiments. The 
atmosphere at such events is that of an exclusive `club' with membership limited to 
those who have shared similar experiences. 
For the 2nd Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment, the amalgamation of the East Yorkshire 
and the West Yorkshire Regiments in 1958, to form the Prince of Wales' Own 
Regiment of Yorkshire, signalled the loss of their regimental name and identity. Some 
of the interviewees retained membership of the new Association, while others did not, 
because for some veterans the new regiment was not deemed their own. The 2nd 
Battalion Veterans' Group included some members of the Regimental Association, 
although many were not. For a civilian researcher, the depth of feeling associated with 
detailing on a cap badge, or the correct procedures to be adopted in a Sergeants' Mess, 
were entirely unfamiliar and were part of a steep learning curve. 
After a careful examination of all available sources, the battalion appears to be a sound, 
ordinary, county formation, like so many others of the north-west Europe campaign. It 
Samuel Hynes, The Soldier's Tale. Bearing Witness to Modern War (Pimlico, 1998) p. 283. 
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displayed moments of extraordinary tenacity, such as at the battle of the bridge near 
Schaddenhof farm, and periods of inaction and being `marginalised' such as the final 
battles to close the Falaise Gap. This is a normal record of service for the campaign and 
despite criticisms of the performance of the British Army during the period, the 
infantrymen of the 2°d Battalion have every reason to be proud of their service. First and 
foremost they are the survivors of a battalion which incurred, like so many others, a 
high casualty rate. Most can easily recall names and distinctive attributes of friends who 
were killed. Secondly, a detailed analysis of the existing written records has revealed 
nothing to suggest the battalion failed to gain any of its objectives, although delays in 
achieving them were common. This too, was quite usual amidst the chaos and confusion 
of the battlefield. More importantly, the battalion was never forced to retreat from an 
objective once taken. 
Other than the battle at Schaddenhof farm, none of the actions in which the battalion 
was involved can be deemed `spectacular'. However, as discussed in the Introduction, 
the word `spectacular' in military terms usually denotes actions in which objectives are 
taken against all the odds, or a unit holds an objective against overwhelming forces; that 
is, an action in which a unit would not normally be expected to succeed. Such 
circumstances were not actively sought, or planned for, by High Command. The key to 
success militarily is to take an objective while employing more forces than the enemy, 
and hence to consolidate the area against counter-attack, using sufficient forces in order 
to do so. To leave a position exposed, or to fail in an attack due to insufficient forces 
engaged, or a lack of support from other Arms, is thereby inviting a strong military 
reaction from the enemy. The battle of Schaddenhof farm became the 2 °d Battalion's 
finest achievement militarily under these very circumstances. Other than the back-up of 
the artillery, there were no other regiments involved to claim a share in the victory, and 
the only armoured support came from a lone tank of the Artillery FOO (Forward 
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Observation Officer). Despite calls from the enemy to surrender, those defending the 
farmhouse considered it `a fight to the finish' in which they would most likely lose their 
lives. The importance of the battle and the lessons that could be drawn from it, is shown 
in the fact that a training film was subsequently made of the development of the battle, 
for, I was told, use in officer training at Sandhurst. 
The success of a battalion in an action is sometimes measured by the number of awards 
made to its officers and men. The 2nd Battalion received an average number of awards 
during this campaign but no Victoria Crosses. Two VCs were awarded to other 
battalions in the Division, but tended to be in response to personal actions which 
changed the course of a battle. For example, Private J. Stokes of the KSLI, made brave 
charges without orders, at the cost of his life, to ensure the remainder of his platoon 
could advance, not usually the role of a private, and therefore worthy of the highest 
award. 9 The awards to the 2 °d Battalion are in the same region as those to other 
battalions in the Division, except for a higher number of awards of the Distinguished 
Service Order, four, of which two went to Major King. The battalion appears under- 
represented in the area of Military Medals compared to other battalions in the Division. 
However it is on a par with the two other battalions of 8t' Brigade, the 1st Suffolk and 1st 
South Lancashire Regiments. 10 Thus the number of awards made to the battalion were 
average and reinforce my conclusion that the performance of the battalion was a solid 
one. 
`Spectacular' is not an appropriate adjective for the majority of the infantry battalions of 
the British Army during this campaign. Solid, reliable, able to take, and hold, its 
objectives, and make a valuable contribution to the outcome of a battle, these are the 
attributes of the 2"d Battalion. Since commencing the research, quite a few of those 
interviewed have passed away. At their funerals, very often the coffins will be decorated 
9 Norman Scarfe, Assault Division, p. 215. 
10 Ibid. Appendix A, Summary of Decorations Awarded. 
252 
with the Union flag, a beret bearing the East Yorkshire Regiment cap badge, and a 
much-polished collection of medals. A careful examination of the evidence shows that 
their regimental pride is not misplaced. 
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A endix A 
2° Battalion Interviewees. 
Arthur Abbott enlisted in the East Yorkshire Regt as a Band Boy in March 1936 and, 
as a regular soldier, served in India before the outbreak of the Second World War. He 
joined the 2°d Battalion as the replacement Medical Sergeant early June 1944 and 
treated the wounded throughout the campaign. He was briefly captured in Venraij but 
returned to the battalion as part of a proposed prisoner exchange scheme. He was posted 
back to England and demobbed in June 1947. 
Alf Ackroyd enlisted in Hull in June 1940 and served with the 70`h West Yorkshire 
Regt until February 1943 when he transferred to the 2°d Battalion. He landed on D-Day 
as a member of 10 Platoon, `B' Company and served until he was wounded and 
evacuated to the UK. Alf was demobbed in September 1946. Post-war, Alf worked for 
Leeds Metals Company and then became self-employed. 
Ron Allen enlisted in the Army in November 1931 at Catterick camp. He was a 
member of the East Yorkshire Regimental Band and served as a stretcher-bearer before 
being evacuated from Dunkirk in June 1940. Ron remained with the Band in the UK 
and transferred to the Band of the Scots Guards post-war. 
Hugh Bone joined the Army in November 1939, and having undertaken officer 
training, was posted to the 2°d Battalion at Watford, in 1942. He was made Signals 
Officer and served as such through the long training in Scotland before landing on D- 
Day. Despite an injury in July, Hugh remained in Normandy and served throughout the 
north-west Europe campaign. At the cessation of hostilities Hugh became the Battalion 
Education Officer and then looked after 14 Displaced Persons Camps, before his 
demob, when he started training for the ministry. 
Ken Boulding joined the Army in July 1943 and served as batman to Jim Fetterly 
during the Normandy campaign. He was later batman to Capt Simpson until he was 
demobbed in July 1947. Ken was in the jeep with Major `Banger' King when it blew up 
on a mine. Post-war, Ken returned to his trade as a joiner. 
Dennis Bowen joined the East Yorkshire Regt in 1941 as a Band Boy and after serving 
with the 70`h (Young Solders) Battalion of the West Yorkshire Regt, he went to 
Richmond as a Junior NCO Weapons Instructor until early 1944. Dennis landed on D- 
Day with the 5t' Battalion East Yorkshire Regt and transferred to the 2°d Battalion in 
December 1944. He remained with the battalion until 1948, when he transferred to the 
Green Howards, where he remained for the next 17 years. Dennis worked as a civilian 
within the Police Force until his retirement. 
Dennis Brown was conscripted into the Sherwood Foresters in August 1944 at the age 
of 18. He joined the 2°d Battalion after the Schaddenhof farm battle and his first battle 
was at Goch. Dennis served in the Middle East and was demobbed as a Corporal in 
November 1947. Post-war, Dennis worked at Flotex Carpets. 
Peter Brown was conscripted into the Army in July 1943 at the age of 18. He served in 
`C' Company of the 2° Battalion and landed on D-Day. Peter was wounded but 
rejoined the battalion and also served in the Middle East. He was demobbed in July 
1947 as a Corporal, and post-war worked for a brewery. 
George Burnham volunteered for the Army in January 1942 and initially served with 
the West Yorkshire Regiment, then transferred to `D' Company of the 2°d Battalion East 
Yorkshire Regiment in time for the training in Scotland. Having landed on D-Day, he 
was a Corporal until the battle of the Chateau de la Londe when George suffered blast 
injuries and was evacuated to the UK. After recuperating, George was posted to the 
General Service Corps as a Sergeant, in charge of escorting prisoners. Post-war, he sold 
heavy trucks, as a Sales Manager. 
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Denis Cade was conscripted into the Sherwood Foresters in July 1944 when he was 18, 
having unsuccessfully applied for the RAF, and was transferred to the 2"d Battalion 
during the battle for Goch. He was in `A' Company and was demobbed in September 
1947, after serving in the Middle East, in the Officers' Mess. Post-war, Denis worked 
on the railways and on the family farm. 
Clive Crauford MC volunteered for the Army in 1940, at the age of 20 and was 
commissioned into the East Yorkshire Regiment. He joined the 2°d Battalion at the end 
of 1942 and was Second-in-Command of `C' Company during the D-Day landings. 
Clive was then promoted to Company Commander and in October was seriously injured 
at Overloon by shell fragments. After treatment, Clive was downgraded medically and 
demobbed at the end of the war. Post-war he worked as a Stockbroker and Financial 
Journalist. 
Albert Eccles worked in a butcher's shop before call-up, and on a farm. After basic 
training in Richmond he joined the 2°d Battalion in time for the training in Scotland and 
drove a truck on D-Day. He served in HQ Company during the north-west Europe 
campaign and in the Middle East thereafter, before being demobbed in November 1946. 
Post-war, Albert worked as a driver then became a miner. 
Llewelyn Francis, or `Taffy', who was known for his singing, was called up at age 21, 
after working in Sheffield steelworks, and joined the 2°d Battalion before the training in 
Scotland, landing with `C' Company on D-Day. He was a Lance Corporal and was 
seriously wounded on patrol in Holland. After evacuation he spent two years 
recuperating from his injuries. 
John Gardner joined the Army in May 1944 and was sent to the Leicester Regt for 
initial training. In October that year he transferred to the 2nd East Yorkshires. He served 
in `C' Company and fought at the Schaddenhof farm battle. John also served in the 
Middle East, as an officer's driver, in GHQ. He was demobbed in 1947 and worked as a 
Machine Operator at Lucas. 
Crowther Goldie was called up in December 1940, when he was 34, and already 
married with four children. He initially joined the Tanks Corps and when his regiment 
was disbanded, he transferred to the 7"' Battalion East Yorks. Crowther was sent to the 
2°d Battalion when it was near Caen. He cooked for his company and also took part in 
infantry actions. At Vire he was injured by 16 pieces of shrapnel. Post-war he went back 
to the building trade and later ran a pub. 
Ernie Goozie joined the East Yorkshire Regt at Richmond in April 1942 when he was 
19. He was posted to the 7th Battalion and remained with this battalion until its 
disbandment in August 1944, when he transferred to the 2"d Battalion. Ernie joined `B' 
Company and served throughout the remainder of the campaign as well as in the Middle 
East, where he was the Post Corporal. He was demobbed in December 1946. Post-war, 
Ernie worked as a guard, then signaller on the railways, and then joined the Water 
Authority. 
Arnold Grave was conscripted into the Army in December 1941 at the age of 19. He 
completed a cook's course and was then posted to the 2°d Battalion in the spring of 
1942, as a regimental cook in `A' Company. Before D-Day, Arnold played tenor sax in 
the battalion dance band. He served food close to the front lines throughout the north- 
west Europe campaign and later served in the Middle East. He was demobbed in 
October 1946 and returned to his pre-war employment as a baker. 
Tommy Hall joined the East Yorkshire Regt in December 1941. He played football for 
the battalion, and boxed for the regiment. He served with the 7`h Battalion until its 
disbandment, when he transferred to `B' Company of the 2°d Battalion. Tommy served 
as a Corporal and was demobbed in December 1945, after turning down the offer of a 
posting to Palestine as a Sergeant. When he returned to the UK, it was to his former 
trade as a builder and bricklayer. 
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Dennis Hallam MC joined the Army in 1940 and was commissioned into a Royal 
Artillery Regt which later converted to infantry. He joined the 2°d Battalion in Scotland 
early 1944 and commanded a platoon in `C' Company. Dennis served throughout the 
campaign and thereafter in the Middle East, before being demobbed as a Captain in 
September 1946. 
Alf Harrison volunteered for the Army in 1939, before the outbreak of war, and 
initially joined the Middlesex Regiment, before transferring to the 2°d Battalion in 
advance of the exercises in Scotland. He served in `B' Company on D-Day, through to 
the end of the war, and thereafter went to Egypt and Palestine. Alf was demobbed at the 
end of 1946, but after four years he re-enlisted and served with the Duke of 
Wellington's Regiment for sixteen years. 
Ted Heslop joined the East Yorkshire Regiment in 1940, after seven years working in 
stables as an apprentice jockey. He served in the Officers' Mess of the 3id Division 
Battle School and on D-Day he landed as batman to Captain Danby of Support 
Company, before transferring to signals later in the campaign. Ted was demobbed in 
1946 and worked for 32 years on the railways as a porter. 
Albert Holdsworth, known as `Butch', volunteered for the Army in June 1940 and 
served with the East Yorkshire Regt initially in `D' Company and then HQ Company. 
Albert completed a catering course in May 1944 and remained with the 2d Battalion as 
a cook during the north-west Europe campaign. He served in the Middle East and was 
demobbed in June 1946, returning to his pre-war job as a butcher, hence his nickname. 
Norman Lucas was conscripted into the Army in April 1944 at the age of 18 and was 
posted to the 2°d Battalion at Venlo in October 1944. He was in `D' Company and 
served as a rifleman, mortarman and Bren gunner. Norman was wounded in the leg in 
the Schaddenhof farm battle, but returned to the battalion, and he went on to serve in the 
Middle East. He was demobbed as a Corporal in October 1947. Norman then worked at 
a glass factory, where he became manager of the mould shop. 
Arthur Lumb joined the East Yorkshire Regiment in June 1940 and served as a 
Dispatch Rider and then with the Regimental Police. He landed on D-Day and served 
right through the campaign, involved in duties such as directing traffic. At the end of the 
war, Arthur guarded prisoners in Belgium and after his demob in January 1946, Arthur 
returned to the textile industry, in charge of a warping department. 
Ted Nicholson joined the Army in early 1944 and underwent his basic training in 
Scotland and County Durham. Initially Ted was in the Duke of Wellington's Regiment 
but joined the 2°d Battalion as a reinforcement near Ghent in Belgium. Ted served in 
`D' Company until he transferred to HQ Company at Moascar Garrison in Egypt, and 
was demobbed in 1947. Post-war, Ted worked for the Post Office as a driver. 
Doug Parker initially joined the West Yorkshire Regt in 1941 as a young soldier and 
was transferred to the East Yorkshire Regiment in December 1942. He served in `B' 
Company and landed on D-Day. Doug served throughout the north-west Europe 
campaign and in the Middle East thereafter. He was demobbed in December 1946 as a 
Corporal. 
Horace Pinfold joined the Army in May 1944 and trained with the King's Royal Rifle 
Corps before joining the Leicester Regiment. He transferred to the 2°d Battalion in 
October 1944 after the Venraij battle and was in `B' Company. Horace served 
throughout the remainder of the campaign and also in the Middle East, where he was 
Company Clerk, until his demob in December 1947, when he trained to be an 
electrician. 
Jack Reid enlisted in the East Yorkshire Regt in March 1930 and served in India before 
the Second World War. He was evacuated from Dunkirk in 1940, and after landing on 
D-Day, served as a Dispatch Rider with HQ Company during the north-west Europe 
campaign. At Venraij Jack was injured after being knocked off his motorcycle and was 
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evacuated to the UK. He was demobbed in 1946. Post-war Jack worked in the stores 
department at Rolls Royce and then in the Qualcast factory. 
Ray Robinson was conscripted into the Army in June 1944 and underwent training in 
Northern Ireland. He joined the 2d Battalion in January 1945 and served with `D' 
Company. Ray was wounded while training Belgian cadets post-war and served in the 
Middle East until his demob in October 1947. 
John Scruton MM joined the East Yorkshire Regt at Beverley in July 1941, having 
completed his degree course, and remained at the depot as a training instructor until 
March 1943, when he was posted to the 2nd Battalion. John served with `C' Company 
and landed on D-Day. He was promoted from Corporal to Lance Sergeant, and he 
remained with the battalion until he was seriously wounded in October 1944. After 
successful treatment, John served with the Mobile Disarmament Unit in Norway. Post- 
war, John worked for Reckitt and Colman (Overseas) Ltd in a managerial role. 
Wilf Slater was conscripted into the Army in March 1944 and was posted to `D' 
Company of the 2°d Battalion at Tilberg in November of that year. He fought at the 
Schaddenhof farm battle during which he was wounded in both legs, and served in the 
Middle East as a truck driver after recuperation. He was demobbed as a Corporal in 
May 1948 and drove coal lorries post-war. 
Arthur Smith joined the East Yorkshire Regt in Beverley in June 1940 and served with 
the Signal Platoon. He landed with `D' Company on D-Day and served until December 
1944 when he suffered hearing impairment and was posted to Military / Civilian Affairs 
in Antwerp. After taking a course he transferred to the RASC until demob in March 
1946. 
Leonard Steel was called up at the age of 18 and undertook initial training with the 
Green Howards Regiment in 1942. He joined the 2°d Battalion in time for the exercises 
in Scotland and landed on D-Day carrying a Brigade wireless set. He served throughout 
the north-west Europe campaign and at the time of his interview, was staying in a 
nursing home, having undergone amputation of both legs. His interview was 
consequently limited in scope, due to his need to rest. 
Wilf Todd enlisted in the Army in November 1941 and joined the 70th (Young 
Soldiers) Battalion of the West Yorkshire Regiment. He transferred to the East 
Yorkshire Regt and served in `C' Company and the Carrier Platoon. Wilf was wounded 
on D-Day but rejoined the battalion to serve throughout the remainder of the campaign 
as well as the Middle East. He was demobbed as Acting Company Sergeant Major in 
October 1946. Post-war, Wilfjoined the Fire Service for 29 years. 
Les Turner was a Sergeant in the 2°d Battalion, having joined `B' Company before the 
exercises in Scotland and going on to land on D-Day. He was wounded in Normandy 
but returned to the battalion and both he and his brother served until the end of the war. 
Bill Turner, Les' brother, was a Private in the MT section of the 2°d Battalion, driving a 
Bren carrier. He joined the East Yorkshire Regiment at 18, in December 1938, and was 
posted to France with the BEF. His carrier was one of those acting as rearguard during 
the withdrawal towards Dunkirk and he was evacuated with the battalion. 
Ron Walker joined the 2°d Battalion at the beginning of the Second World War and 
served with the BEF in France, before being evacuated from Dunkirk. He volunteered to 
be transferred to the Parachute Regiment in 1942, before the combined exercises in 
Scotland. 
George White was conscripted into the Army in May 1944 and posted initially to the 
York and Lancs Regiment. He joined the Mortar Platoon of the 2°d Battalion in March 
1945. He served in the Middle East and was demobbed in January 1948. Post-war, 
George returned to his previous occupation as a butcher. 
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Partners Interviewed. 
Phyllis Allen and her husband Ron, were married just before he left to go to France 
with the British Expeditionary Force. Phyllis had gone into service at the age of 14, as a 
lady's maid. She followed Ron to Beverley with young children and had difficulty 
finding somewhere to live during the war years. Post-war the couple lived in London 
while Ron played in the Band, then they moved north to Blackpool. 
Elsie Hall and her husband Tommy were married in October 1940, and had a young son 
the following year. Elsie had been a packing case maker before her marriage but moved 
into her sister's house during the war to look after her sister's daughter and her own son, 
while her sister was at work. Post-war, Elsie became a butcher and the couple bought a 
house that Tommy had built. 
Winnie Isherwood met her husband Harold when she was 17 and he was 18. They 
were married when Winnie was 21 and serving in the Wrens as a batwoman. Harold 
landed on D-Day and served throughout the campaign. He suffered from ill-health post- 
war, due to his wartime experiences and retired early after working on the railways and 
down a mine. They returned to Normandy for the 50"' anniversary of D-Day. 
Edna Lumb met her husband Arthur in Beverley when he joined the Army and became 
friends with Edna's brother. Married during the war, Edna worked in munitions, making 
bullets for the RAF, before the birth of her son Peter. Later Edna worked in a mill and 
then a confectionery shop. During the war, Edna lived with her mother. Aller Arthur's 
demob, in January 1946, their first house was a pre-fab, which Edna described as 
`gorgeous'. 
Vera Scruton met John at a dance in Hull, a few days before war was declared. She had 
just started teaching and had been evacuated with children to the Selby area. The couple 
were married in 1943 and Vera managed to visit John at various postings in the UK 
before D-Day. Their daughter was born at the end of the war, and Vera and John moved 
into their first home in Hull. 
Mary Todd and her husband Wilf were married in October 1943 when she was 18 and 
he was already serving with the 2nd Battalion. During the war, Mary sewed uniforms for 
the armed forces and remembers receiving the news by telegram of Wills injury on D- 
Day. Post-war, the couple initially lived with Mary's parents until a pre-fab house 
became available in 1949. Mary eventually became an auxiliary nurse in the maternity 
unit of St. James' Hospital in Leeds. 
Canadian officers corresponded with. 
Jim Fetterly MC joined the Canadian Army in 1940 and volunteered to serve in the 
British Army after three years. He was posted to the 2°d Battalion in May 1944 and 
landed on D-Day in command of a reserve platoon. After receiving a head injury he set 
up a sniper school for three weeks, but asked to be returned to the battalion, with whom 
he remained for the remainder of the campaign. Jim returned to Canada in September 
1945 with the rank of Captain. He worked for an investment company and later sold 
property in Alberta. 
Len Robertson MC, known as `Robbie', joined the Canadian Army in 1940 and by 
1943 he was QMS of the Orderly Room and decided to apply for a commission. He 
volunteered to serve in the British Army and left for the UK in April 1944. Len opted to 
stay with two of his friends, Stirling Reid and Hugh Neily, and all three were posted to 
the 2°d Battalion in time for D-Day. After suffering wounds, Len returned to Canada in 
April 1945 with the rank of Captain, and began work for his pre-war employer, a home 
furnishing company, from which he retired as a Director. 
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Appendix B 
Order of Battle for Sword beach -6 June 1944 T British Infantry Division. 
8th Infantry Brigade 
1st Bn The Suffolk Regiment 
2°a Bn The East Yorkshire Regiment 
1St Bn The South Lancashire Regiment 
9th Infantry Brigade 
2nd Bn The Lincolnshire Regiment 
1st Bn The King's Own Scottish Borderers 
2°a Bn The Royal Ulster Rifles 
185th Infantry Brigade 
2°d Bn The Royal Warwickshire Regiment 
1St Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment 
2°d Bn The King's Shropshire Light Infantry 
HQ 3rd Division 
3rd Recce Regiment RAC 
7th 33rd and 76th Field Regiments, RA 
20th Anti-Tank Regiment, RA 
17th, 246th and 253rd Field Companies, RE 
2 °a Bn The Middlesex Regiment (MG) 
Units under command for initial assault phase: 
27th Armoured Brigade 
13071 8t` Royal Hussars 
The Staffordshire Yeomanry 
The East Riding Yeomanry 
1St (Special Service) Brigade 
3,4 and 6 Commandos 
45 (RM) Commando 
2 Troops 10 (RA) Commando (French) 
1 Troop RM Engineer Commando 
Elements of 79 Armoured Division 22°d Dragoons 
5th Assault Regiment, RE 
218 Bty and HQ 73 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RA 
1 Troop 318 Bty (of 92 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RA) 
263 Field Company, RE 
629 Field Company, RE 
41 RM Commando (from 4 Special Service Brigade) 
3 Troops 5 Independent Armoured Support 
Battery SP, RM 
Beach Groups 
5th Bn The King's Regiment 
1 S` Buckinghamshire Bn 
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Units of 51' Highland Division which landed on D-Day and came under command of 
3rd Division: 
5th Bn The Black Watch 
1St and 517th Bns, The Gordon Highlanders 
Plus elements of: 
Royal Corps of Signals 
Royal Army Service Corps 
Royal Army Medical Corps 
Royal Ordnance Corps 
Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
Corps of Military Police 
Pioneer Corps. 
Sources: 
Remembering D-Day. Personal Histories of Everyday Heroes Martin W Bowman 
(London, 2004) and Tim Kilvert-Jones Sword Beach. British 3`d Infantry Division /27th 
Armoured Brigade. (Barnsley, 2001) 
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Appendix C 
Lt (later Maiort Reginald Rutherford's LCA on D-Day. 
10 Pin HQ 
Lt Rutherford 
Sgt Patterson W 
Pte Peachy 
Pte Wise W 
Pte Williams KIA 
Pte Mitchell 
No 1 Section 
Cpl Hawks KIA 
Cpl Stout KIA 
Pte Stead W 
Pte Wells W 
Pte Senior W 
Pte Scott 
Pte Wilson W 
Pte Gateson 
No 2 Section 
L/Cpl Marsden KIA 
Cpl Ackroyd 
Pte Patterson 
Pte Marsh W 
Pte Rawlins W 
Pte Ambrose W 
Pte Harrison W 
Pte Hopkins KIA 
No 3 Section 
L/Sgt Fenwick KIA 
Pte Ron Major W 
L/Cpl Spiers W 
Pte Taglione 
Pte Burgess W 
Pte Brooks 
Cpl Housley W 
Pte Preston 
LOBs (Left out of Battle) Sgt Clegg and Ptes Seed, Day, Barritt, Rogerson, Mason, and 
Coulthard. 
This table shows the high casualty figures incurred in one platoon during D-Day, with 
fourteen wounded and six killed, leaving just ten men able to advance to the inland 
objectives. 
A copy of the original document, supplied by Alf Ackroyd, who noted what happened 
to the occupants of the LCA, is overleaf. 
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Men of Lt. R. Rutherford's 
LCA on D- Day Supplied by Alf Ackroyd 
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Appendix D 
2nd Battalion East Yorks Christmas Card 1944 
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